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Abstract 
Earlier research on strategic sensegiving has discovered numerous tactics that change leaders 
use to inﬂuence their followers’ mental models. However, these studies have focused only on 
the content of the words spoken during the sensegiving process. This has led to an 
overemphasis of cognitive processes and identity dynamics in the existing theory. At the same 
time, the role of non-cognitive factors and, especially, emotional arousal, in sensegiving has 
been understudied. 
To ﬁll this gap in the sensegiving theory, I analyze sensegiving from an emotional 
perspective in this dissertation. In contrast to previous studies, my empirical analysis goes 
beyond the content of words spoken. Instead, I use video-based, qualitative analyses to 
recognize emotional dynamics from non-verbal cues. A total of 1,252 sensegiving instances, 
which include both the sensegiver’s actions and the sense-receivers’ reactions, are analyzed 
in this way. The instances occurred during a strategic change seminar of a Finnish Property 
Service Company. This analysis is complemented and contextualized by interviews, surveys, 
and ﬁeld observation. 
A process theory of emotional sensegiving is generated through the data analysis. 
Accordingly, emotional sensegiving consists of dozens of micro-sequences that further 
consist of three micro-phases. The micro-phases are increasing arousal, cognitive 
(re)framing, and reinforcing commitment. Emotional arousal that is generated during the ﬁrst 
micro-phase decays slowly and transfers to the later micro-phases. The arousal becomes 
associated with cognitive content that is delivered during the subsequent micro-phases. 
Consequently, the latter content feels more emotional and is better internalized. The use of 
tactics for increasing emotional arousal is supported by a background process which counters 
resistant reactions in a pre-emptive way. 
This dissertation contributes to research on sensegiving in four speciﬁc ways. First, the 
recognition of “increasing emotional arousal” as a sensegiving tactic allows scholars to see 
that the primary purpose of many sensegiving acts is to inﬂuence emotions, not cognitions as 
the previous theory would indicate. Second, the process theory of emotional sensegiving 
explains how emotional arousal can be used to increase the effectiveness of sensegiving in 
organizations. Third, the process theory has implications for the current, identity-based 
sensegiving theories. Most importantly, the need to unfreeze sense-receivers’ identities is 
reduced. Fourth, this thesis illustrates how video-based data collection and analysis methods 
can be used to enrich our understanding of sensegiving. 
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Aikaisempi strategista merkitysten luomista käsittelevä tutkimus on tunnistanut lukuisia 
taktiikoita, joita muutosjohtajat käyttävät vaikuttaakseen seuraajiensa mentaalimalleihin. 
Aikaisemmat tutkimukset ovat kuitenkin keskittyneet lähinnä sanojen sisällön 
analysoimiseen. Tämä on johtanut kognitiivisten tekijöiden ja identiteetin ylikorostamiseen 
nykyisessä teoriassa. Tunteiden ja tiedostamattomien prosessien rooli strategisessa 
vaikuttamisessa on samanaikaisesti jäänyt tutkimatta. 
Pyrin täyttämään tämän tutkimuksen aukon analysoimalla strategista merkitysten luomista 
emotionaalisesta näkökulmasta. Toisin kuin aikaisemmat tutkimukset, analyysini ei rajoitu 
pelkästään sanojen sisältöön. Teen sana-analyysien sijaan videoanalyysin ja tunnistan 
emotionaalisia tekijöitä ei-verbaalisista reaktioista. Kaikkinensa analysoin 1 252 
merkityksenluomistilannetta, jotka sisältävät sekä vaikuttajan teot että vaikutettavien 
reaktiot. Nämä tilanteet toteutuivat erään suomalaisen yrityksen muutosseminaarissa. 
Kyselyt, haastattelut ja havainnointi täydentävät ja kontekstualisoivat tätä videoanalyysiä. 
Analyysin tuloksena syntyy emotionaalinen merkitysten luomisen prosessiteoria. Sen 
mukaan emotionaalinen merkitysten luominen koostuu lukuisista mikrojaksoista, jotka 
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kasvattaminen, kognitiivinen uudelleen määrittely ja sitoutumisen vahvistaminen. 
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myöhempiin mikrovaiheisiin. Tunneintensiteetti assosioituu myöhemmissä mikrovaiheissa 
keskusteltuun sisältöön. Näin ollen jälkimmäinen sisältö tuntuu voimakkaalta ja se 
muistetaan paremmin. Tunneintensiteettiä kasvattavien taktiikoiden käyttöä tukee 
taustaprosessi, joka estää vastustelevat reaktiot etukäteen. 
Tämä väitöskirja edistää tutkimusta neljällä tavalla. Ensimmäiseksi se, että 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Research on strategic change has shifted its focus from structures and processes to 
understanding how cognitive reorientation can be achieved in organizations. During 
the past 20 years, numerous scholars have recognized the importance of realigning 
mental models with the new strategy (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; 
Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Labianca, Gray, & Brass, 2000; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007; 
Rouleau, 2005). However, while this cognitive turn has advanced our understanding of 
strategic change, the latest advances in the research on the human mind are still to be 
incorporated into the theories of strategic change. It has increasingly been recognized 
that emotions have a substantial influence on how people understand things and 
choose to act (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Damasio, 1994, 2003; Hodgkinson & 
Healey, 2008; Hodgkinson & Healey, in press; Huy, 2002; Loewenstein, Rick, & 
Cohen, 2008). Hence, when the purpose is to change what people do in organizations, 
realigning only their conscious thinking and explicit cognitions is not sufficient. 
Instead, change leaders also need to influence their emotions. It is only when people 
“feel connected to the strategy” (McKinsey_Quarterly, 2011, emphasis added; see also, 
Vuori, Healey, & Hodgkinson, 2011) that they really change their behaviors. I 
investigate in this thesis how emotional arousal can be generated and leveraged during 
sensegiving to make people truly internalize the new organizational direction.  
Sensegiving refers to the process of influencing others’ sensemaking and cognitions 
towards a preferred definition of organizational reality (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). 
The current understanding is that people’s sensemaking is much influenced by their 
identities (Mills, 2003; Patriotta & Spedale, 2009; Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, & 
Obstfeld, 2005) and that the route to successful sensegiving, therefore, goes through 
the sense-receivers’ identities (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Pratt, 2000). People are likely 
to accept only those ideas that allow them to maintain a consistent, positive 
understanding of themselves; i.e., only those ideas that fit with their identity needs 
(Weick, 1995: 20). Hence, the existing theory argues, to make people think in radically 
new ways one must first break their existing identities and then build a new identity 
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that is consistent with the new idea (see, Mantere, Schildt, & Sillince, in press; Pratt, 
2000). For example, when CEO Stephen Elop e-mailed that, “Consumer preference for 
Nokia declined worldwide. […] at least some of it has been due to our attitude inside 
Nokia. We poured gasoline on our own burning platform,” (Engadget, 2011) he was 
trying to make Nokia’s employees think that whoever they were and whatever they 
were doing was not going to work; and that they should therefore be open to new 
alternatives.  
Management scholars have recognized a large number of tactics sensegivers use to 
make their followers abandon old thinking and internalize new thinking. The tactics 
range from the use of symbolism (Gioia & Thomas, 1996), metaphors (Hill & 
Levenhagen, 1995), and narratives (Brown, Stacey, & Nandhakumar, 2008) to 
adapting explanation styles (Rouleau, 2005) and using specific framing language (Fiss 
& Zajac, 2006). However, practitioners are still unhappy:  “only one transformation in 
three succeeds [...] It seems that, despite prolific output, the field of change 
management hasn’t led to more successful change programs” (McKinsey Quarterly, 
2009). Likewise, the increased employee withdrawal intentions (IT-Viikko, 2011), 
market share decrease from 30.6% to 25.1% within a few months (Gartner, 2011), and 
the 21% decrease in stock price in one week1 after Nokia’s CEO Stephen Elop’s 
burning platform -sensegiving illustrate how acting exactly as prescribed by the 
orthodox theory can produce bad outcomes. 
There is a fundamental methodological limitation in the existing sensemaking and 
sensegiving studies that largely explains why their advices are insufficient. They have 
only analyzed words written on paper, in the form of interview transcripts, field notes, 
archival materials, and survey answers. Each of the sensemaking (Balogun & Johnson, 
2004, 2005; Bechky & Okhuysen, in press; Grant, Dutton, & Rosso, 2008; Maitlis, 
2005; Quinn & Worline, 2008; Weick, 1988, 1993; but, Whiteman & Cooper, in press, 
is an exception) and sensegiving studies (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia & Thomas, 
1996; Gioia, Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007; Pratt, 
2000; Rouleau, 2005) has only recorded words said during sensemaking/sensegiving 
episodes and then analyzed their content. Yet, much of human communication is non-
verbal (e.g., Choi, Gray, & Ambady, 2005), many things beyond people’s awareness 
                                                 
1
 Elop gave out the burning platform memo on 2011-02-08. Nokia’s stock price decreased from 
11.28 USD to 8.84 USD in seven days. see:  
http://www.google.com/finance?client=ob&q=NYSE:NOK [accessed 2011-07-21] 
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can influence their emotional states (e.g., Russell, 2003), and people interpret any 
information differently depending on their own emotional state (e.g., Izard, 2009). 
When only words are analyzed, all these emotional effects are missed. 
There are three specific points about emotions that are especially relevant for 
sensegiving. First, research has shown that people make choices not based on their 
knowledge but based on their affective reactions to that knowledge (Bechara & 
Damasio, 2005). Hence, it is not sufficient that sensegivers make people cognitively 
know something but they must ensure that they will also affectively feel in a way that 
makes them prefer the intended alternatives. Second, people internalize and remember 
those things that are associated with strong emotional reactions better than neutral 
content (Finn & Roediger, 2011; Phelps, 2006). Hence, to make people remember their 
message, sensegivers should ensure that the sense-receivers react to it emotionally. 
Third, people often misattribute the source of their emotional arousal such that arousal 
created in a previous moment can transfer into a next moment, making whatever 
people hear in the next situation feel highly emotional (see e.g., Foster, Witcher, 
Campbell, & Green, 1998; Zillmann, 1971). Hence, it might be possible for 
sensegivers to manipulate sense-receivers’ emotional arousal first and only then make 
them think that this arousal is triggered by the actual, cognitive message the 
sensegivers are delivering. 
However, the existing sensegiving research has not focused on or has had no access to 
these kinds of emotional dynamics. Even ethnographic sensegiving research (e.g., 
Pratt, 2000), which is supposed to be close to people’s experience, misses a lot of what 
is going on in any situation. A researcher making field notes simply cannot record all 
the facial expressions, changes in the tone of voice, body postures, and other emotional 
cues displayed and exchanged in social situations. Instead, the focus tends to be on the 
words—and the subsequent analyzes tend to focus on the content and meaning of those 
words. Consequently, I argue, the existing sensegiving theory tends to overemphasize 
the cognitive meaning of words said during sensegiving episodes. At the same time, 
the existing sensegiving theory remains ignorant to the emotional influences on the 
way people extract, interpret, remember, and act on the information delivered by 
sensegivers. By way of an illustration, according to the current identity-and-meanings-
dominated sensegiving theory, sending an e-mail saying that “our platform is burning” 
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(as Nokia’s Elop did) should produce the same effect as intensive, emotional, face-to-
face communication of the same message. Yet, it is obvious that this is not the case. 
To fill this gap in the sensegiving research, I studied sensegiving from the emotional 
perspective. The primary data of the study consists of a video of 1,252 sensegiving 
instances. I was able to recognize different types of sensegiving acts and different 
emotional and cognitive reactions to them by comparing how these instances were 
different from and similar to each other. The sensegiving instances occurred during a 
three-day seminar that was a part of the strategic renewal of a large Finnish property 
service company. The video allowed analyzing not only what the sensegiver said but 
also the emotional tone of those words and the sense-receivers’ verbal and nonverbal 
reactions to those words; I had access to the sensegiver’s and the sense-receivers’ 
facial expressions, the volume and pitch of their voices, and their bodily gestures. I 
could replay the video several times, also in slow motion, which ensured that I was 
able to capture much more emotional dynamics than a study relying only on field notes 
or transcripts.  
The video data was contextualized and complemented by various data sources. The 
data included interviews of the seminar participants before and after the seminar, the 
sensegiver, and the change leaders of three firms that had used the sensegiver’s 
services, repeated surveys, and my own participant observation and non-participant 
observation in the seminars. This vast set of data ensured that I could understand the 
contextual meaning and the overall effects of the emotional sensegiving that I was able 
to study through the video. 
A model of emotional sensegiving emerged from my analysis. The model describes 
how sensegivers can leverage emotional arousal to increase the effectiveness of their 
sensegiving. Emotional arousal can first be created with content that is only marginally 
related to the actual, organizationally relevant content of sensegiving. Emotional 
arousal is slow to decay and it can therefore transfer to a next moment. When 
emotional arousal generated by irrelevant content co-exists in sense-receivers with 
organizationally relevant cognitive content, the sense-receivers will associate the 
emotional arousal with the organizationally relevant content and, therefore, remember 
it better and act on it more likely.  
 Introduction 
5 
The arousal effect can be applied through a series of micro-sequences during which 
sensegivers first increase sense-receivers’ emotional arousal levels through a variety of 
tactics; then deliver the cognitive sensegiving message, and finally use tactics that 
reinforce sense-receivers’ commitment to the cognitive message. The smooth flow of 
such micro-sequences is supported by a background process which legitimizes the 
tools the sensegiver is using so that sense-receivers will not get defensive or avoidance 
reactions. The emotional arousal the sense-receivers experience will become 
associated with the cognitive content of sensegiving through arousal transfer and 
misattribution and, hence, increases the impact of the cognitive sensegiving. 
The first contribution of this thesis is the recognition of “increasing emotional arousal” 
as a sensegiving tactic. This discovery of the process of increasing arousal shows that 
many sensegiving actions can be better understood through their emotional effects, not 
cognitive effects. Many sensegiving actions are carried out to influence the emotions 
of sense-receivers, whereas previous sensegiving research has only conceptualized 
sensegiving tactics that directly aim at cognitions. Understanding that immediate 
emotional reactions to sensegiving are relevant also allows recognizing how several, 
seemingly unrelated factors, like jokes, physical activity, and music can significantly 
influence the outcomes of sensegiving.  
Second, the process theory of sensegiving that is inductively developed in this thesis 
sheds further light on how emotions can be leveraged in sensegiving and starts filling 
the above identified gap in the existing research. The model provides an early step for 
an emerging research program that is to fully incorporate emotions into our 
understanding of sensegiving. The model is also relevant from a practical point of 
view and provides a large set of new opportunities for increasing the effectiveness of 
organizational sensegiving.  
As a third contribution, the emergent process theory of emotional sensegiving has 
implications for the existing identity-based views on sensegiving. It complements their 
explanations and also provides an alternative interpretation for many of the findings 
and inferences. Most importantly, the possibility that one can make sensegiving more 
effective by leveraging emotions reduces the need to use identity threats in the process 
of cognitive change in organizations. 
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The fourth contribution of this thesis is a methodological one. The thesis illustrates 
how video-based analysis of sensegiving can be used to move analyses beyond words 
written on paper. The technological developments during the last ten years has made it 
simple and inexpensive to produce digital videos and analyze them using computer 
software. This new development in the tools for making sense of data will inevitably 
lead to more accurate understandings of what happens in organizations in general (see 
also, LeBaron, unspecified) and in sensegiving situations in particular.  
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Next, after the introduction, I will review 
previous research on sensegiving. The third chapter describes the research setting and 
the way I collected and analyzed the data; as well as the limitations of the study. The 
findings are then described in three sections: Chapter four describes the process of 
emotional sensegiving in the change seminar at a concrete level. Chapter five describes 
data showing that the participants’ mental models indeed changed during the seminar. 
The main theoretical finding is presented in chapter six: It presents a process theory of 
emotional sensegiving that emerges from the data analysis in combination with the 
existing literature and theoretical reasoning. This section also illustrates how the model 
can be applied in practice. Chapter seven describes the theoretical and research 
implications of the process theory of emotional sensegiving. Chapter eight is the 
conclusion which summarizes the main contributions of this dissertation. 
  7 
2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON SENSEGIVING 
This dissertation is about how leaders and change agents can more effectively change 
the mental models of other people by leveraging emotional arousal. I use the word 
sensegiving to refer to the process of influencing others’ mental models. Also several 
other concepts could be used to characterize similar attempts, such as persuasion, 
influencing, manipulation, and teaching.2 My aim is to contribute to the management 
theories of sensegiving. This study, therefore, builds on sensegiving theories that are 
relevant and legitimate in the management context. These are the theories that are 
currently used to understand how leaders and change agents promote strategic changes 
in organizations. These theories are also used for deriving practical lessons for leaders 
to follow, as the Nokia CEO Stephen Elop burning platform example in the 
introduction illustrated. In essence, to improve the way we understand strategic 
sensegiving and the lessons practitioners take from our theories, the sensegiving 
theories that are relevant in the management context need to be expanded.  
The research on sensegiving builds on the research on sensemaking. Understanding 
how human mental models change is an optimal starting point when the goal is to 
ultimately understand how they can be changed. When one understands which factors 
contribute to changes in the way people understand situations, one can then 
intentionally manipulate those factors to cause the people’s mental models to change 
in the desired way. In this thesis, I use the concept of sensemaking to refer to the 
process during which people form and change their mental models of the situations in 
                                                 
2
 Each of these processes results in changes in what people think about a topic. For example, 
when someone speaks about Marxists’ thoughts about organizing, and the person hearing the 
speech changes his understanding of how ownership structures influence people’s well-being, 
there are several ways to interpret the situation: (1) He was persuaded to admit that the firm 
structure is not optimal for employee well-being, (2) he was influenced to change his attitudes 
toward the owners, (3) he was manipulated to support the left-wing political coalition in the 
next election, or (4) he was taught about interdependencies between different units and a theory 
that has been developed to describe them. By this example, I want to illustrate that effective 
sensegiving skills can be used for several purposes and the moral value of any sensegiving 
attempt is not in the theory of sensegiving but the person applying the theory is responsible for 
his or her aims.  
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which they are based on the cues they have extracted (Weick, 1995). I define 
sensegiving as the intentional manipulation of the cues other people extract and 
process, consciously or sub-consciously, to make them change their mental models in 
a desired way. 
Scholars have, for long, studied how people form understandings of situations and 
make decisions based on these understandings. Different perspectives make different 
assumptions about the nature of sensemaking and of the factors that are central to 
sensemaking. These assumptions have significant implications on how sensegiving 
should be done. The assumptions start from full rationality and bounded rationality, 
and then move on to the role of heuristics and biases, cognitive maps, identity, and 
subtle emotional influences. 
However, the sensegiving literature has not kept pace with the latest developments in 
the understanding of human cognition. During the past 15 years, researchers have 
recognized how subtle emotional factors influence people’s sensemaking in a major 
way (Damasio, 1994; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008, in press; Loewenstein et al., 2008). 
A person can interpret and remember the same information in drastically different 
ways depending on which emotional state he or she is in when hearing the information. 
Yet, as the literature review below shows, no-one has so far investigated how 
organizational sensegivers could leverage such emotional effects in sensegiving. For 
example, which kinds of cues should they provide for sense-receivers to make them be 
in an emotional state that increases the chances that they will change their mental 
models as intended by the sensegiver? 
The earliest ideas of sensemaking assumed it to be a fully rational process. 
Accordingly, people have access to all relevant information and are able to process it 
immediately and reach an accurate assessment of the situation. Hence, to change 
people’s understanding of a situation, one just needs to provide new information. 
However, this perspective was strongly criticized by Simon (March & Simon, 
1958/1993; Simon, 1947; 1955) who developed the concepts of “bounded rationality” 
and “satisficing search.” Accordingly, people try to be rational but there is a limit to 
how much information they can collect and process; hence, the order in which a 
sensegiver communicates information to sense-receivers influences how they will 
understand the situation. This happens because they will mainly pay attention to the 
information that comes first. 
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Two separate perspectives emerged to explain how individuals cope with bounded 
rationality. The heuristics and biases perspective (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 
1982) emphasizes the process of thinking. Accordingly, people reduce their need for 
cognitive processing by applying (consciously or non-consciously) simple rules such 
as “if others believe it, I should believe it as well.” A sensegiver can apply these ideas 
by framing his message in a way that leverages such biases (Cialdini, 1993). The 
second perspective, cognitive maps (Bougon, Weick, & Binkhorst, 1977; Huff, 1990), 
has shown that people maintain internal representations of their environment and use 
(consciously or non-consciously) these representations to select which information 
they should pay attention to and how they should interpret it. The implications for 
sensegiving are that to make people change their understanding of a situation, one 
either needs to make new information salient from the point of view of the old 
cognitive map or first “unfreeze” it (see e.g., Gardner, 2004).3  
The currently dominating perspective in the management context maintains that 
identity is central to sensemaking. According to this view, people’s definition of what 
is happening depends on how they define themselves; and because they want to 
maintain a stable and positive definition of themselves, they tend to interpret situations 
in ways that support their identity concerns (Weick, 1995: 18-24). The implication for 
sensegiving is that to change the way people understand situations one must first help 
people to redefine their identities (e.g., Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Pratt, 2000) or link the 
new understanding to the old identity in a constructive way (Heath & Heath, 2010; see 
also, Plowman et al., 2007).4  
However, as stated above, these perspectives have not incorporated the latest findings 
of the subtle emotional effects on human cognition. Neither has a separate literature 
stream of emotional sensegiving emerged. In the following pages, I will first review 
the existing perspectives on sensemaking and sensegiving in more detail and discuss 
how some of their findings could be interpreted or expanded from the emotional 
                                                 
3
 All the perspectives assume that people have some kinds of internal representations of the 
environment and the purpose of sensegiving is to change these representations. I call these 
representations mental models. The stream of literature that I call cognitive maps perspective 
has given a central role to the representations themselves in the process of their change. To 
differentiate this more central role, I call the representations cognitive maps when discussing 
this perspective. If not cutting hairs, mental models and cognitive maps could be treated as 
synonyms. 
4
 When sensemaking and sensegiving scholars, including myself, speak about identity, they are 
referring to social identity rather than personal identity (see Ashforth et al., 2008: 327, for this 
observation; and Tajfel & Turner, 1986, for the difference between social and self-identity). 
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perspective. I will then review theory and empirical findings on how emotional factors 
influence sensemaking. I will discuss how these factors might be leveraged in 
sensegiving and how I will explore them empirically. The overall review is 
summarized in Table on the next page. 
2.1 Fully Rational Perspective 
2.1.1 Sensemaking from the fully rational perspective 
The fully rational perspective on sensemaking has been used to describe how people 
make decisions. The perspective is still (often implicitly) assumed in many theoretical 
perspectives ranging from economics (see e.g., Lucas, 1997) to strategy (see e.g., 
Furrer, Thomas, & Goussevskaia, 2008). In extreme forms of fully rational ideas, 
people are assumed to be able to access all information relevant to their situation and 
process that information without delay. Hence, people are assumed to constantly 
understand the external reality with full accuracy, even if it was changing rapidly. In 
addition, people are assumed to be able to envision all possible action alternatives in 
any situation and calculate their expected utility. Hence, people are seen to be able to 
make optimal decisions at any point in time.  
The fully rational model of sensemaking does not have to assume any kinds of stable 
internal presentations for people, such as mental models or schemas. People are 
constantly able to access the information about the environment directly and 
reconstruct their understanding; hence, there is no need to store ideas, meanings, or 
knowledge from the previous moment. The consequence for studying cognitive change 
is that cognitions should change whenever environments change and there is no reason 
why cognitions would lag behind environmental changes. 
2.1.2 Implications of the fully rational perspective for sensegiving 
The implications of the fully rational perspective for sensegiving are straightforward. 
As people change their understandings without delay when they receive information 
about changes in the environment, a sensegiver just needs to provide such information 
to people to change their understandings. The form, style, or amount of the 
information, or the way of presenting the information should not matter. As long as 
people have the new information, they will change their evaluation of the situation.  
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However, the fully rational perspective is not an accurate description of how the 
human mind works, even though the rational assumptions are sufficient for some 
theories describing macro-level phenomena. The first inaccurate assumption relates to 
the time needed for absorbing and understanding information. It has been estimated 
that people can consciously process about 45 bits of information per second 
(Dijksterhuis, Aarts, & Smith, 2005) which equals to reading one page of text per 
minute. Obviously, then, people cannot change their understanding of a situation 
immediately after receiving all the new relevant information about a situation. Second, 
as the empirical findings reviewed below show, the way people process information 
tends also to be biased, not accurate. Third, everyday experience shows that people do 
not always believe or remember all the information they have received. Hence, just 
providing all the information is not a good strategy for sensegiving. 
2.2 Bounded Rationality 
2.2.1 Sensemaking from the bounded rationality perspective 
The bounded rationality perspective emerged as a critique against models that assumed 
full rationality. Simon and March (Simon, 1947; March & Simon, 1958) recognized 
the first of the above listed limitations of the rational model; that people are unable to 
collect and process all information relevant to any situation or choice. They recognized 
that when making choices, people do not systematically evaluate each alternative and 
then choose the best one. Instead, they search alternatives in a sequential order and 
choose the first one that satisfies the criteria they have set for the decision. For 
example, when a couple is buying an apartment, they may set three criteria for an 
acceptable house: (1) price less than 300,000 euro, (2) located within 10 kilometers 
from the office, and (3) larger than 80 square meters. Then they start searching for the 
apartment. They take a look at the first one, check it against the criteria, and if it does 
not meet the criteria, they move on to the next apartment. Once they find one that 
meets all the three criteria, they will buy the house. The solution is satisficing. 
However, there is no guarantee that the solution is optimal because they never 
searched all alternatives; it is possible that there would have been apartments that are 
cheaper, located closer to the office, and larger. But because it is impossible to 
evaluate all alternatives due to time constraints, they will settle for the one that is good 
enough.  
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The same logic of satisficing search can be illustrated in an organizational context. For 
instance, when firms are hiring new employees, they often get hundreds of 
applications. Often, they have a set of criteria (they can be implicitly defined) that the 
candidate chosen should satisfy. A busy manager then starts going through the pile of 
applications and picks up, for example, the first three ones that match the satisficing 
criteria. The manager may not even read the rest of the applications. Instead, he invites 
the first three candidates that met the criteria to an interview. Similarly, when firms are 
choosing strategic actions, they may develop a small number of alternatives. They use 
a set of criteria such as expected profitability, risks, and possible strategic 
consequences to evaluate the alternatives. If they find one that is good enough along 
these criteria, the firm is likely to choose that one—without ever even developing a 
comprehensive set of alternatives it would have in that market situation. They do not 
develop them because they do not have the time and resources to think about every 
possible scenario and because the chosen alternative already seems good enough. 
The search logic for decision alternatives can also be interpreted to describe the 
process of forming understandings of situations (see also, Rudolph, Morrison, & 
Carroll, 2009). When people are making sense of a situation, they are exposed to a set 
of cues from the environment and they can generate alternative explanations of what is 
happening. A fully rational account of such a situation would maintain that they 
observe all the cues from the environment and consider all the alternative explanations, 
and then choose the explanation that is fully consistent with the cues. The boundedly 
rational process, on the other hand, would follow the logic of satisficing search: people 
observe some set of cues and consider them against the first explanation of the 
situation that comes into their mind. If the first explanation is satisficing, they will 
consider it as the explanation of the situation. Formally, one could say that an 
explanation is satisficing when it explains 45% of the variance observed, or casually, 
when the explanation seems to account for the most important cases. However, if 
people consider that the first explanation is not good enough, they will consider an 
alternative explanation and/or observe more cues. Once they have recognized a 
satisficing explanation and, thus, constructed a mental model of the situation, they will 
reduce active attention to the cues and stop critically evaluating their mental model.  
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2.2.2 Sensegiving from the bounded rationality perspective 
The general implication of bounded rationality for sensegiving is that people will 
mainly pay attention to the information they hear first. They will not systematically 
consider everything a sensegiver is saying but make up their mind as soon as they 
reach a satisficing explanation of the situation. If the sensegiver does not convince the 
sense-receivers fast enough, the satisficing explanation can be that the sensegiver is 
not worth listening. Once the conclusion has been made, people will reduce active 
attention to the sensegiver’s words and are not likely to revise their emergent 
understanding of the sensegiver. 
 In addition to establishing the sensegivers’ credibility, one should consider how 
bounded rationality influences which alternative the sense-receivers choose to believe. 
The targets of sensegiving are in the process of developing or changing their 
understanding of an organizational issue or situation. There can be many explanations 
of the situation and the sense-receivers are likely to choose the first plausible 
explanation that they hear; and then stop paying active attention to the issue. Hence, to 
give sense effectively, one should provide the preferred alternative first (see also, 
March & Simon, 1958: chapter 6).  
Also the supporting evidence for the preferred alternative should be provided early. If 
sense-receivers are exposed to evidence that is against the preferred alternative before 
hearing the supporting evidence, they may reject the alternative before even hearing 
the supportive evidence. On the other hand, they might accept the alternative after 
hearing the supporting evidence and never even consider the conflicting evidence, if 
the supporting evidence is presented first.  
Empirical findings are consistent with the lessons derived from the bounded rationality 
perspective. For instance, a deductive presentation style, in which sensegivers first 
give a key argument and then describe the supporting evidence in a prioritized order, 
before moving on to the background and less critical details, has been found to be 
more effective than an inductive style (see, Huczynski, 2004: 293). Also lessons like 
“it’s better to give one excellent reason than ten good reasons” (Bechwith, 1997: 173-
174) and “clarity should be your primary goal” (Starbuck, 1999) are consistent with 
this view.  
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March and Simon (1958) also described what triggers the search in the first place. This 
is a crucial question for sensegiving as well, because, if it is true that people stop 
paying attention to cues and critically evaluating their mental model once they have 
formed the first satisficing explanation, then further changing their mental models 
should be impossible. So, what triggers the search for a better understanding of a 
situation? March and Simon argued that individuals have a more general aspiration 
level which refers to acceptable outcomes. For example, as long as my understanding 
of reality allows me to function smoothly in social interactions, I can keep going on as 
usual. However, if my social interactions suddenly become awkward, it might trigger 
me to ask “what is going on?” Hence, I would again start paying active attention to the 
cues and evaluating new explanations against the set of satisficing criteria. Likewise, 
firms are likely to revise their strategies only after performance declines (see e.g., 
Huff, Huff, & Thomas, 1992).  
The point that not meeting the aspiration level triggers the search implies that 
sensegivers should first show sense-receivers that their current understandings are not 
good enough. Sensegivers should somehow show that the old understandings people 
hold do not enable them to function in ways that produce the outcomes they want to 
achieve. In this way they can make the sense-receivers actively listen to and process 
the information the sensegivers then provide to change their understandings. (There 
might also be other ways to make the sense-receivers pay active attention to the 
sensegiving message and process it but the bounded rationality perspective does not 
provide them.) Once the sensegiver gets their active attention, he or she should follow 
the lessons derived from the logic of sequential, satisficing search.  
There are also sensegiving situations where people cannot leave the sensegiving 
situation. In most extreme cases, prisoners of war, who are being brainwashed, can 
undergo months of intense sensegiving and they are forced to pay full attention to the 
message. In organizationally more relevant cases, companies arrange mandatory 
seminars for employees—like the one analyzed in this thesis. The bounded rationality 
perspective does not provide completely clear implications of what happens in such 
instances. At some point in time in such seminars, people will probably have found a 
satisficing explanation of the seminar content. Hence, their natural reaction would be 
to stop searching for better explanations. However, the situation can force them to be 
active. This might make some of them revise their first choice but others may remain 
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mentally passive and hold on to their first explanation. A question emerges, how can a 
sensegiver maintain the participants’ activity levels for extended periods of time, 
without making them believe that the understandings they formed at the early phases 
of the seminar are invalid?  
Another question that emerges when looking at the bounded rationality perspective is, 
“are there other ways, in addition to the sequential search, that people use to cope with 
their limited ability to process relevant information?” This question is partially 
answered by the heuristics and biases perspective as well as by the cognitive map 
perspective.  
2.3 Heuristics and Biases 
2.3.1 Sensemaking from the heuristics and biases perspective 
Soon after Simon’s work was published, several scholars studied how individuals 
simplify the task of making sense of complex set of cues. The most central piece in 
this work is Kahneman’s (Kahneman et al., 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) 
research on heuristics and biases. They found that people use “a limited number of 
heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks” and that while “In general, these 
heuristics are quite useful [they] sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974: 1124). 
An often described bias Tversky and Kahneman (1974) recognized is the ignorance of 
base rates: For example, when people are first told that Steve is a helpful, shy and 
introverted person and then asked whether he is more likely a librarian or a salesman, 
people tend to answer that he is more likely to be a librarian. They provide this answer 
because Steve fits the stereotype of a librarian and does not fit the stereotype of a 
salesman. Yet, there are far more salesmen than librarians and, hence, it should be 
more likely that he is a salesman, not a librarian. The process of estimating the 
probability based on the stereotypes consumes less cognitive effort and is, therefore, 
applied. 
Anchoring is another example of the biases recognized by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974). Anchoring refers to the effect that “different starting points yield different 
estimates, which are biased toward the initial values” (p. 14). For example, when 
individuals are asked to estimate the product 8*7*6*5*4*3*2*1 they systematically 
give higher answers than individuals who are asked to estimate the product 
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1*2*3*4*5*6*7*8 because the first task starts with higher values. Not surprisingly, 
this effect is nowadays a part of many negotiation strategy toolsets: when you are the 
one to set the initial price, the outcome is supposed to become anchored to that initial 
value (e.g., Hammond, Keeney, & Raiffa, 1998). 
Besides Tversky and Kahneman (1974), also several classic experiments have been 
associated with this school of thought. These experiments include, for example, 
Milgram’s  (1974) obedience to authority studies which showed that people are willing 
to do many things that go against their own judgment if authority figures ask them to 
do so. Another example is studies showing that people infer what they should do in 
potentially dangerous situations from the behavior of others (Latane & Darley, 1969; 
1968). These studies showed that instead of processing information and trying to make 
sense of the observed cues directly, people often simplified the situation by looking at 
others and (subconsciously) chose to react in the same way as others were reacting. 
Most dramatically, they relied on this heuristic even when physical cues, such as 
smoke, strongly pointed to different behaviors than the behaviors of the other people. 
2.3.2 Implications of the heuristics and biases perspective for sensegiving 
Cialdini (1993) popularized the idea that one could influence people by using their 
heuristics. If a message is communicated in a way that triggers any of the heuristics 
people have, the people are more likely to accept the persuasive message. For 
example, the above mentioned finding that people often look at cues of how to behave 
from the behaviors of others rather than directly making sense of the whole set of cues 
constitutes the social proof bias. To apply the social proof bias, when a sensegiver 
wants to convince people of an argument, he or she should show that other people 
already believe him or her. Likewise, a sensegiver might communicate his message in 
a way that activates appropriate stereotypes and makes people ignore base rates, when 
trying to develop support for an unlikely alternative. In a third example, Cialdini 
referred also to Festinger’s (1957) work on cognitive dissonance and derived a 
“commitment and consistency” bias from his work (even though Festinger did much 
more than showed this tendency). Accordingly, if a person is first made to take a minor 
voluntary action supporting a certain attitude, that person is likely to change his or her 
attitude to be consistent with the action. Consequently, he or she will become more 
likely to take more substantial actions aligned with the new attitude. 
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Scholars have also investigated when people are most likely to fall victim to the 
heuristic-based influencing. A central and a peripheral route to persuasion and attitude 
change have been recognized (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986; Chaiken, 
1980). The central route refers to deliberate, effortful processing of the message 
relevant cues, whereas the peripheral route refers to making relatively automatic 
inferences based on message irrelevant cues, such as the sensegiver’s formal status. It 
has been found empirically that people who are motivated are less likely to rely on 
heuristics when making sense of situations. The motivation can be internal to people, 
such as the need for cognition that makes some people always prefer an active way of 
thinking (Cacioppo et al., 1986). The motivation can also be created externally; for 
instance, created motivation by telling the research subjects that they are expected to 
discuss the content of the message in the future (Chaiken, 1980). These findings 
highlight that while the heuristics perspective promises nearly magical tools for 
persuasion, there are several ways people can counter these tactics; and that the higher 
the stakes, the more likely they are to do so.  
It should be noted that while the early research on heuristics tended to emphasize their 
negative effects on sensemaking, more recent research has started to highlight the 
positive outcomes of using heuristics. In fact, the most recent review on heuristic 
decision making defined them as follows: “A heuristic is a strategy that ignores part of 
the information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or 
accurately than more complex methods” (Gigerenzer, 2011, emphasis added). The 
central argument is that in complex and uncertain environments heuristics have high 
ecological validity and they actually perform better than more elaborate decision tools, 
such as complex statistical algorithms. Examples of application include the prediction 
of heart-condition in emergency wards (Green & Mehr, 1997) and the prediction of 
winners at the Wimbledon tennis tournament (Scheibehenne & Bröder, 2007). In the 
management context, Bingham, Eisenhardt, and others (Bingham & Eisenhardt, in 
press; Bingham, Eisenhardt, & Furr, 2007; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) have studied 
how heuristics are a part of dynamic capabilities and capability development.  
The positive heuristics view has not yet been modified for influencing purposes. 
However, it is easily imaginable that so will be done soon. Heuristics rely on the fact 
that complex patterns (e.g., fire; heart condition) produce certain surface 
manifestations (e.g., smoke; simple measure). In natural settings, such manifestations 
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are not likely to occur without the underlying complex pattern. However, if someone 
was to artificially produce similar surface manifestations, the person using the 
heuristic would be trigged to act according to the heuristic. For example, a middle-
manager might artificially manufacture figures that are used as the key inputs for 
heuristic decision making if he or she wanted the decision makers to favor his or her 
suggestion. 
2.4 Cognitive Maps 
2.4.1 Sensemaking from the cognitive maps perspective 
Each perspective reviewed here assumes some sort of a cognitive presentation for 
people. I have referred to these representations as mental models that contain beliefs 
and attitudes about the world. I have so far discussed how bounded rationality and 
heuristics and biases influence the process of developing mental models of the 
environment, and how these influences should be taken into account in sensegiving. In 
this section, I review literature that has discussed how these mental representations 
themselves influence the process of their development. To provide some conceptual 
clarity, I call this perspective “Cognitive Map” perspective, instead of mental model 
perspective. The most central thing to note is that this perspective assumes that the 
cognitive presentations themselves influence the process of extracting and interpreting 
cues which is to lead to change in the cognitive presentations themselves. To highlight 
this recursive process and bidirectional influence between mental models and 
information processing, I call the cognitive representations “cognitive maps.” Yet, it 
should be remembered that talking about change in cognitive maps is tantamount to 
talking about change in mental models. The only difference is that mental models are 
not necessarily assumed to influence the process of their change whereas cognitive 
maps are assumed to have a central role in the process of their change.  
Psychologists started studying the cognitive maps people develop of their 
environments more than fifty years ago. Tolman (1948) studied how rats found their 
way through mazes. His main finding was that rats develop spatial maps that locate 
different entities in a two-dimensional space rather that strip maps that would prescribe 
whether the rats should turn left or right in each choice point. The main evidence for 
this conclusion was the fact that the rats were able to find the shortest way to the 
reward even though the specific turn-points in the maze were changed. Hence, the rats 
knew where the reward was rather than which combination of turns would lead to the 
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reward. From this he also concluded that humans similarly construct cognitive maps of 
reality, rather than merely learn action sequences that lead to rewards. 
Another early scholar to study cognitive maps was Piaget (1954). He studied how 
children form understandings of their surroundings and recognized that they mentally 
construct maps5 that allow them to function. He also recognized that these maps are 
used and developed in two ways. Assimilation refers to a process where people 
interpret the surroundings through the map and classify environmental objects 
according to the map. Assimilation can lead to incremental changes in the cognitive 
maps, such as refining some element or dividing an element into two sub-elements. 
The second process, accommodation, refers to more radical changes in the cognitive 
map. It occurs when people realize that their current map does not explain reality and 
then construct a new map in bottom-up fashion from the environmental cues they have 
observed. Later scholars have developed similar concepts to assimilation and 
accommodation, such as type I vs. type II learning (Bateson, 1972), first-order vs. 
second-order change (Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974), single-loop vs. double-
loop learning (Argyris, 1976; Argyris & Schön, 1974), or business vs. strategic 
learning (Kuwada, 1998).  
One of the first applications of cognitive maps in the management context was the 
study by Bougon, Weick & Binkhorst (1977). They carried out a relatively descriptive 
study of the cognitive maps held by jazz orchestra members. This study showed that 
some elements are seen as antecedents and other elements as consequences in 
cognitive maps and that people tend to believe that they have more power over the 
consequences than the antecedents. This study laid a foundation for later management 
studies that focused on how managers’ cognitive maps influence the way they interpret 
their environment and how these maps change or do not change after radical 
environmental changes.  
In the nineties, several scholars recognized that managers’ cognitive maps tend to lag 
behind environmental changes and cause them to make poor decisions. Barr, Stimpert, 
and Huff (1992) studied the US railroad industry and recognized that while some 
                                                 
5
 Piaget actually used the concept ”schema” to describe the mental representations the children 
constructed. While some scholars might recognize nuanced differences between the different 
constructs, for the purposes of this review and dissertation, it is sufficient to treat the different 
constructs as interchangeable, as has been done in the management context in general (see 
Walsh, 1995). 
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managers recognized the environmental changes, they failed to think through their 
implications and integrate them to their cognitive maps and strategy. Huff et al. (1992) 
argued in a simulation paper that only cumulative stress (cumulative bad results and 
evidence inconsistent with cognitive maps) triggers cognitive maps to change. 
Hodgkinson (1997) carried out the first prospective longitudinal, quantitative study of 
changes in cognitive maps and recognized that managers’ cognitive maps of 
competition did not change over an 18-month period, despite major structural changes 
in the industry. Finally, Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) showed how Polaroid failed to 
adapt to the digital era, even though it had the necessary capabilities and resources, 
because the management held on to old cognitive maps that contained assumptions 
that would have been valid only in the analogical era. The basic message from each of 
these studies is that cognitive maps tend to change only after a vast amount of 
contradicting evidence has accumulated. The basic explanation has been the human 
tendency to mainly look for evidence that confirms the existing assumptions (see, 
Neisser, 1976; Wason, 1968) and the tendency to interpret any evidence through the 
cognitive maps (like in Piaget’s assimilation). 
I have synthesized much of the existing cognitive map literature in a conceptual model 
that describes the process of cognitive map change (Vuori, 2008; Vuori & Laamanen, 
2008). The model is presented in Figure 1 below. Accordingly, people first develop 
some “basic beliefs” that describe some central environmental fact. They construct the 
basic beliefs by observing and interpreting the environmental cues. In the second 
stage, people derive additional, “derived beliefs”, from the basic belief. These derived 
beliefs can be described as consequences or implications of the basic belief(s) and/or 
additional descriptive beliefs that partly get their justification from the basic belief 
rather than the environmental cues directly. Hence, a cognitive map has been formed 
and this cognitive map guides the scanning, interpretation, action, and reflection 
processes of the individual possessing the map. However, as the environment keeps 
changing, cues which are inconsistent with the cognitive map eventually emerge. At 
first, the individual is likely to ignore these cues (cf. assimilation); however, once 
enough of contradicting cues have accumulated, the whole cognitive map is likely to 
collapse and the person starts building a new cognitive map from the scratch (cf. 
accommodation). The model is presented here only as a heuristic tool to facilitate the 
discussion of how sensegivers can leverage the existing knowledge of cognitive maps. 
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Figure 1: A synthesis model of the literature on cognitive map development (Vuori & 
Laamanen, 2008) 
2.4.2 Implications of the cognitive maps perspective for sensegiving 
General implications for sensegiving can be drawn from the cognitive maps literature. 
First, because cognitive maps influence which information people will pay attention to, 
merely providing information is insufficient. Instead, that information must somehow 
be made salient to the interpreters, even if their cognitive maps would not 
automatically focus attention on that information. Second, because the cognitive maps 
also influence how sense-receivers will interpret the information, the interpretation 
process should also be aided externally. A sensegiver should walk through the 
implications of his or her message and actively counter alternatives. If a sensegiver 
does not provide such a step-by-step instruction for interpreting the new information 
and its implications, sense-receivers are likely to use the new information to reinforce 
their old cognitive maps due to the confirmation bias and selective attention rather than 
to revise their cognitive maps. Third, before trying to force a new cognitive map, a 
sensegiver should make the old cognitive map collapse by providing contradicting 
evidence and describing how it invalids the existing cognitive map. In this way, the 
sense-receivers should become more open to alternative perspectives.  
While there is surprisingly little research on the implications of cognitive maps for 
sensegiving, scholars have developed training interventions to help managers change 
their cognitive maps. These studies imply that cognitive maps may change when 
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individuals process new information; however, they may also react defensively to new 
information and choose not to revise their mental models. 
Consider the study of Ackermann and Eden (2010) as an example of management 
interventions for updating cognitive maps. They studied software tools that allow 
managers to explicate their beliefs visually. They described a method in which each 
manager first draws his or her own cognitive map on a computer screen, in the same 
virtual space as other members of the management team. Then the managers examine 
each others’ maps and build links between them and/or change their own maps. In the 
empirical data that Ackermann and Eden described, some of the managers ended up 
changing their cognitive maps quite radically during the exercise, while some made 
only cosmetic changes. Similar findings were made also by El Sawy and Pauchant 
(1988) who found that cognitive maps tended to change when group members 
discussed new environmental information. Hence, being exposed to new information 
and being forced to process it can lead to changes in cognitive maps. However, group 
interaction may also amplify biases if alternative perspectives are suppressed (Janis, 
1972; see also, Vuori, 2011a). 
However, people sometimes react negatively when someone challenges their cognitive 
maps and tries to change them. Hodgkinson and Wright (2002) described how they 
tried to use a scenario-planning technique to make a top management team revise their 
cognitive maps. The intervention failed because “the participants adopted a series of 
defensive avoidance strategies [that] served as a means of coping with the 
unacceptably high levels of decisional stress, which arose as a result of having to 
confront a variety of alternatives, each with potentially threatening consequences for 
the long-term well-being of the organization” (p. 949). The implication for sensegiving 
is that attempts to invalidate sense-receivers’ cognitive maps can fail if they reveal too 
strong a threat for the individuals holding those maps. The identity perspective on 
sensemaking and sensegiving sheds further light on this effect. 
2.5 Identity 
2.5.1 Sensemaking from the identity perspective 
The identity perspective on sensemaking can be traced back to Mead (1934) who 
theorized how mind, self, and society are related. He described how people learn to 
understand who they are by looking at themselves through the eyes of the others; and 
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argued that the self that is created in the process (the “me”) influences how they make 
sense of the world and choose to act: “we normally organize our memories upon the 
string of our self” (p. 135) and “what occurs takes place not simply in his own mind, 
but rather that his mind is the expression in his own conduct of this social situation … 
Mind is nothing but the importation of this external process into the conduct of the 
individual … ” (p. 188). Mead argued that the socially learned “me” influences 
people’s behavior so much because it is the way people coordinate their behaviors and, 
thus, maintain a functioning social order. The sensemaking and sensegiving literatures 
have regarded this social aspect of identity as central and when referring to identity, 
sensemaking and sensegiving scholars refer to what is called social identity in the 
psychological research (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008: 327). 
A second important early work in this stream of research is Berger & Luckmann 
(1966). Like Mead, they described how social interaction increases and stabilizes 
people’s understanding of themselves, which will also stabilize the way they 
understand reality: “I hear myself as I speak … as I objectivate my own being by 
means of language, my own being becomes massively and continuously available to 
myself … and I can spontaneously respond to it” (p. 53). Hence, the way someone 
understands himself or herself influences what he or she will say and do.   
Weick brought the centrality of identity into the management discourse on 
sensemaking. In 1995, he defined the seven properties of sensemaking and “Grounded 
in identity construction” was the first of them. He argues, following (and citing) Mead, 
that the individual is constantly trying to define himself or herself, hearing several 
alternative conversations in his or her head, and imagining alternative situations that 
would define himself or herself in different ways. Most centrally, Weick argues, 
“Depending on who I am, my definition of what is ‘out there’ will also change” (p. 
20), which implies that identity has a major influence on which kinds of mental models 
people construct of their environments and how they potentially update them. Usually, 
people prefer to interpret situations in ways that allow them to maintain a consistent 
view of themselves as good individuals who are capable of influencing the course of 
events. For example, pharmaceutical sales representatives tend to emphasize that they 
provide physicians with the latest information about medicine so that they can better 
treat their patients; the sales representatives also downplay the profit motives behind 
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the attempts to manipulate physicians to prescribe more expensive medicine (Vuori, 
San, & Kira, 2009). 
One of my main critiques of the existing sensemaking and sensegiving literature is that 
the centrality of identity has been emphasized too much. The way Weick (1996) (see 
also, 1993) re-explained the dynamics of Mann Gulch fire illustrates my point. 
Thirteen firemen died partly because they did not drop their tools when they were 
running away from the fire. The tools were heavy and slowed them down too much. 
The obvious question is: why did they not drop their tools? Weick (1996: 308) 
answered,  
“fires are not fought with bodies and bare hands, they are fought with tools that are 
often distinctive trademarks of firefighters and central to their identity […] Given the 
central role of tools in defining the essence of a firefighter, it is not surprising that 
dropping one’s tools creates an existential crisis. Without my tools, who am I? A 
coward? A fool? The fusion of tools with identities means that under conditions of 
threat, it makes no more sense to drop one’s tools than to drop one’s pride.” 
I believe that it is reasonable to challenge the claim that the men who were running for 
their lives engaged in this introspection and decided to keep their tools, no matter 
what. Even one of the founders of the identity-centered stream of literature provides a 
strong counter-argument against Weick’s conclusion: “When one is running to get 
away from someone who is chasing him, he is entirely occupied in this action, and his 
experience may be swallowed up in the objects about him, so that he has, at the time 
being, no consciousness of self at all” (Mead, 1934: 137, emphasis added). The central 
point here is that there are identity-unrelated, reflex-like, automatic, emotional, and 
sub-conscious dynamics that influence how people think and behave but the current 
sensemaking and sensegiving literatures are not capitalizing them.  
2.5.2 Implications of the identity perspective for sensegiving 
While the foundation may be shaky, management scholars have elaborated their ideas 
building on the centrality of identity in sensegiving. It has been recognized that image 
and ambiguity are two central constructs needed to describe how identities develop, 
evolve, and can be changed in organizations.6 Dutton and Dukerich (1991) studied 
                                                 
6
 The studies reviewed here suffer to some extent from fuzzyness in the level of analysis. They 
often claim to study organizational identity but then the data describes individual-level 
sensemaking. This problem has been widely recognized (Whetten, 2006: 220). Furthermore, 
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how the members of the Port Authority of New York made sense of their 
organization’s response to an issue about homeless people. Their key finding was that 
the image (how others were thought to see the organization) influenced how they saw 
themselves (identity) and how they understood the issue and reacted to it. In 
sensegiving terms, the idea of using image as a means for changing identities was 
further studied by Gioia and Thomas (1996). They discovered qualitatively and 
corroborated quantitatively that projected future images (how we want others to see us 
in the future) influenced organization members’ identities and how they thought about 
the organization’s situation and preferable actions. Hence, to change how people think, 
one should first change how they think others should see them in the future, which will 
influence their identities, which will change the way they interpret situations and 
issues. 
Ambiguity is the second central construct in the current sensegiving literature. Gioia 
and Chittipeddi (1991) recognized that one central sensegiving tool is “ambiguity-by-
design.” Creating ambiguity among sense-receivers allows the sensegiver to push his 
or her own interpretation of the situation forward; when people do not understand what 
is going on, they are more likely to accept any plausible interpretation of the situation. 
Studies of identity construction have similarly recognized that some sort of ambiguity 
is central in the process of redefining identity. Corley and Gioia (2004) recognized 
how a spinoff created several changes for the employed individuals which triggered 
identity ambiguity and made them say things like “we don’t even know who we are 
right now” (p. 184). This ambiguity then triggered the leaders of the organization to 
engage in active sensegiving which ultimately led to a renewed, post-spin-off identity. 
Most recently, Gioia, Price, Hamilton, and Thomas (2010) discovered that ambiguity 
plays a central role also in the process of building an identity for a newly established 
organization that has no prior identity. Ambiguity triggers people to consider and 
contrast against alternative identities in a process that ultimately results in converging 
to a single identity.  
The future image can also be used intentionally to create ambiguity and dissatisfaction 
with the present identity. Pratt (2000) studied how a network marketing organization, 
Amway, managed identification among its employees. Based on ethnographic data, he 
                                                                                                                                 
social identity (i.e. identification with a group with a specific identity) is part of individual 
identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986); and the organizational part of individual identity has the 
strongest influence on people’s behavior in organizations (Ashforth  et al., 2008: 339).  
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built a theoretical model that described the identification process in the firm. In the 
first phase, the firm engaged in “sensebreaking” with the goal of making the 
employees dissatisfied with their current lives and identities. The main tool for 
sensebreaking was “dream building” in which people were encouraged to imagine 
themselves as rich, happy, and powerful in the future. The gap between this ideal 
future self (cf. future image) and the present identity made them dissatisfied with the 
presented identity. This gap created seekership (“a sense of identity-related 
discontentment that results in a drive to find meaning” p. 469) in the employees. The 
organization provided this meaning by the means of sensegiving. It used mentoring 
and relationship barriers to ensure that the members’ sensemaking was “encapsulated” 
and, hence, received inputs only from the organization. The lesson from this study and 
from the identity-centered sensegiving research in general, then, is that to change the 
way people think, you should first make them hate their current selves by creating 
dreams of something better and then describe how your way of thinking will help them 
achieve those dreams. A similar, more generic process model of identification/identity 
change that consists of sensebreaking and sensegiving was also proposed by Ashforth 
et al. (2008) in their review of identity and identification in organizations.  
In addition to the intuitively derived critique about overemphasizing the role of 
identity in sensemaking (the firemen example above), another fundamental limitation 
in the identity-based sensegiving studies should be mentioned. Each of the studies 
reviewed in this section has analyzed field notes, interview transcripts, and/or archival 
materials. Such an approach has facilitated tracking how identities evolve over time. 
However, the central limitation is that each data analyzed only consists of words 
written on paper and nothing else. The data does not contain the way those words were 
said, the facial expressions of the speakers and listeners, the pitch and loudness of 
voice, bodily gestures, and many other non-verbal features of communication. There is 
much more going on in any social situation that people can consciously recognize 
(e.g., Bargh, 1999; Choi et al., 2005; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Gawronski & Payne, 
2010), let alone write down into field notes or retrospectively describe in an interview. 
When only words are recorded and analyzed, the existence and potential effects of all 
these non-verbal forms of communicating and responding are ignored. Hence, it is no 
wonder that the studies have emphasized the content and meaning of words when 
explaining why and how people’s thoughts and actions changed.  
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Given both the methodological limitation and the intuitive critique about 
overemphasizing the role of identity, it can be argued that the existing sensegiving 
research has focused too much on tactics of identity breaking. It may well be that there 
are other, stronger reasons beyond identity that explain why sensegiving succeeded in 
the cases analyzed (the next sub-section and the findings of this thesis offer concrete 
alternatives). For example, it might be that the emotional arousal created by the 
identity threats caused people to buy into the new beliefs (see e.g., Phelps, 2006) and 
that identity threat as a source of this arousal was just coincidental. If such is the case, 
then the lesson that “you should first make them hate their current selves” may not 
only be ineffective but also a morally questionable advice because identity threats can 
create anxiety and suffering (e.g., Major & O'Brien, 2005; Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 
1999).  
A milder critique to the existing identity-central sensegiving studies is that they seem 
to have ignored the idea of building on top of the current identities in a process of 
continuous change. In such an approach, sensegivers could capitalize on the positive 
elements of the current identities of the sense-receivers and build new ideas on top of 
them; central in this approach is that there is no future vision or a process of 
unfreezing but one just looks at what is going on now and how it could be improved by 
adding something (Plowman et al., 2007; Weick & Quinn, 1999; Vuori & 
Khoroshkova, 2010). For example, if a firm’s identity includes the desire to make 
good phones, a sensegiver might use this positive aspect of the identity as a source of 
excitement and describe a new phone with a new operating system as an opportunity to 
expand the current strength of the firm, instead of saying that the firm is on a burning 
platform and about to lose everything. Small additions to the current identity could 
incrementally accumulate and, ultimately, produce a radical change (cf. Plowman et 
al., 2007). In addition, empirical evidence from mergers shows that individuals are 
more committed to the merged organization if they perceive that there is continuity 
from their old identity to the new situation (van Leeuwen, van Knippenberg, & 
Ellemers, 2003). However, if identities are not threatened, then the question becomes, 
how can a sensegiver make the sense-receivers internalize the new ideas when they are 
not experiencing meaning void caused by sensebreaking and identity threat? Again, 
the answer is likely to be found in the subtle emotional dynamics of thinking and 
communicating.  
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2.6 Subtle Emotional Influences 
There are a large number of studies and theoretical models that show how the 
sensemaking process is influenced by subtle emotional factors. The basic message 
across these studies is that seemingly irrelevant factors can influence how people make 
sense of entities and change and form mental models. However, the current 
sensegiving theory has not yet leveraged these ideas and no-one has developed 
sensegiving tools that would utilize the power of emotions in the process of producing 
a desired mental model change in sense-receivers. 
2.6.1 How emotions influence sensemaking 
A new wave of research in decision making and economics (Bechara & Damasio, 
2005; Loewenstein et al., 2008; see also Hodgkinson & Healey 2008, in press) has 
discovered that emotions have a fundamental influence on how people understand 
situations and choose to act in them. The effects of emotions are rooted in biological 
processes:  
“changes in neurotransmitter release induced by somatic state [emotions] signals modulate 
the synaptic activities of telencephalic neurons subserving behavior and cognition, thereby 
providing a mechanism for somatic states to exert a biasing effect on behaviors (e.g., 
selection of a response over another), feelings, and cognitive patterns.” (Bechara & 
Damasio, 2005: 343) 
Damasio’s (1994; 2003) research on patients who have lost emotional components 
from their brain has been the key driver of the research on how emotions influence 
human sensemaking and choice processes. Elaborating the initial insights, Bechara and 
Damasio (e.g., 2005) have focused on studying how the emotional reactions triggered 
by different choice alternatives ultimately determine which alternative people will 
choose. Despite what people know of a choice issue, they tend to choose the 
alternative that produces the most positive emotional reactions. Usually, the choice 
that is the best one also from a rational perspective produces the most positive 
emotional reaction and, therefore, makes people prefer the rationally best alternative. 
However, if a task irrelevant emotion occurs in a person’s mind, this can make him or 
her choose sub-optimally. Likewise, people with certain brain damages suffer from a 
similar problem: they understand that their choice is bad but still do it because it feels 
the best (see also, Damasio, 1994). Also the choices’ closeness in time and certainty 
influence how strong an emotion they produce, which is why people sometimes prefer 
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small certain short-term pleasure over uncertain long-term success. The emotions 
influence people’s choices even when they are not aware of the emotional reactions 
(Bechara and Damasio, 2005: 348). 
One implication of Damasio’s work for this dissertation is that sensegiving without 
associated emotional reactions may be insufficient. Because “’knowledge’ without 
‘emotional signaling’ leads to dissociation between what one knows or says, and how 
one decides to act” (Bechara and Damasio, 2005: 348), it is not sufficient to make 
sense-receivers understand what they should do. In addition, a sensegiver should make 
them develop emotional reactions consistent with the new cognitive understanding.  
There are also a large number of other empirical studies that illustrate the different 
ways emotions influence the sensemaking and choice process. The first set of these 
studies shows that self-induced emotional states can influence how people make sense 
of external factors. As many elements of the brain are bi-directional (see e.g., 
Barsalou, 2008; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), emotional states can be induced by making 
people physically act as if they were experiencing the emotion (see also, Ekman, 
2003). Such physical moments can induce the emotion and then make people interpret 
unrelated stimuli as being consistent with the emotion and, thus, evaluate it differently. 
For example, when people are made to have a smiling expression by holding a pencil 
between their teeth, they tend to evaluate comics to be funnier than control groups 
(Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). Likewise, when people are made to shake their 
heads from side to side, as if to be in a negative state, they tend to evaluate arguments 
more negatively than control groups; and when people are made to shake their heads 
up and down, they tend to evaluate arguments more positively than control groups 
(Wells & Petty, 1980). 
Other studies have tested and documented more ways of how emotions influence 
people’s sensemaking and decision making. When people are angry, they tend to take 
more risks (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). When people are in a positive mood, they are 
more creative and generate more alternative ideas (Fredrickson, 2005). Conversely, a 
negative mood makes individuals (Forgas, 1992) and groups (van Knippenberg, Kooij-
de Bode, & van Ginkel, 2010) evaluate alternatives more critically and, hence, 
improve decision quality in tasks which require logical thinking.  
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Besides influencing the way people make sense of an issue, the emotional state also 
influences how well they will remember the issue. Basically, the more emotionally 
arousing an issue, the more people will remember. Already William James (1890: 670) 
argued that:  
“The attention which we lend to an experience is proportional to its vivid or 
interesting character; and it is a notorious fact that what interests us most vividly at the 
time is, other things equal, what we remember best. An impression may be so exciting 
emotionally as almost to leave a scar upon the cerebral tissues.”  
More recently, several scholars have found empirical evidence supporting the claim 
that emotional arousal enhances memory. Specifically, arousal enhances the encoding 
of the content that is temporarily held in the working memory into the long term 
memory (e.g., Phelps, 2006). This is relevant for sensegiving which aims at changing 
sense-receivers’ mental models because mental models reside in the long term memory 
(Carlston, 2010; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). If the goal is to change mental models, it is 
not sufficient to make people think about something consciously for a fleeting moment 
in their working memory but a lasting change in the long term memory is needed. Yet, 
it is far more difficult to make semi-permanent changes in their long term memory 
than it is to make people think about some content in their working memories (Smith 
& DeCoster, 2000). 
The evidence that emotional arousal can enhance the encoding of the contents of the 
working memory into the long term memory comes from both naturalistic studies and 
from lab studies. Naturalistic studies have recognized that people tend to remember 
emotional events like the death of Princess Diana (Davidson & Glisky, 2002) and the 
September 11 tragedies (Pezdek, 2003) better than non-emotional events. As an 
example of lab studies, MacKay and Ahmetzanov (2005) measured if people 
remember the location of taboo words, such as “shit” and “whore” on a computer 
screen better than the location of neutral words, such as “crow” and “mouse.” They 
found support for their hypothesis and concluded that “emotion triggers binding 
mechanisms that link an emotional event to contextual features such as its location” (p. 
31). Phelps (2006:  34) described these binding mechanisms in more detail:  
“Emotion, specifically arousal, is proposed to enhance hippocampal-dependent 
consolidation. […] physiological arousal results in activation of the beta-adrenergic 
receptors in the amygdala. The amygdala, in turn, modulates hippocampal processing, 
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resulting in enhanced consolidation or storage for events that elicit an arousal 
response.” 
Arousal can also enhance the internalization of more abstract thoughts, in addition to 
having a positive effect on episodic memory. By more abstract thoughts, I refer to 
ideas of what are good behaviors, heuristic behavioral rules, descriptions of cause-
effect relationships, and values. If such an abstract idea is associated with emotion, it 
should be better remembered. Consistent with this idea, there is recent empirical 
evidence that emotional arousal triggered by photographs can improve the retention of 
English-Swahili word pairs (Finn & Roediger, 2011). The possibility of enhancing the 
memory of abstract ideas is important for sensegiving purposes the goal of which is to 
make sense-receivers internalize, for example, a new mental model of their 
organization’s situation.  
In addition to the amygdala triggered enhancements in memory consolidation, 
emotions increase memory through repetition. This further supports the idea that also 
abstract thoughts can be better internalized through emotions. Bechara and Damasio 
(2005: 360) explain how:   
“With each ‘thought’ brought to working memory, the strength of the somatic state 
[emotion] triggered by that ‘thought’ determines whether the same ‘thought’ is likely 
to recur (i.e., will be brought back to memory so that it triggers another somatic state 
that reinforces the previous one), or whether that ‘thought’ is likely to be eliminated.”  
This reappearance of an emotional thought into consciousness is important because 
every time a thought is brought into consciousness, the related associations in the 
mental model in the long term memory are reinforced (Carlston, 2010; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000).  
In sum, the above reviewed research on emotions and sensemaking shows three 
important findings. First, emotions influence people’s choices, in addition to their 
cognitive understanding of the situation. Hence, it is not sufficient that a sensegiver 
makes people “know” things but he or she must make them also “feel” those things. 
Second, the emotional state in which people are influences how they will interpret any 
information they receive. Hence, sensegivers should make the sense-receivers be in an 
emotional state that is consistent with what they are trying to argue. Third, emotional 
arousal enhances people’s memory of the content they hear. Hence, sensegivers should 
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increase the intensity of the emotions the participants are feeling during a sensegiving 
episode.  
To apply the above reviewed effects of emotions on sensegiving, one needs to 
understand how a sensegiver could make sense-receivers be in the optimal, highly 
aroused, emotional state. The manipulations used in the above-reviewed lab studies are 
not feasible for managers and consultants who need tools that can be used in the 
organizational context. The research on how emotions and emotional arousal emerge, 
accumulate, and transfer from one situation to another provides a useful starting point 
for exploring this question. 
2.6.2 How emotions “behave” 
A central question for understanding how a sensegiver could leverage the above 
described emotional dynamics is how emotions emerge and remain active. Russell’s 
(2003) core affect model provides a parsimonious way of investigating the basic 
dynamics of emotion for this purpose. Core affect refers to “state of the central 
nervous system experienced as a subjective feeling and with peripheral correlates 
[such as heart rate, tone of voice, facial expressions, and body movements]” (p. 154). 
Core affect can be described in terms of two dimensions that are valence that varies 
from positive to negative and arousal that varies from low to high. These two 
dimensions are orthogonal and, according to Russell, all emotions can be described as 
points along the two-dimensional space created by arousal and valence. People 
experience core affect and then cognitively interpret what is going on. If the cognitive 
elements of the situation match with a prototype of an emotion, then people think they 
are feeling that emotion. 
What is most essential in Russell’s model for this thesis is that while several factors 
influence people’s core affect, they often attribute their core affect to a limited number 
of factors. It is possible that a first event causes changes in people’s core affect, while 
they misattribute those changes to a second event. Hence, they end up (mistakenly) 
making an association between the second event and the emotional reaction. As 
Russell explains:  
“Core affect can be manipulated by drugs: stimulants, depressants, euphoriants, and 
dysphoriants. More typically, however, changes in core affect result from a 
combination of events, such as the cumulative stresses of a week on the job. Some of 
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these causes are beyond one’s ability to detect consciously, such as ionization in the 
air and infrasound. A key to understanding core affect is that people have no direct 
access to these causal connections and limited ability to track this complex causal 
story. Instead, a person makes attributions and interpretations of core affect. 
Sometimes the cause is obvious, but at other times, one can undergo a change in core 
affect without knowing why. […] In misattribution (Schwarz, 1990), a change in core 
affect due to one source is misattributed to another […] Attributions usually seem 
correct to the attributor, but research has demonstrated misattributions.” (Russell, 
2003: 149) 
The possibility that core affect created by one thing transfers to a new situation and is 
attributed to another thing can be illustrated as follows. When people have fever, they 
tend to be low in arousal and negative in terms of valence. This is a physical state and 
without a cognitive framing, they just feel bad. However, if they hear bad news while 
in this state, they may attribute the low-arousal, high-negative-valence to the news and 
experience the news as more depressing than they would in a normal state. 
Consequently, they may start feeling really sad because of the news, instead of just 
feeling bad because of being sick, even though their core affect has changed little 
because of the news. The cognitive reframing changes their understanding of their own 
emotional state. 
There are also studies showing how high arousal created by one event can transfer to 
the next situation, while the valence created by the first event is forgotten. 
Understanding how the arousal transfer happens would provide a unique tool for 
sensegivers to associate high arousal with their cognitive sensegiving content. Zillman 
(1971) carried out a lab study that tested if content-unrelated arousal can transfer to a 
new situation. The following procedure was used: Subjects first received electronic 
shocks from an actor. This was to make them somewhat angry toward the actor. The 
subjects then watched either a neutral, an aggressive, or an erotic film. After watching 
the film, the subjects were asked to give 12 electronic shocks to the actor, supposedly 
to give feedback to enhance learning. They could choose the intensity of the shocks 
from a scale from 1 to 10. The intensity was measured as a dependent variable in the 
study, as a proxy measure for how angry the subjects were toward the actor. It turned 
out that those who had watched the erotic film gave the strongest shocks (on average, 
5.071 intensity), those who had watched the aggressive film also gave quite strong 
shocks (3.948), and those who had watched the neutral film gave the mildest shocks 
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(3.067; all differences statistically significant). Zillman interpreted this finding to 
support the excitation transfer paradigm: the erotic film increased the participants’ 
arousal which amplified the anger they felt toward the actor. Because both the erotic 
film and the aggressive film increased the value of the dependent variable compared to 
the neutral video, it can be concluded that it was the emotional/physical arousal that 
increased the anger toward the actor rather than the cognitive content of the videos. 
The arousal created by the erotic film was transferred into the anger felt toward the 
actor and intensified it.  
Another illustrative study was carried out by Dutton and Aron (1974; see also, Foster 
et al., 1998, for a review and meta-analysis on similar studies). All the subjects in this 
study were male. Dutton and Aron first scared the research subjects by making them 
cross a bridge which had “a tendency to tilt, sway, and wobble, creating the impression 
that one is about to fall over the side [to] a 230-foot drop to rocks” (p. 511). A control 
group carried out a non-scary task (they crossed a low stable bridge). After the initial 
mood manipulation, the individuals interacted with a female research assistant who 
asked them to fill a survey and write a short story of a female whose picture was 
shown to them. The content of these stories was coded for sexual content. It was found 
that those subjects, who had been scared before they interacted with the female 
assistant, described the picture in more erotic terms than the participants who were not 
scared before the interaction. In addition, the research subjects had been given the 
phone number of the research assistant: in the condition group, 9 out of 18 research 
subjects called her afterwards, whereas in the control group only 2 out of 16 called. 
Given all the results, it was concluded that the emotional arousal caused by the scary 
bridge was transferred to the interaction with the female research assistant and the 
subjects interpreted this arousal as sexual arousal toward the picture shown and the 
research assistant.  
There are also several other studies that have shown that arousal created in one 
situation by means of one emotion can transfer into a next situation and amplify 
another emotion. Anger can turn into an urge (Brehm, 1999), chemically induced 
arousal can transfer into whatever emotion cognitively accessible in the situation 
(Schachter & Singer, 1962; 2000), warm subliminal feelings produced by a warm 
coffee cup can turn into interpersonal liking  (Williams & Bargh, 2008) and “the same 
core affect (induced through subliminal stimulation) can emerge into consciousness as 
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a mood in some circumstances but as liking for a beverage in other circumstances” 
(Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2000, cited in Russell, 2003: 148). Hence, it has 
been concluded that:  
“arousal is nonspecific and slow to decay, that people are inept at partitioning the 
sources of their arousal, and that people cognitively interpret their arousal. Hence, 
arousal left over from a previous setting can combine with arousal in a new situation 
and intensify one’s emotional reaction. … What is provocative about these findings is 
that the valence of the prior experience is irrelevant; only the arousal transfers” (Fiske 
& Taylor, 2008: 319-320) 
The physiological approach by Bechara and Damasio (2005) is also consistent with the 
behavioral-level findings of valence-independent arousal transfer. Bechara and 
Damasio note that physical arousal can indeed decay slowly and transfer from one 
situation to the next one. When it is transferred to the next situation, it functions as a 
baseline in the next situation. If the events in the next situation also produce arousal, 
this arousal adds on top of the baseline arousal. Hence, a moderately arousing event 
can be experienced as highly arousing if the person is already aroused when going 
through the event. As Bechara and Damasio (2005: 363) write: 
“pre-existing somatic states influence the feeling and triggering of subsequent ones 
[…] Indeed, operation of the somatic marker circuitry is a complete circle: primary 
and secondary inducers trigger somatic states; feedback signals from triggered somatic 
states influence activity in neural structures critical for primary and secondary 
induction; the modulated neural activity within these structures will in turn influence 
subsequent induction of somatic states from primary and secondary inducers. […] 
Neurotransmitters such as dopamine lower the threshold of neuronal cell firing in 
structures such as the insular/SII, SI cortices, the amygdala, and the VM cortex, so that 
the threshold for feeling and triggering somatic states is changed.” 
However, Bechara and Damasio (2005) also note that there are some differences 
between positive and negative emotions, so this effect is not as pure as the behavioral 
experiments would suggest. Yet, there are many similarities between positive and 
negative arousal and more complex mechanisms that may create a strong opposite 
reaction in the secondary inducers that can boost the flip from positive to negative (p. 
365). Consequently, the idea of using negative arousal to amplify later positive arousal 
remains plausible. These ideas can be interpreted to imply that while it is possible to 
transfer the arousal from many emotions to many other emotions, it is not possible to 
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transfer all emotions to any other emotion. Hence, some level of continuity should be 
maintained if a sensegiver is to amplify emotional arousal first with some content and 
then associate the arousal with some other content such that the strong emotion 
seemingly results from the second piece of content. It is an empirical question of how 
to create such continuity. 
In conclusion, the research on emotions and their effects on sensemaking suggests that 
people would remember, internalize, and act on emotional content better than 
unemotional content. The research also suggests that it might be possible to make any 
content feel emotional by transferring emotional arousal from earlier moments and 
then somehow make people associate that arousal with the desired content. Before I 
will empirically explore how sensegivers could use this opportunity, I will review the 
scant management sensegiving research that has referred to emotional dynamics. 
2.6.3 Emotions in the management sensegiving literature 
There are a handful of management studies that have considered emotions in the 
context of sensegiving. Hill & Levenhagen (1995) argued that metaphors are useful in 
sensegiving because they provoke emotions. Hill and Levenhagen argued, 
“establishing an organizational direction requires the ability to communicate a vision 
or mission in an understandable and evocative manner … The emotions and 
contradictions built in to metaphorically articulated visions provide a means of 
motivation.” (pp. 1069-1070). In essence, they are saying that if a sensegiver can 
communicate his or her cognitive content in a form that is emotionally arousing (i.e. 
the metaphor), the impacts will be stronger. This argument is consistent with the 
arguments of Bechara and Damasio on the point that “knowing it” is not enough but 
one must also “feel it” to take action. However, considering the emerging 
understanding of how emotions are formed and can transform from one situation to the 
next one, metaphors seem to be an elementary and not very effective tool for creating 
emotional reactions and commitment. 
In another conceptual paper, Hodgkinson and Healey (in press) proposed that: “The 
greater the extent to which firms foster emotional commitment to new investment 
opportunities, the greater the likelihood that they will seize those opportunities.” 
However, they did not discuss in detail which kinds of practices, tactics, tools, or 
approaches would be suitable for this kind of emotional sensegiving and commitment 
building. All we know, so far, is that metaphors might be a way to put emotion into the 
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cognitive content of sensegiving. My goal in this thesis is to find alternative, more 
effective ways for doing it.  
There are two empirical studies that have focused on emotional dynamics during 
sensegiving and organizational change. Huy (2002) found two seemingly opposing 
emotion management patterns: pushing people to commit to a change and attending to 
change recipients’ own emotions. The combination of these two patterns facilitated 
organizational adaptation by making people take actions to enact the change while 
simultaneously allowing the people to deal with the emotional reactions to the new 
practices. Rouleau (2005) recognized several micro-practices that two middle 
managers used to sell change every day in their organizations. These micro-practices 
relied on the middle managers’ tacit knowledge. They used them, among other things, 
to give emotional support to the employees and to create “subjective and emotional 
effects” in the sense-receivers so that they would be more committed to the ongoing 
organizational change. However, while Rouleau recognized this purpose of the micro-
practices, her focus was not on their emotional dynamics nor did she explain why and 
how the tactics created the emotional effects. Taken together, these two studies seem 
to suggest that to promote an organizational change, sensegivers should both 
empathically allow sense-receivers to deal with their emotional reactions and to 
enhance emotional commitment to the new direction. This dissertation continues from 
where they finished and asks how the emotional commitment to the new understanding 
of the organization and its purpose can be created.  
*** 
In conclusion, as our understanding of how humans make sense of issues and change 
their mental models has increased, scholars have been able to update the theories of 
how sensegivers can intentionally modify others’ mental models. The latest 
developments in the research on sensemaking have highlighted the role of emotions 
but the sensegiving research has not yet internalized these ideas. Emotions influence 
which cues people will extract from the environment, how they interpret those cues, 
and how well they will internalize, remember, and act on those interpretations. 
Furthermore, basic research on emotions has shown that emotional arousal created in 
one setting can be transferred into another setting and make the other setting feel 
emotional. Hence, it might be possible for sensegivers to use some techniques to 
influence sense-receivers’ emotional arousal in ways that somehow make sensegiving 
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more effective. The existing sensegiving research does not tell us what those “some 
techniques” might be, how they should be used, or how they increase the effectiveness 
of sensegiving. The purpose of the empirical part of this dissertation is to investigate 
and conceptualize those techniques and study how they can be combined to ensure the 
effective delivery of the desired cognitive content. Formally, I aim to answer the 
following research question:  
Research Question: How can emotional arousal be used to make sensegiving 
more effective? 
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3 DATA AND METHOD 
This study aims to increase the understanding of emotional dynamics in sensegiving. It 
was deduced from existing research that emotions might be used to increase the 
effectiveness of sensegiving. The question that emerged was: “How?” To answer this 
question, I analyzed a change seminar which was to initiate the strategic renewal of a 
Finnish Property Service Company (pseudonym) by changing its employees’ mental 
models. The seminar was run by a change coach who used original sensegiving tactics. 
During the seminar, the sensegiver increased the participants’ emotional arousal in 
various ways and then associated this arousal with work-related cognitive content. My 
aim has been to create generalizable knowledge that will be relevant for academics 
studying the phenomenon of sensegiving as well as for practitioners who aim to boost 
performance and well-being by creating new meanings in their organizations.  
This study followed an inductive, open-ended design. When I started the study, I had 
only a loose idea of improving the understanding of sensegiving in the context of 
strategic renewal. During the course of the study, the goal evolved to be to extend 
existing sensegiving theory with the most recent insights on the way the human brain 
works. Particularly, the goal evolved to be to explore empirically how emotional 
arousal can be generated and leveraged during sensegiving processes, and to 
conceptually expand these findings into a process theory of emotional sensegiving. 
The sensegiver (the change coach) that is studied in this thesis was an optimal 
theoretical sample for studying emotional sensegiving. Initially, the coach and the 
seminar were chosen as the objects of this study because they had something unique, 
special, and powerful in them. The coach seemed like a unique character and several 
companies witnessed that the coach’s seminars produce results. Also, the coach 
seemed to use a very negative approach, yet produce very positive results and 
optimistic thinking. All this was puzzling and held the promise of finding something 
that is theoretically novel, relevant, and interesting. Hence, the study was started. 
Retrospectively, the coach and his seminar provided an excellent opportunity for 
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studying the emotional dynamics of sensegiving because the coach used emotional 
arousal to enhance the effects of his cognitive sensegiving in a peculiar way. The 
emotional intensity in the seminars was so high that it can be considered as an extreme 
case of emotional sensegiving. The “something” that was initially recognized to be 
unique and worth studying in the seminar thus turned out to be the way the coach 
created and used emotional arousal as a tool for sensegiving. Observation and deep 
qualitative analyses were needed because the coach’s ability to use emotional arousal 
in sensegiving was based on his tacit knowledge. He was not aware of the way he used 
emotions in sensegiving and was unable to explicate the process of using them.  
There were also two other reasons why qualitative methods were suitable for studying 
the coach and sensegiving. First, at the beginning of the study, there was no clear 
understanding of what made the coach’s sensegiving successful. Hence, an open-
ended, exploratory approach was more likely to produce valuable theoretical insights 
than the testing of ad hoc hypotheses about the coach. Second, as the focus of the 
study evolved to the question of how a sensegiver can leverage the emotional 
influences on people’s sensemaking, it was important to understand the qualities of the 
coach’s sensegiving tactics rather than any quantitative attribute of the sensegiving. By 
analyzing how the coach delivered his message and how the participants reacted, I was 
able to recognize both a number of qualitatively distinct emotional sensegiving tactics 
and an overall pattern of emotional sensegiving that explain the effects of the seminar. 
The understanding of these mechanisms and processes are analytically generalizable to 
other settings, and provide a basis for future theory development and testing.  
I got access to the seminars through a mutual interest in the content of the seminar—
increases in well-being and productivity through respectful social interaction and 
empowerment. The coach that is analyzed here participated in a seminar on these 
topics held by a professor at Helsinki University of Technology. They casually 
discussed during the professor’s seminar and the professor found the coach’s 
sensegiving approach interesting. Hence, he suggested finding a student to study the 
coach’s sensegiving. The coach agreed. Around the same time, I e-mailed the 
professor and asked for a summer job relating to same topics (earlier, I had written a 
book chapter about influencing (Vuori, 2006) for a book edited by the professor); 
hence, they hired me to study the coach. The professor is a celebrity in the Finnish 
context and the coach saw it as an honor and a good learning opportunity to participate 
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in the study. The coach also helped me to get access to the seminar participants by 
asking the company representatives to allow and organize interviews with the 
participants. The organization saw this as an opportunity to evaluate the effects of the 
seminar on their employees.  
I collected and analyzed data on the seminar in an iterative fashion, as is common in 
inductive, qualitative research (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The purpose of the iterative 
process is to simultaneously develop a deeper understanding of the empirical material 
being analyzed and contribute to theory. In a way, the purpose is to understand, in a 
deep way, some aspect of the empirical material that has not yet been explained by 
previous research. For example, Pratt (2000: 462) described this process as follows:   
“I then organized the emerging themes into a coherent framework. After developing, 
exploring, and evaluating the utility of several alternative frameworks, I arrived at the 
one that I believed offered a strong contribution to theory without doing undue 
violence to my experience. It was important that my framework add to theories of 
organizational behavior, but I did not want my framework to unduly distort the actual 
experiences of [the research subjects].” 
I similarly developed and experimented with various theoretical frameworks, until I 
arrived with one that both explains the seminar dynamics and contributes to the 
sensegiving theory. During this process, my focus deepened such that as I initially 
analyzed three seminars and related organizational factors, the ultimate deep focus was 
on the one seminar that was video-recorded. While the general process provided a 
good contextual understanding, the focus on the video provided the necessary depth. 
This changing in focus is also legitimized by Pratt (Pratt, 2009: 859): “one’s criteria 
for sampling may change as a study progresses—and that is not only legitimate, but 
expected!”  
In general, it can be said that the way I collected and analyzed the data during the 
various iterative cycles of my study was influenced by various methodological books 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lee, 1999; Lipton, 2004; Smith & Hitt, 2005; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998; Yin, 2003) and articles (Alvesson & Karreman, 2007; Dubois & Gadde, 
2002; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Pratt, 2009; Rousseau & Fried, 
2001; Siggelkow, 2007; Weick, 1989;  see also, Vuori, 2009; Vuori & Piik, 2010), as 
well as by my reading of numerous qualitative articles that have used similar research 
designs to study similar phenomena (the most important ones have been Corley & 
 Data and Method 
43 
Gioia, 2004; Maitlis, 2005; Mantere & Vaara, 2008; Michel, 2007; Pratt, 2000). 
However, I did not strictly follow any single methodological authority in conducting 
my analysis. Rather, it was a highly personal sensemaking process during which I used 
the methodological tools as aides for sensemaking. I have tried to describe this process 
transparently in the following pages. 
3.1 The Change Seminar 
The change seminar was a part of strategic renewal in the Property Service Company. 
The Property Service Company employed about 10,000 people and had annual 
revenue of 700 million euro during the study. The purpose of the strategic renewal and 
the associated seminar was to shift strategic focus from cost competition to high value 
services, hence boosting profitability and longevity of the firm. There were three main 
elements in this strategic renewal: (1) reorganization from hierarchical structure to 
team-based structure, (2) new values, attitudes, and culture, and (3) new focus in sales 
from revenue to profitability. The new values, attitudes, and culture were to be created 
by training all the employees of the firm in three-day seminars, all held by the same 
coach. Emotional sensegiving during these seminars is the focus of this study. More 
contextual factors and their potential effects on my findings are discussed below in the 
sub-section “contextual limitations.” 
The coach had held the seminars for 20 years and developed a strong routine for 
running the seminars. He had an overall plan of the content of the seminars and this 
content remained the same in each seminar, even when different companies were being 
trained. In addition, he had his unique sensegiving style, which was not explicated or 
conceptualized in his head or in writing, which remained similar across the seminars. 
Hence, I was able to first participate in one seminar, then develop more structured data 
collection instruments, and then collect data in the following seminars, as described 
below in the “data collection” section.  
The seminar contained a mix of lessons regarding organizational structure and culture, 
linked with folk-psychological theories of social interaction. The coach’s basic 
message was that old, hierarchical structures lead to sub-optimization, low 
productivity, and waste. They must, therefore, be replaced with team-based organizing, 
in which employees take more responsibility of the work; there is continuous 
improvement and consideration of the whole work system; and even innovative 
initiatives by the employees. To make this new structure work, the coach argued, 
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workers also need to learn new, more assertive and responsible ways of interacting 
with each other, management, and customers. The coach used several concepts to 
describe the new, needed behaviors in the team-based organization. These concepts are 
briefly defined in Table 2 below. The findings section contains several illustrations of 
the coach’s sensegiving and the “what” of the sensegiving becomes apparent in these 
illustrations, even though the theoretical focus is on “how” the coach gives sense. 
Table 2: Definitions of key terms that the coach used for describing social interaction patterns 
Concept in 
Finnish 
Free translation to 
English 
Meaning of the concept 
Kerttu [name of a woman] Kerttu refers to an overly nice woman. She does 
not stand up for herself but allows others to abuse 
her. 
Markku [name of a man] An indifferent man who avoids facing problems 
and people who talk about problems. If something 
does not work, he ignores it and, for instance, 
leaves his task unfinished. 
Idiootti The idiot When people are angry and behaving badly, the 
coach argued, they are letting their idiot speak for 
them. I.e. the idiot is the angry part of a person, 
who sometimes takes over (when people lose self-
control). 
Vastuuttaminen The process of 
assertively 
demanding that 
others behave 
correctly 
When others make a mistake or do not follow 
rules, the coach explained, people must assertively 
demand them to behave in the right way. This way 
the work system will remain functional and no-one 
is abused. 
Kriisiyttäminen Surfacing problems 
that have been 
suppressed 
If there is a problem in a work unit and supervisors 
do not fix it, even when employees have asked for 
this, the employees must make a crisis out of the 
situation. They must communicate the problem to 
higher levels and to the coach and stop activities 
until the issue is resolved. 
Kuri vs. 
kurinalaisuus 
External discipline 
vs. self-discipline 
OR authoritarian vs. 
authoritative  
Key concept pair describing organizational culture. 
External discipline refers to the use of hierarchical 
power, control, and sanctions. Self-discipline 
refers to a system in which people take 
responsibility and initiatives, and behave well. 
 
As the seminar progressed, the coach kept moving back and forth between his 
organizational theory and his theories of social interaction. As can be seen from 
Table 3 below, the emphasis slightly shifted from the description of problems 
to the description of solutions towards the end of the seminar. Yet, the coach 
kept describing both problems and solutions; as well as both organizing-related 
and social interaction -related content throughout the seminar. One notable 
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detail in the timeline is that group assignments were carried out only during the 
latter half of the seminar, when the coach had already told the participants how 
they should think. 
Table 3 (1 of 2): The realized timeline and content of the seminar  
Time  Content 
Mon 9:30-10:20 General introduction to the seminar, location, and the organizational 
change.  
Round of introductions, each participants tells who they are & where they 
are from 
Mon 10:30-11:33 The organizational restructuring and TMT commitment 
The rules of the seminar 
Taylorism as the root reason for current problems and bad working life  
Mon 11:33-12:30 (Lunch break) 
Mon 12:30-13:35 Structural and cultural change from Taylorism to team-based organizing 
New definition of productivity 
Critique of the current structure of the firm 
Mon 13:45-14:30 Several concepts relating to social interaction 
Mon 15:00-15:50 More about social interaction 
Culture and values relating to team-based organizing 
Mon 16:00-16:50 Growing as a human being; self-esteem 
Interdependencies between social interaction system  and self-esteem 
Definition of love 
Tue 8:30-9:30 Recap of Monday’s content 
Outline of the organizational and cultural change that is being 
implemented 
Tue 9:45-10:30 Honesty and openness 
First forbidden word (“you”) in the process of behaving assertively 
Tue 10:40-11:30 Solving interpersonal conflicts 
How to handle one’s own bad mood 
Second forbidden word (“intentionally”) in the process of behaving 
assertively 
About punishments and punishing 
Tue 11:30-12:30 (lunch break) 
Tue 12:30-13:55 Punishing children 
Attitudes influence perception 
The process of surfacing suppressed problems 
Tue 14:10-14:30 The new strategy of the firm  
Rules and principles guiding the organizational change 
Tue 15:00-15:40 Creating teams and the right culture for team-based organizing 
Tue 15:50-16:15 Instructions for group assignment 
Group formation 
Tue 16:15  Groups work on the assignments [no video of the process] 
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Table 3 continues (2 of 2) 
Wed 8:35-9:30 Recap of seminar content so far 
Illustrations and discussion of concrete problems in the firm 
Wed 9:54-10:50 New requirements for supervisor work 
Employee initiative system 
Presentation of group assignments begins 
Wed 11:00-11:30 Presentation of group assignments 
Wed 11:30-12:30 (lunch break) 
Wed 12:30-13:00 Last group presents their assignment 
Instructions for second group assignment 
Wed 13:00-13:45 Groups are doing the assignments [not on the tape] 
Wed 13:45-14:30 Discussion about a problem mentioned by a participant 
Groups present the assignments 
Recap of seminar content 
Encouragement for the change  
 
3.2 Data Collection 
I used multiple sources of data (Table 4) in four phases to get a thorough 
understanding of the coach’s sensegiving and its effects. The use of multiple 
data sources is commonly recommended for theory building research because it 
allows understanding the complexity of the phenomenon better and verifying 
tentative findings from multiple sources (Yin, 2003; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
All the data was collected between January 2006 and August 2006. 
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Table 4 (1 of 2): Data sources and phases in data collection 
Data source Description Primary purpose for collecting 
the data 
Phase 1: Pre-understanding to facilitate structured data collection 
Seminar #1 with 
Milk Company 
Participant-observation with only 
very limited pre-understanding of 
what is on the agenda; active 
participation also in the evening 
activities 
Extensive notes of seminar 
content & informal discussions 
with participants 
General understanding of the 
seminar content and process to 
prepare for more structured data 
collection  
Get an insider understanding of the 
seminar and its effects 
 
Phase 2: Structured data collection of the seminar and its immediate effects 
Seminar #2 with 
Property Service 
Company 
[This is the primary  
seminar analyzed 
in the findings 
section] 
Video recording the seminar 
Some notes of seminar content 
and informal discussions 
Record accurate data for future 
analyzes [Fragments of the video 
were coded in 2006 but the video 
was fully used only in 2011 when it 
was digitized and I analyzed it 
directly with Atlas.ti software] 
Interviews with ten 
participants of 
seminar #2 before 
and after the 
seminar 
Interview questions focused on 
the participants’ opinions, beliefs, 
and attitudes on topics that were 
discussed in the seminar. In the 
after interviews, I also asked 
about their views about the coach 
and the seminar  
Assessment of the effects of the 
seminar on the participants’ 
thinking and attitudes by 
comparing their before and after 
answers to the same questions 
Insights about the process 
Surveys filled by 
participants in 
seminar #2 before, 
during, and after 
the seminar 
Likert-scale questions about 
beliefs and attitudes that related to 
the content of the seminar 
After-survey also contained 
questions about the coach 
Two open questions about how 
the participants are feeling and 
what they think of the coach 
(asked after the first and second 
day of the seminar) 
Assessment of attitude and belief 
change by comparing before and 
after answers 
Assessment of participants’ views 
of the coach  
Get a more comprehensive 
understanding of how the 
participants’ thoughts and emotions 
evolved during the seminar 
Phase 3: Additional data on the seminar and its immediate effects  
Seminar #3 with 
Property Service 
Company 
Participant-observation, notes Ensure that the dynamics of the 
seminars are similar with one 
another; gain deeper informal and 
first-person understanding of the 
process 
Surveys filled in by 
the participants of 
seminar #3 before 
and after the 
seminar 
Open questions about general 
thoughts and feelings 
Likert-type questions relating to 
seminar content 
Further data on belief and attitude 
change; and on reflections about 
the coach and the seminar 
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Table 4 continues (2 of 2) 
Phase 4: Data on the context and overall effects of the seminar 
Interviews with 
four change leaders 
from three 
companies (Milk, 
Property Service, & 
Sausage) 
Questions about the context and 
effects of the seminars in the 
three firms; and about the leaders’ 
views on the coach 
Deeper understanding of the 
context of the seminar 
Evaluation of the general effects of 
the seminar 
Interviews with 
five participants of 
seminars held in 
2000 (Sausage 
Company) 
Questions about what they 
remembered from the seminar; 
and how it had influenced their 
own thinking and behavior, and 
their work system 
Evaluation of whether the seminar 
has had long-lasting effects on the 
participants’ thinking or behavior 
Continuous process: Interaction with the coach 
Interviews (3) and 
informal discussion 
(>20) with the 
coach 
Questions relating to the context 
and content of the seminar; and 
sensegiving tactics of the coach 
Deeper understanding of and data 
on what and how the coach is 
trying to make the participants 
believe (unfortunately, the coach 
was not able to explicate his 
sensegiving tactics and the “how” 
of his sensegiving but only spoke 
about the content and context) 
 
3.2.1 Phase 1: Participant-observation in the first seminar 
I started the data collection by participating in the coach’s seminar in January 2006. I 
had three goals in this first phase of data collection. First, I wanted to develop a 
thorough understanding of the content of the seminar. This would allow me to design 
interview and survey questions to assess belief and attitude changes potentially caused 
by the seminar. Second, I wanted to develop a preliminary understanding of the 
process of sensegiving in the seminar to be able to focus my data collection on the 
following phases of the seminar on factors that seemed crucial. Third, I wanted to 
develop a deep, first-hand understanding of the process of the seminar. This first-hand 
experience would provide valuable inputs for my later theorizing and also functioned 
as a reality check for emerging ideas of how the training potentially influences people.  
When I participated in the first seminar, I had very limited understanding of the coach 
and what the seminar was about. Hence, I had no pre-conceptions of the coach at the 
beginning of my data collection. I was an active participant in the seminar. I listened to 
the coach just like the rest of the audience (I did not participate in discussions, though; 
nor did many other audience members). I also participated in the evening activities: I 
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went to sauna with the male participants and got drunk with them in the hotel bar on 
both evenings; I also actively had discussions with the participants, about both life in 
general and the content of the seminar during these evening activities.  
During the first seminar, I made detailed notes of the coach’s arguments and my own 
reflections. My focus and reflections mainly related to the content of the seminar 
because I got really excited about them. In total, I made 35 pages of handwritten notes 
of the seminar. Thirty-one of these pages were filled with content-related notes and 
four pages contained notes about my observations of the coach’s sensegiving tactics 
and the participants’ reactions during the seminar. In addition, I made five pages of 
notes of my informal discussions with the participants in the evenings. I used the notes 
to develop the first memos of the content of the seminar and the coach’s sensegiving 
tactics.  
3.2.2 Phase 2: Comprehensive data collection of the second seminar and its 
effects 
The goal of the second phase of data collection was to collect comprehensive data on 
the process of the seminar and its effects on the participants. I video recorded the 
seminar to get accurate, objective, and lasting data of the seminar, and asked the 
participants to fill in surveys and give interviews to understand how they experienced 
the seminar and how the seminar had influenced their mental models and attitudes.  
Video recording the second seminar 
I video recorded the second seminar in March 2006. I had realized during the first 
seminar in January that I should have video of the seminar to be able to analyze the 
coach’s sensegiving and participants’ reactions comprehensively and thoroughly. 
While I was able to make plenty of notes during the first seminar, it was obvious that I 
had missed a lot – if I focused on content, it was difficult to make notes of “how” the 
coach was giving sense and vice versa. Even more difficult would have been making 
notes about participants’ reactions simultaneously. It would simply have been 
impossible to observe, let alone write down all the emotional reactions ranging from 
changes in the tone of voice to bodily movements and facial expressions. Hence, I 
videotaped the seminar.  
The video camera was located at the back of the seminar room and was therefore not 
constantly visible to the participants (see Figure 9 below – the picture is taken from the 
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video). Many of the participants also told me that they forgot that I was recording the 
seminar and the camera is not mentioned or pointed at even once in the 16 hours of 
material that I have of the seminar. However, the coach said that he initially felt a bit 
nervous about the camera but he also said that he got used to it after a couple of hours. 
Hence, the recording should not have disturbed the normal dynamics of the seminar.   
I used the video in two phases. First, in summer 2006, I watched about 50% of the 
video from the screen of the video camera and made notes of the sections that I found 
to be most relevant. In total, I coded 153 instances in this way. About half of my codes 
also contained a verbatim transcription of what happened in that particular instance, 
while the remaining half contained only my description/interpretation of the episode. 
This first set of coding functioned as an input for my analysis of the process—together 
with the handwritten notes described above and below—for the analyses until the 
spring of 2011.  
The second phase of analyzing the video occurred in spring 2011. I decided that I have 
to go deeper into the data and analyze the video more comprehensively. Hence, I 
digitized the 16 one-hour tapes. Consequently, I was able to view, pause, and code the 
videos on a computer, which allowed me to analyze the sensegiving dynamics in the 
seminar much more comprehensively. I coded the video minute-by-minute and 
produced 1,252 codes of the video. These codes and the sections of the video that were 
linked to these codes functioned as a new input for my analyses. I was able to analyze 
and categorize clips of the video directly, which provided a good access to non-verbal 
dynamics. I also carried out two separate inter-coder reliability assessments to ensure 
the validity of my own coding.  
Interviews with ten participants of the second seminar 
I interviewed ten participants of the second seminar before and after the seminar. The 
interviews were conducted about one week before the seminar and one week after the 
seminar. The interviews lasted about 30 minutes. I asked questions that I hoped would 
reveal a change in the participants’ mental models, when answers before the seminar 
would be compared to answers after the seminar. I asked them, for instance, (1) to 
assess their own and the firm’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, (2) 
describe on what and who their work influences, and (3) how they would behave if a 
coworker asked them to carry out extra tasks/a customer was trying to start a fight/they 
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disagreed strongly with their supervisor/they had insulted someone. In addition, in the 
interviews that I carried out after the seminar, I asked how they felt about the coach 
and the seminar; and was there some content that they found exciting. I voice recorded 
the interviews and later transcribed them in a near-verbatim way. I also made notes 
during the interviews. 
I used the interview data in two main ways. First, I compared the participants’ answers 
to the same questions before and after the seminar to assess any changes in their 
thinking. The comparison to pre-training answers was important to avoid the 
retrospect-bias. Second, I underlined any statements they made about the process of 
the seminar and their reactions to it, so that I would have richer inputs for analyses of 
the coach’s sensegiving. 
Surveys filled by the participants of the second seminar 
I also asked the participants of the second seminar to fill in surveys before, during, and 
after the seminar. The surveys they filled before and after the seminar contained 
Likert-type questions about attitudes and beliefs relating to the content of the seminar 
(see Table 19 in chapter 5). Again, my goal was to find evidence of mental model 
change by comparing the answers the participants provided before the seminar to the 
answers they provided after the seminar. These surveys were filled as the first thing in 
the first morning of the seminar, and as the last thing on the last day of the seminar. 
The latter survey also contained questions about how the participants perceived the 
coach. 
The participants also answered two open-ended survey questions after the first day and 
on the third morning. The questions were: “Please describe in a few sentences which 
kinds of feelings and thoughts this day made you feel” and “What do you think about 
this training, its usefulness, and the coach? Please answer in a few sentences.” The 
reason for asking these questions was that the participants’ answers to these questions 
would provide a more comprehensive understanding of how the participants’ thoughts 
and feelings evolved during the sensegiving process.  
I used the open-ended answers provided after the first and at the beginning of the third 
day in two ways. First, I read through all the answers and coded them in different 
ways. My codes included, for instance, “signs of survival anxiety,” “hostile toward the 
coach,” and “indifferent.” I used this coding to develop a better qualitative 
Data and Method 
 
52 
understanding of the whole process and the participants’ reactions—which functioned 
as an important input for my later sensemaking of the coach’s sensegiving. Second, 
once I had understood that the coach seemed to manipulate the participants’ level of 
emotional arousal, I also coded the open-ended answers along two dimensions of 
arousal (high-low) and valence (positive-neutral-negative). I also carried out an inter-
coder agreement check with these codes.   
3.2.3 Phase 3: Further data on the seminar and its effects 
In the third phase of my study, I collected additional data on the process and effects of 
the seminar. The main purpose for collecting this additional data was to verify that the 
dynamics of the second seminar (which underwent the most comprehensive analysis) 
were not idiosyncratic to this seminar but representative of more general sensegiving 
dynamics. 
Participation in the third seminar 
I participated in the third seminar in April 2006. It was organized in Oulu for the 
Northern-Finland employees of the Property Service Company. The primary goals for 
participating in this third seminar were: (1) further deepening my understanding of the 
seminar dynamics, (2) checking if the seminars were similar to one another [the three 
that I participated in were], (3) further interacting informally with the coach and the 
change leaders of the Property Service Company [they also participated in this 
seminar]. I made 15 pages of handwritten notes during this seminar. Each of these 
goals was met and they provided an incremental contribution to my overall 
understanding of the seminar.  
Surveys filled by the participants of the third seminar 
I asked the participants of the third seminar to fill in surveys before and after the 
seminar. The surveys contained open questions relating to their 
expectations/reflections, thinking, and feelings, and Likert-type questions relating to 
the seminar content (see Table 20 in chapter 5). Again, the goal was to collect 
evidence of mental model change by comparing answers given before and after the 
seminar. In addition, I hoped to assess their general attitudes towards the training and 
mood before and after the seminar. Each of these pieces of evidence functioned as 
inputs for sensemaking about the sensegiving dynamics in the seminar. 
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3.2.4 Phase 4: The context and overall effects of the seminar 
In the fourth phase of data collection, I wanted to collect data that would allow 
assessing whether or not the seminar had also long-lasting effects on the participants 
and their behavior at work. In addition, I wanted to better understand the 
organizational context of the seminar. To achieve these two goals, I interviewed 
change leaders from three companies who were or had been working with the coach 
and five persons who had participated in the coach’s seminar five years earlier. 
Interviews with four change leaders from the three companies 
I interviewed the change leaders of the three companies who were involved in this 
study during the summer 2006. The interviewees included the development manager (I 
interviewed him twice) and the retired CEO of the Sausage Company, the development 
manager of the Property Service Company, and the development manager of the Milk 
Company. The interviews lasted between one and two hours. I asked questions about 
how they thought the seminar influenced the participants and what they thought about 
the coach. I also asked if they thought the seminar supported the organizational 
renewal processes in the firms and what other factors influenced the success of this 
process. 
Interviews with five participants of seminars held in 2000 
As a final source of data, I interviewed three employees and two managers of the 
Sausage Company who had participated in the seminar in 2000. I carried out the 
interviews in August 2006. The goal of the interviews was to assess if they still 
remembered some of the content of the seminar and believed that it had influenced the 
behavior and thinking of themselves and their work units. The interviews lasted about 
30 minutes each. I basically asked what they remembered about the seminar, what they 
thought about the coach, and how the seminar changed the way they and others think 
and act at work. My rationale was that if the seminar had an influence on the 
participants’ thinking and behavior, they should have explicit memories of the content 
of the seminar.  
The retrospective, explicit memory approach to assess mental model change has, of 
course, several limitations. Three of them are most relevant in this context: (1) some 
learning might happen sub-consciously (e.g., Reber, 1989); (2) the participants could 
remember the content because it was repeated after the seminar; and/or (3) they might 
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not have changed their thinking even if they remembered the seminar content. Hence, 
mere retrospective assessments would not be of much value if one aims to evaluate the 
effects of any seminar. However, when combined with the prospective measures of 
mental model change, I believe the retrospective measures provide valuable, 
triangulating evidence of the effects of the seminars analyzed in this thesis.  
3.2.5 Continuous process: Interviews and informal discussions with the 
coach 
I interviewed the coach formally three times and had tens of informal discussions with 
him through the period from January 2006 to August 2006 and during summer 2007. 
The formal interviews lasted from 30 minutes to two hours. I voice recorded and 
transcribed them. I asked questions about the background, context, and content of the 
seminar and his approach to sensegiving. He described several successful company 
renewals and his theory of how companies should manage their employees and, thus, 
increase their productivity and well-being. These interviews, as well as the informal 
discussions, helped me to develop a deeper understanding of the content of the coach’s 
sensegiving and the context and background of the seminar. 
I also tried to use the interviews to understand the sensegiving tactics and process from 
the point of view of the coach. However, the coach had severe difficulties in 
explicating his tacit knowledge of sensegiving (the “how” of his sensegiving). 
Whenever I asked him how he tries to persuade the participants, he immediately 
started talking about the content of his sensegiving. This happened even when I 
interrupted him several times and explained that I was interested in his persuasion 
tactics, not the content. Hence, I was not able to extract an explicit theory of 
sensegiving tactics that the coach was following (and the findings section describes my 
interpretation of his tacit knowledge that surfaced in action only). The facts that I had 
developed a close relationship with the coach, that he genuinely tried to help in doing 
the study, and that he was close to retiring ensure that the coach did not pretend to not 
understand what I was asking to protect his intellectual capital and competitive 
position.  
3.3 Data Analysis, Part 1: the Sensegiving Process 
My data analysis consisted of two parts. First, the theoretically most relevant part 
focused on the sensegiving process in the seminar. The second part assessed changes 
in participants’ mental models.  
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The first part of the analyses proceeded in iterative cycles during which the study’s 
focus became sharper, reducing the breadth of analyses and increasing their depth 
(Figure 2 and Table 5). Each iterative cycle was characterized by moving between data 
analysis, reading the literature, and general conceptual reasoning. I first analyzed the 
seminar and its context in a holistic way to develop a narrative of how the seminar 
unfolded and was related to and supported by organizational factors. Then I put more 
focus on the seminar and, through an iterative process, became more and more focused 
on the coach’s sensegiving tactics, their emotional effects, and then again, at a more 
micro-level on the coach’s emotional sensegiving tactics. The last analysis phase 
provided the theoretical contributions of this study, while the earlier phases provided 
inputs for this last phase and contextual understanding that helps in understanding how 
the theoretical findings can be generalized.  
 
Figure 2: The study’s focus became sharper during the iterative analysis process 
I applied various theoretical perspectives throughout the analysis. I read over 1,500 
books and articles during the five-year analysis period. I applied several of the models 
of the literature in my mind on the data and mentally experimented if they would help 
in explaining the data and in developing theoretical insights. I explored and tested 
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those models that passed these initial tests more explicitly in notes and short memos. 
In this section, I describe those ideas that also passed this second round of testing. The 
broad variety and the mere number of theoretical perspectives applied during the 
process as interpretation aides should have ensured that I have not been overly biased 
by a theoretical lens, when interpreting the data. Rather, I chose to focus on the 
combination of theoretical perspectives that seemed to best explain the data, after 
experimenting with various alternatives. This explanation created by the synthesis of 
the sensegiving theory with the emotion theory also constitutes the foundation of my 
theoretical contribution.  
I will describe the phases of my data analysis as transparently as I can. Even though 
journal articles conventionally describe a reconstruction of data analysis that seems to 
proceed in a linear and straightforward way, it is generally acknowledged that data 
analysis is almost always a messy, iterative process. I hope that the increased 
transparency in my description will increase the trustworthiness of my findings (see 
also, Pratt, 2009; Zalan & Lewis, 2004). 
3.3.1 Phase 1: General understanding of the seminar 
In the first phase of my data analysis, I wanted to develop an overall understanding of 
how and why the seminar influenced the participants and their firms. I used two main 
analytical perspectives to structure this analysis: Kotter’s (1995) eight factors 
contributing to the success of organizational change and Gardner’s (2004) seven 
factors contributing to individual mental model change. I interpreted the seminar data 
through these two lenses and described how the coach’s influencing tactics applied 
their principles.  
In concrete terms, my analysis proceeded as follows: I created tables in which Kotter’s 
eight factors and Gardner’s seven factors were in the left column. Then I wrote notes 
of how the coach and the trained firms applied the principles of the theoretical 
frameworks in the right columns of the table. For instance, one of Gardner’s (2004) 
seven factors is “Real World Events”; he argues that when a new idea is linked with 
concrete external events, people are more likely to believe the new idea (p. 17). I 
showed, in my analysis, how the coach used this principle whenever he told examples 
of the case companies or other companies. Likewise, Kotter argues that “creating a 
sense of urgency” is an essential element of making organizational change succeed; I 
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wrote in the column next to this how the coach’s description of the firm’s problems 
can create such sense of urgency.   
The output of this phase was a narrative report of the unfolding of the seminar and the 
related organizational changes. The document also included the tables I had made as a 
“theoretical explanation” of why the seminar had the effects it had on the participants 
and their firms. The document did not yet contain strong, novel theoretical ideas and 
its main role was to deepen my understanding of the data and its context, as well as to 
function as an input for later phases in the analysis.  
3.3.2 Phase 2: The seminar macro-structure and sensegiving micro-tactics 
The second phase of my analysis consisted of two goals at different levels of analysis. 
First, I wanted to understand the macro-structure of the seminar. I analyzed the 
seminar macro-structure through the unfreeze-change-refreeze model (Lewin, 
1951/1997; Schein, 1999). Again, I created a table in which the concepts of the theory 
framework (psychological safety, survival anxiety, change, refreezing) were in the left 
column. Then I put notes and segments of the data in the right column to investigate 
how the seminar content was consistent with the framework. Through this analysis I 
understood that the coach created strong negative emotions especially during the early 
phases of the seminar (later, during phases 4 to 6, I would focus on how he created 
these emotions and associated them with the cognitive content of the seminar; later 
analyses would also reveal that the coach continued to create strong emotional 
reactions throughout the seminar). 
The second part of the second analysis phase focused on micro-tactics the coach used 
to influence the participants. I used two theoretical perspectives to help me 
conceptualize his micro-tactics. The first perspective was the research on the use of 
heuristics and biases in persuasion (as summarized in Cialdini, 1993 and Huczynski, 
2004: Chapter 9). It focuses on understanding how sensegivers use the cognitive 
shortcuts people use to influence those people. For example, people often change their 
attitudes to match their previous actions, even though those actions had been caused by 
external triggers rather than their attitudes (Festinger, 1957); hence, if a sensegiver 
manages to manipulate someone to show minor commitment to a topic, he or she is 
more likely to be convinced by subsequent sensegiving on the topic (see Cialdini, 
1993: 57-113). 
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The second theoretical perspective I used to analyze the coach’s sensegiving micro-
tactics was Systems Intelligence (Hämäläinen & Saarinen, 2004). It combines insights 
from Senge’s (1990) systems thinking with general lessons of positive psychology 
(Snyder & Lopez, 2005). The main question I was asking from this perspective was 
how the coach creates self-reinforcing interaction cycles that reinforce the effect of the 
coach’s sensegiving among the participants. 
In concrete terms, I used the two theoretical perspectives in my data analysis as 
follows. I went through my observational material of the coach’s sensegiving and 
coded them from these two perspectives. As an example of how I used the heuristics 
and biases perspective, when the coach asked the participants to indicate that they 
agree with the coach, I marked a code, “uses the commitment and consistency bias” to 
the text. Likewise, to illustrate the systems intelligence perspective, when a participant 
then provided an affirmative answer and other participants saw this and also indicated 
their agreement, I drew an arrow diagram (systems diagram as described in Senge, 
1990) and coded the whole section as “commitment reinforcing interaction cycle.” The 
outcome of this coding was the recognition of 11 specific micro-tactics that the coach 
used. Later data analyses, however, caused these initial conceptualizations to undergo 
major changes.  
3.3.3 Phase 3: Linking micro-tactics to macro-process 
I continued analyzing the seminar data from the point of view of both micro-level 
influencing tactics and more macro-level phases of change intervention during fall 
2008. I had changed theoretical perspectives a bit, though. I had replaced the systems 
intelligence perspective with sensemaking (Weick, 1995) and sensegiving (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991) because they suited the data better and offered a more rigorous 
theoretical perspective. I still used the theories of Lewin and Schein to describe the 
macro-phases of change interventions; while also recognizing that both Pratt’s (2000) 
“sensebreaking” and Gioia & Chittipeddi’s (1991: 439) “ambiguity by design” 
resemble the unfreezing concept. I also kept the heuristics and biases perspective as a 
part of my micro-level analyses and Senge’s (1990) system diagrams as a 
methodological tool (although I had already realized that Weick used similar loop 
diagrams in his 1979 book). 
In concrete terms, the analysis proceeded as follows: I used the earlier documents as 
inputs for this analysis phase. I identified the most interesting sensegiving micro-
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tactics recognized earlier and started thinking how they contribute to the macro-phases 
of the seminar. For instance, I noticed that a micro-tactic called “the cycle of opening 
up” seemed to create trust among the participants. Hence, I conceptualized that this 
sensegiving micro-tactic was an essential part of creating “psychological safety” at the 
early stages of unfreezing, in the seminar. Likewise, I concluded that two other micro-
tactics were central to creating “survival anxiety” and “commitment to the change.” 
While I later realized that the way I linked these single instances to the macro-phases 
of the seminar was inaccurate, the insight that the micro-tactics created emotional 
reactions that were relevant for understanding how the coach’s sensegiving worked 
was crucial for my theoretical analysis. 
3.3.4 Phase 4: Focusing on emotional reactions  
When I began the fourth analysis phase, I had already realized that the participants’ 
emotional reactions to the coach’s sensegiving were central for understanding the 
success of his sensegiving. I, therefore, went back to the data and tried to interpret it 
from new angles, understanding what happens, in an emotional sense, during the 
seminar. I read my field notes and the open survey answers the participants had 
provided after the first day and in the morning of the third day. At the same time, I 
kept reading sensegiving articles and reviews about emotion theories. During this 
relatively unstructured process, I discussed with other researchers, wrote short memos 
regularly, and experimented with different perspectives. Ultimately, I got an insight 
that the concept of “faith” (Weick, 2006) could be used to describe the emotional state 
the participants were in after the seminar. I defined faith as a “strong sensation that we 
can do this and we must do this.” In essence, it was a state of high, positive emotional 
arousal (but this more parsimonous description came to my mind only later—after I 
had abandoned the faith concept). 
I also incorporated my emerging understanding of the theories of social cognition (as 
outlined in Fiske & Taylor, 2008) into my analyses. My ideas were, naturally, a bit 
naïve at this stage but they also contained the seed of the main idea of this thesis: I 
understood that one moment of sensegiving can create emotional arousal that can 
transfer to the next moment and be associated with different cognitive content (Fiske 
& Taylor, 2008: 319). I realized that many of the coach’s lessons that had little to do 
with work indeed increased the participants’ emotional arousal and that this arousal 
could be associated with the work-related content the coach was also talking about.  
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Combining the two insights, that faith (a high arousal, positive emotional state) is the 
outcome of the seminar, and that negative arousal can transfer into positive and be 
associated with novel content, I created a preliminary model of how the coach used 
various micro-tactics to “build faith through sensegiving” (Figure 3).  
There were two main limitations in this version of my theorizing: First, I had become 
slightly decoupled from the data in the process of increasing the level of abstraction in 
my conceptualization of the data. My arguments about the flow of events and 
combination of tactics suffered from inaccuracies. Second, the concept of faith created 
more confusion than clarity—it took attention away from basic emotional dynamics, 
while inviting religious questions, and not helping in understanding the data or 
sensegiving. 
 
 
Figure 3: According to my 2009 interpretation, three micro-tactics moved emotional state from 
(1) neutral to (2) mild positive to (3) strong negative to (4) strong positive faith 
3.3.5 Phase 5: Creating and transferring emotional arousal 
During the fifth analysis phase, I kept simplifying and elaborating the model presented 
in Figure 3. I simplified the model by abandoning the concept of faith and by merging 
the two arousal-increasing cycles into one tactic: increasing arousal. I also selectively 
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coded all the notes I had of the seminar to identify any tactics the coach used for 
increasing the participants’ emotional arousal. I recognized a handful of such instances 
and collected them into a table. However, I did not further process these tactics into 
sub-categories or conceptualize them. I did not do this further analysis and 
conceptualization of the tactics because the number of instances was small in my notes 
(I still had no access to the digitized video).  
I elaborated the model by reading more about sensegiving and emotion and social 
cognition theories. I developed a better theoretical understanding of what can cause 
emotional arousal, how it can be recognized in people, how it influences their thinking, 
behavior, and memory, and how fast/slowly arousal can decay. I incorporated these 
insights into the manuscript I had of the sensegiving process at that time.  
While the key insight of leveraging emotional arousal that is created with work-
unrelated content started to become stronger, my model still contained a serious flaw. 
The model assumed that the arousal transfer happens over longer time periods than a 
few minutes. I was still biased by the idea of three main phases (i.e. Lewin’s [1947] 
unfreeze-change-refreeze and also Pratt’s [2000] sensebreaking-sensegiving-
identification). I was able to recognize this flaw in my thinking with the help of the 
data. I used the open-ended survey answers that the participants of the seminar that 
was video-recorded had provided after the first day and at the beginning of the third 
day in the seminar to verify my hunch. Once I had understood that the coach seemed to 
manipulate the participants’ level of emotional arousal, I coded the open-ended 
answers along two dimensions of arousal (high-low) and valence (positive-neutral-
negative). This coding showed that the majority of the participants were negatively 
aroused after the first day and positively aroused in the morning of the third day. 
However, when I asked another PhD student to code the same material in the same 
way, it suffered from low inter-coder agreement (71% for arousal and 54% for 
valence). The low inter-coder agreement in this phase was an important turning point 
for my theorizing. Earlier in the process, I had thought that the coach would first 
increase arousal by providing negative information during the first day, and then 
associate this high arousal with positive valence. The fact that the data did not support 
this claim helped me to realize also the theoretical flaw in my idea—that emotional 
arousal can transfer only over short time periods (minutes), not days, as I initially had 
thought.  
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3.3.6 Phase 6: Microscopic focus on the dynamics of emotional sensegiving 
I started the final iteration cycle with (1) the insight that there are emotional and 
cognitive components in sensegiving and (2) the assumption that arousal reinforces the 
effects of cognitive sensegiving. I digitized the 16 video tapes (approximately 15 hours 
of video) which I had of the seminar and analyzed that video with computer, as 
described below. As I moved further in my analysis, I got deeper and deeper into the 
“how” of the arousal component. 
I will describe the iterative coding process in detail below. To make my data as 
transparent as possible, I will describe in a chronological narrative how I recognized 
different sub-elements in the data; how I categorized them into second-order categories 
and theoretical dimensions (Figure 4); and how the model that is presented in the 
section “emotional sensegiving in the seminar” ultimately emerged from the data. 
Before moving to the narrative, however, allow me to make six general observations 
about the coding process. 
First, the coding proceeded as follows. I watched the video and paused it every few 
seconds or couple of minutes, depending on what was happening. Whenever 
something relevant happened, I stopped the video, marked the beginning and end point 
of that relevant episode, and wrote a code that described this episode. These 
descriptions are called first-order codes. I needed about four to six hours to code each 
hour of the video. I coded only one or two hours of video per day to maintain freshness 
and attention in coding. In this way, I produced 60-100 first-order codes per one hour 
of video. 
Second, the coding process was highly iterative. While I was coding, I constantly 
wrote memos and initial categorizations and models to keep making sense of the data.  
The categorization of first-order codes into second-order categories and aggregate, 
theoretical dimensions are essential elements of inductive, qualitative analyses (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998; Corley & Gioia, 2004). I constantly compared the first-order codes in 
my mind and created various alternative categorizations. I also recorded these ideas 
into memos, producing 5-10 memos per one hour of video. 
Third, categorization is always a bit fuzzy a process. In fact, there are two ways 
humans can categorize entities (see e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Smith & DeCoster, 
2000) and both of these ways bracket continuous reality (Weick, 1979). The first way 
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to categorize is to group similar objects together. The second way is to first define the 
abstract properties of a category and then include those empirical instances in that 
category that meet the abstract criteria. In reality, when I was coding, these two ways 
of categorizing were intertwined. I conceptually understood what happened in concrete 
episodes and then generated ideal/abstract properties of a category from my insights. 
Then I observed instances that roughly met these criteria and grouped them into the 
same category. At the same time, I recognized that some concrete instances were 
similar to the ones already included in the category, and grouped them together based 
on similarity and further thought about the abstract properties of that category. But I 
also used these new instances to define the category. Consequently, by comparing the 
similar instances and making sense of their properties, I actually redefined the abstract 
properties of the category that was emerging. Then I again looked for instances that 
met the abstract criteria and/or were similar to the instances already included in the 
category. Hence, it was through this fuzzy and iterative process that the ultimate 
categories emerged.  
Fourth, I constantly worked directly with the video, not transcripts during this last 
analysis phase. This way I got a much deeper understanding of not only what was said, 
but how it was said and all the non-verbal behaviors and reactions of the coach and the 
participants. The coding, categorization and writing were much slower this way, but 
the additional depth it provided was invaluable. 
Fifth, as my focus was now on emotional sensegiving, I also needed to code for 
emotions. I needed to pay attention to both the sensegiver’s emotional displays and the 
participants’ emotional reactions. To increase the trustworthiness of my coding, I 
familiarized myself with various ways of assessing emotions from observational data. I 
read reports, books, and studies that discussed assessing emotions from the pitch of the 
voice (Sobin & Alpert, 1999), skin resistance (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Naqvi & 
Bechara, 2006), facial expressions (Ekman, 2003; Ekman & Friesen, 1978), body 
postures and movements (de_Meijer, 1989; Pease & Pease, 2006), and the display of 
emotions in general (Damasio, 1994, 2003; Goleman, 1995, 1998). I also 
experimented with many of the instruments that have been developed for assessing 
emotions in these different ways (including: software for assessing voice pitch; 
hardware and software for measuring skin conductance; software for reading emotions 
from facial expressions). I had also gained familiarity with such tools by developing 
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concrete prototypes of a device that applied such emotion-reading hardware and 
software.7  To maintain the transparency of my interpretations, I have tried to describe 
the facts of what I saw and heard in the video as accurately as possible in the findings 
section, whenever I am making inferences about the participants’ emotional reactions. 
The explicit cues that I used for recognizing emotions are presented in Table 6 below.  
Table 6: Observable cues of emotional states used in coding emotional reactions 
Emotional 
cue 
Description Reference 
Laughter & 
crying 
Positive arousal: laughter: “ha-ha-ha” voice and smile 
with open mouth which usually shows teeth 
Negative arousal: crying: Tears, trembling voice, whining 
sounds 
Damasio, 1994; 
Goleman, 1995 
Change in 
volume and 
pitch of voice  
Fear/nervousness: higher pitch, somewhat lower volume 
Anger: lower pitch, higher volume 
Joy: somewhat higher pitch, somewhat higher volume 
Sadness: lower volume 
Sobin & Alpert, 
1999 
Body 
movements 
Anger and excitement: increased body activity, such as 
aggressive waving of hands or leaning forward 
Anxiety and uncomfortable emotions: moving back and 
forth or from side to side; repeatedly changing position on 
a chair. Similar head movements and scratching head. 
Looking for help from others. 
Fear and sadness: closing down (head down, hands pulled 
together close to the body, lack of movement) and/or 
moving as if to avoid something (backwards, around an 
object) 
de Meijer, 1989 
Facial 
expressions 
Anger: eyebrows pulled down and together, lips tightened 
or grimace 
Sadness: eyebrows pulled up and together, cheeks pulled 
up, lips pulled down, face tilts downwards 
Fear: eyebrows pulled up, upper eyelids high up, mouth 
open, lip corners pulled toward ears 
Joy: smile (lips pulled up, eyes wrinkled) 
Disgust: wrinkled nose, eyebrows down, lower eyelids up 
Contempt: asymmetric face such that one lip corner is 
pulled up while the other remains still 
Ekman, 2003; 
Ekman & 
Friesen, 1978 
 
                                                 
7
 The prototypes were developed during a student course “Mechanical Engineering 310” 
organized by Stanford University: http://www.stanford.edu/group/me310/me310_2010/ 
[Accessed 2011-04-15] I participated in the course in the academic year 2006-2007. My team’s 
task was to develop a portable device that uses biofeedback to communicate emotions to 
people. We built several prototypes that used different technologies for this purpose. They 
included tone of voice, content of words, heart-rate, skin conductance, skin temperature, facial 
expressions, and body posture. This coursework increased my knowledge of and ability to 
recognize non-verbal signs of emotions 
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I used the cues outlined in Table 6 in a heuristic way when I carried out the qualitative, 
theory building analysis. The cues recognized in Table 6 are peripheral correlates of 
emotional states that exist inside the heads of individuals (Russell, 2003). Hence, these 
cues do not always manifest when there is an emotional state. People tend to suppress 
some emotional reactions, like crying, shouting, and aggressive body movements, in 
public situations. In addition, a purely cognitive reaction, such as thinking “that is 
logically correct” should not provide any visible reactions, such as nodding or shaking 
head from side to side, as thinking happens inside the head. Body movements indicate 
that some level of emotional arousal was triggered by an argument and the consequent 
thinking process; the arousal might be too low for the person to register it as an 
emotion, yet sufficiently high to produce a spontaneous behavioral reaction (see 
Damasio, 2003: Chapter 2; Russell, 2003). Hence, even marginal signs of emotional 
reactions can be considered as relevant evidence. In addition, the fact that several 
participants showed signs of emotions in most instances that were categorized as 
emotional reactions reduces the probability that I had coded random body movements 
as emotional reactions.  
I also carried out a reliability check with more focused coding on emotions, including 
an assessment of inter-coder reliability, after I had finished the inductive coding phase. 
The procedure and results of the inter-coder reliability assessment are reported later in 
this section.  
Sixth, when I was coding for the seminar participants’ reactions, my focus was on the 
most common reactions. Not all people reacted in the same way all the time. However, 
most people reacted in similar ways most of the time. As my goal was to understand 
sensegiving tactics and their typical effects, I chose to limit my focus to the common 
reactions. There are undoubtedly several individual-level factors that influence how 
people react to sensegiving. I address some of them in the “contextual limitations” 
section below. For the purposes of my theorizing, however, understanding how most 
of the seminar participants reacted to the coach’s sensegiving is sufficient. 
Coding: ideas of data structure emerge on 2011-03-20 
Having now discussed the general principles of the last phase of my data analysis, it is 
time to describe the actual analysis process in detail (if you just want to see the 
outcome, please jump to Figure 4 on page 70). I describe in microscopic detail the 
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coding and theorizing that happened between March 20 and March 25, as this period is 
representative of how my theoretical insights emerged. It also illustrates how I started 
refining the emergent idea; a process that ultimately led to my findings.  
I started simply by watching the video with the Atlas.ti software and coding the video. 
I had first developed more elaborate insights about what the coach was doing after 
coding Tapes 1-3 and 33 minutes of tape four. I recognized three main elements in the 
coach’s sensegiving, and some potential sub-categories in them. The three main 
elements formed in my head as I was doing the first-order coding – I compared the 
instances and grouped similar instances together in my thoughts; I experimented with 
tens of combinations during this thinking process. I wrote the following memo about 
the data structure: 
 
------ Memo begins ------ 
1. Increasing arousal 
- Harsh claims 
- Jokes 
- Intimate stories 
- Confusion about concepts [Retrospectively added comment: This sub-
category did not get sufficient empirical support and I had to abandon it at a later 
stage] 
2. Cognitive reframing 
- Re-explaining harsh claim [This category later transformed into “re-
explaining”] 
- Same example linked to work context 
- Less related lecturing [This category later transformed into “Simple 
telling”] 
3. Ensuring commitment 
- Asking for affirmation 
- Asking to think about the point [This sub-category did not get 
sufficient empirical support and I had to abandon it] 
- Recap/summarize key points [I realized later that this category is a form of 
simple telling rather than a tactic for increasing commitment] 
These three phases repeat themselves again and again. Much of 
the content that has followed the pattern are 
o overview 
o Taylor 
o Org chart 
o Kerttu [“Kerttu” is the name of a woman] 
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o Hoiva [Translation: nurture]: Starts with arousing fact & 
question (”why mom wants to destroy his son?”), 
description of hoiva [nurture] process (really blaming 
women and mothers = harsh claims) 
o kuri & kurinalaisuus 
o if rules are not followed: first discusses with 
audience, then makes his point with "minua on 
hakattu" [I have been beaten] 
------ Memo ends ------ 
 
After these initial realizations, my coding focused more on these elements. As can be 
seen below, the idea was refined, elaborated, extended, and sharpened during the 
coding and analysis process.  
Refining the set of second-order categories 2011-03-22 
I started experimenting with initial second-order categories more systematically by 
creating "families" in Atlas.ti software: I started with those second-order categories 
that seemed the clearest by creating a family name for such categories. I started this 
explicit grouping for families after I had coded four hours of the seminar video and 
produced 363 codes and 34 memos. I felt that I had to create some explicit structure on 
the complex data or I would get too confused. On March 22, 2011, the initial set of 
second-order categories was:  
- Asking for affirmation 
- Brutal, provocative claim 
- Joke 
- Legitimizing emotions 
- Links previous illustration to workplace 
- Open display of emotion 
- Reacting to audience’s display of disbelief (this category emerged only when I 
was grouping together codes for 'Asking for affirmation') 
- Reference to intimate relationship 
- Work-related provocative examples (this category emerged only when I was 
grouping together codes for 'Reference to intimate relationship') 
I accumulated 15-40 codes for these initial categories. Once I had grouped them 
together, I could develop a better understanding of each emergent category and its 
properties. I wrote new notes and memos also in this phase, and an initial description 
of these categories with theoretical explanation and empirical illustrations in both text 
and tables.  
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In parallel with creating the second-order categories and defining their properties, I 
also coded for micro-episodes that showed progress in time from amplifying arousal to 
cognitive (re)framing, and reinforcing commitment, after viewing the first four hours 
of the video. I was able to recognize various instances with this kind of a pattern, even 
though I still had no explicit second-order codes to describe the specific tactics the 
coach used in each of the three main phases.  
By simultaneously coding for the second-order categories and for the micro-episodes, I 
was able to develop both a deepening understanding of each specific tactic and a more 
general understanding of their interdependence. In this way, I managed to cope with 
the challenge of understanding the whole vs. parts. On one hand, none of the micro-
acts of sensegiving, such as a single joke, makes sense if it is not connected to a larger 
whole. On the other hand, a description of the larger process is not that insightful 
unless one understands its elements. 
Intense refinement continues 2011-03-25 
I kept making sense of the data and writing my insights down into a text document that 
ultimately became the findings section of this thesis between March 22 and March 25. 
During this writing period, I constantly went back to the data to understand it better. In 
three days, the initial set of second-order categories had evolved such that I thought I 
had good understanding of the following five categories: 
- Reference to intimate relationship (38 coded instances in the data)  
- Jokes (36) 
- Bridging an example to work content (6) 
- Pure lecturing (8) 
- “Do you find this logical?” (23) 
I had also recognized that the following categories have potential value in explaining 
the emotional sensegiving process and tactics in the seminar. However, I felt that there 
was not enough data to clearly understand, define, and conceptualize these categories, 
so I decided to pay close attention to such kinds of dynamics in the subsequent rounds 
of coding. 
- Tactics that weakened the desire to control emotions or encouraged the 
participants to react emotionally (28) [Retrospectively added comment: The 
fourth theoretical dimension—legitimizing sensegiving tools—evolved from 
this second-order category]  
- Brutal claims (38) 
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- Re-explaining with more nuances and qualifiers (2) 
- Increasing efficacy (3) 
- Other tactics for increasing commitment (-) 
I also decided to still keep an open mind when continuing the coding after analyzing 
the first four hours of the video. I did this because the coach might introduce some new 
tactics during later phases of the seminar. Likewise, new kinds of reactions and 
patterns could emerge from the audience. 
In terms of the second dimension along which I was coding—the temporal progress 
with the tactics—I decided to still code several examples from the second and third 
day so that I could see if and how the micro-level episodes changed during the 
seminar. The evidence I had gathered by coding data from the first day indicated that 
the episodes progressed in a similar manner from (i) increasing arousal to (ii) cognitive 
(re)framing to (iii) increasing commitment. This insight needed to be verified with 
additional data from the next two days of the seminar.  
One more round of sensemaking before moving to the fifth hour 2011-03-26  
Before moving on to code the fifth video, I decided to go through all the codes one 
more time and try to assign them to families (second-order categories). I felt that I still 
could find many relevant categories and codes from the data that I had missed during 
the earlier days of coding. It took me about two hours to go through the list of 360+ 
codes, with focus only on those codes that had not been assigned to families before. 
During this process, I assigned tens of first-order codes to the existing families 
(second-order categories) and also recognized a handful of potential new families and 
assigned some codes to these families. I also started seeing similarities and differences 
between different families. Regarding the categories that I had earlier recognized to 
need more data, I found more codes for the following: 
- Brutal claims: new total number of codes: 56  
- Increasing efficacy: 16 
- Re-explaining: 10 
- Links previous example to workplace: 12  
- Pure lecturing: 47 
- Legitimizing emotions: 30 
Also new categories started emerging at this stage. Hence, I decided to give attention 
to them in the future rounds of coding. Such new categories were:  
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- Audience arousal (26)8 
- Background of the coach (9) 
- Emotional lecturing (content that is emotional and work-related): 25 
- Interactive lecturing: 19 
- Legitimizing sensegiving tools (2) 
- Open display of emotion9 (9) 
- Pushes the participant(s): 13 
- Work-related provocative examples (38) 
It is also important to note that I did not find support for two categories that I had 
thought would have a central role in explaining the data. In other words, my earlier 
intuitive feel of what was going on in the data was not corroborated by the more 
analytical approach of coding the data. The implication of this lack of support was that 
I seriously needed to consider dropping these categories from my model. However, I 
decided to keep them still in the process so that I would notice if the behaviors only 
emerged in later phases of the seminar (yet, there was no more data about them, so I 
dropped these categories from the final model). The categories were: 
- Imagining the personal consequences of the idea (a form of increasing 
commitment): 0 codes 
- Confusing terms trigger arousal and debate: 4 codes 
There were also four other second-order categories that received only a handful of 
codes. However, some of these tactics were of such quality that it made sense that such 
behaviors only occurred a few times. In addition, the fact that such behaviors were 
missing from the seminar and the coach's sensegiving toolkit were also revealing. 
- Reacting to audience display of disbelief: 8 (actually quite many times for four 
hours) 
- Recaps core points: 4 
- Speaks about his own role: 1 (the coach did very little meta-level discussion in 
the seminars and also in the interviews with me) 
Outcome of the data analysis A: Data structure in categories 
I kept coding the video and simultaneously categorizing the codes along the two 
dimensions of data structure and temporal pattern in the same iterative way as 
illustrated above. The data structure that is presented in Figure 4 ultimately emerged 
                                                 
8
  In the description of the data, I have merged this category with the categories describing 
sensegiving tactics that aimed at increasing arousal because the participants’ reactions were 
tightly coupled with such tactics 
9
 I initially coded for open display of emotions as a separate emotional sensegiving tactic. 
However, I noticed that open display of emotion was usually part of the other emotional 
sensegiving tactics. Therefore, I decided to not present it as a separate category in the findings 
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from the data. I categorized the 1,252 first-order codes into 17 second-order categories. 
I further categorized these 17 second-order categories into four main theoretical 
dimensions that refer to different types of sensegiving tactics: increasing arousal, 
cognitive (re)framing, reinforcing commitment, and legitimizing sensegiving tools. 
The findings section describes numerous data to illustrate each category.  
 
Figure 4: Emergent data structure  
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Outcome of the data analysis B: Temporal progression of sensegiving 
The data also showed the temporal progression from increasing arousal to cognitive 
(re)framing to increasing commitment. As the data described in the next chapter 
shows, one of the second-order codes categorized under the aggregate dimension of 
increasing arousal often started the teaching of a new content. These second-order 
codes were often followed by one of the second-order codes categorized under the 
aggregate dimension of cognitive (re)framing. Finally, second-order codes categorized 
under the aggregate dimension of reinforcing commitment often concluded episodes 
focusing on a single point. 
It should be noted that defining what constitutes a micro-episode is not a trivial 
question. When I decided which sensegiving instances together constituted a micro-
episode, I was bracketing a continuous flow of events and words in the seminar. The 
choice of how to bracket continuous events is always a judgment call and a social 
agreement rather than a fact that exists in the external reality (Weick, 1979: 153-157). 
The way I bracketed the data was my interpretation which was influenced by the 
theoretical lenses I used. Other scholars using different lenses might have bracketed 
the data in a different way. At the same time, there are two empirical facts that do not 
depend on the lens used to bracket the data: (1) the coach increased the participants’ 
arousal levels just seconds or minutes before telling work-related content and (2) 
emotional arousal influences people’s perceptions, interpretations, and memory. The 
way I bracketed the data allowed conceptualizing the process of generating emotional 
arousal and associating it with work-related content. This conceptualization allows us 
to better understand what happened in the seminar and to theorize how emotional 
arousal could be used to increase the effectiveness of sensegiving also elsewhere. In 
essence, my interpretation of the data increases our theoretical understanding of 
sensegiving. 
3.3.7  Inter-coder agreement of the second-order categories 
To ensure the trustworthiness of my conceptualization of the data into second-order 
categories and theoretical dimensions, I asked two outsiders to code segments of my 
data. The initial level of agreement was 96% and consensus was found over the 
remaining codes through discussion. The specific steps in the external validation 
exercise were: 
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1. I first created a document to provide structure for the inter-coder assessment: I 
wrote down instructions for the assessment for the outsiders, made a table into 
which they could provide their answers, and wrote a definition of each 
category in the document. 
2. I collected one to three representative video clips of each second-order 
category. In total, I collected 23 video clips. The duration of these clips varied 
from four seconds to three minutes. 
3. I showed the 23 video clips to the two outsiders and asked them to answer 
which clip belonged to which category in the document that I had created in 
the first step. I briefly walked them through the category definitions before the 
coding exercise. The two coders carried out the process separately. Neither of 
them knew the theoretical idea or data of my research prior to the coding 
exercise. I did not see their answers until they had finished the coding 
exercise. I allowed the coders to watch the clips many times. Both of them 
recognized most of the clips/categories immediately and wanted to see only a 
few categories two or three times. Both coders needed about one hour to 
categorize the 23 video clips. 
4. I asked the coders to tell me once they were ready. They then showed their 
coding results to me and we went through them together. We compared their 
results with the way I had categorized the video clips.  
The level of agreement was sufficiently high in this reliability check. Both coders 
agreed with 22 of 23 (96%) categorizations with me. Both coders only disagreed with 
me on the categorization of one video clip. It was a different clip for each of them. 
When there was disagreement, I explained my idea to them and asked if they could see 
my logic. Both of them immediately said that they realized what I meant and agreed 
with my categorization.  
Given that both coders were able to categorize the video clips in the same way as I had 
done in my inductive categorization of the data, the trustworthiness of my findings is 
increased. It seems that I coded and categorized the data in a way that is reasonable for 
outsiders who are exposed to the data and the category definitions for the first time. 
Hence, it can be concluded that my conceptualization of the data accurately describes 
the data. 
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3.3.8 Inter-coder agreement of the emotional reactions to sensegiving 
After having recognized and externally validated the sensegiving categories discussed 
above, I carried out a further validity check. I wanted to double check that the seminar 
participants did indeed react emotionally to the six sensegiving tactics that were 
categorized under the aggregate dimension of “increasing arousal.” While I was 
coding for the sensegiving tactics as discussed above, my approach was open-ended 
and I did not explicitly score emotional reactions among any dimension. Instead, I was 
paying attention to sensegiving and reactions to it, keeping also emotional dynamics in 
mind. What emerged were the categories described above. My open codes implied that 
emotions are a relevant part of the process. The explicit coding for emotional reactions 
to sensegiving that I describe here was carried out to verify that this was indeed the 
case. The coding proceeded in five steps. 
1. I used the Table 6 (above, on page 63) which shows four main categories for 
recognizing emotional reactions as the starting point of the validation task. 
2. I selected video clips that consisted of the coach’s sensegiving act and the 
participants’ reactions to the sensegiving. I collected five or six representative 
clips of each of the six sensegiving categories. Hence, I had 32 clips. I edited 
the clips so that only the participants’ reactions remained in each clip (but I 
kept record of which reaction related to which sensegiving act). I also included 
8 clips that showed non-emotional reactions so that I could distinguish 
between emotional vs. non-emotional reaction. In total, then, I had 40 video 
clips. 
3. I first coded the 40 clips myself in terms of the explicit cues of emotions 
shown in Table 6. I coded each clip on a scale from zero to two in terms of 
each of the four categories of emotional cues (0: no evidence, 1: some 
evidence, 2: clear evidence). I recognized emotional cues in all of the clips that 
showed reactions to “increasing arousal”  tactics and I did not recognize 
emotional cues in the clips that showed reactions to non-emotional 
sensegiving tactics. Hence, the preliminary check was satisfied. 
4. I asked two outsiders to code the same clips using the same coding scheme. 
They had only a marginal understanding of my research topic. They only saw 
the participants’ reactions so they had no idea why the participants reacted the 
way they did. Hence, they only focused on coding whether or not the 
participants showed emotional cues in their reactions or not. The fact that one 
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of the coders did not speak Finnish (which is spoken on the video) further 
corroborates the claim that the coding was indeed based on non-verbal 
reactions, not on the content of words. I asked the coders to view each clip 
four times, so that on each viewing, they focused on one of the four signs of 
emotions. I also allowed them to review any clips as many times as they felt 
was necessary. 
5. I first calculated the level of agreement between the two coders and between 
me and each coder in terms of the details of emotional displays. This was done 
by calculating how many of the 160 cells (40 clips x 4 emotion-cue categories) 
the coders agreed on with each other. 
6. I also calculated the level of agreement in terms of whether each clip was 
coded as emotional or not. This latter check provided a general view of if there 
were emotions in the participants’ reactions in the specific clip or not. It was 
judged that the coders agreed that the episode was emotional if they both had 
recognized at least some evidence for at least one of the four emotion 
categories. Conversely, they were judged to disagree if one of them coded that 
there was no evidence of emotional cues in a clip, whereas another one of 
them coded at least some evidence of emotional cues in the clip.  
7. In addition to the simple level of agreement which is the de facto standard for 
assessing inter-coder reliability in qualitative sensemaking and sensegiving 
studies (see e.g., Clark, Gioia, Ketchen, & Thomas, 2010; Gioia et al., 2010), I 
also counted Cohen’s Kappa values for agreement. The Cohen’s Kappa can be 
considered a more robust measure for inter-coder agreement because it adjusts 
the estimates such that the effects of chance agreement are taken into account. 
However, it can also be considered too conservative because it assumes that if 
coders are not certain of their input they simply guess, whereas in real life this 
is not likely to be the case. Instead, coders may often feel uncertain between 
two alternatives and choose the one that feels a bit better than the other one. In 
any case, values between .41–.60 are considered to indicate moderate 
agreement and values between .61–.80 are considered to indicate substantial 
agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
The results of the inter-coder reliability check show a sufficient level of agreement 
between the coders. In terms of the specific emotion categories, the level of agreement 
between the two coders was 83%. Coder #1 and I agreed on 80% of the codes and 
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Coder #2 and I agreed on 79% of the codes. In terms of whether the clips showed any 
emotional cues or not, the level of agreement was 90% between the two outsiders, 
82.5% between me and Coder #1, and 92.5% between me and Coder #2. Given that 
existing sensemaking and sensegiving studies have reported agreement levels around 
85% as sufficient (see e.g., Clark et al., 2010), the level of agreement in this study can 
be considered sufficient as well.  
Likewise, the values of Cohen’s Kappa were sufficient. In terms of the specific 
emotion cues, the values varied between substantial and moderate: the values were 
0.64, 0.58, and 0.59, respectively, between the two outside coders, me and Coder #1, 
and me and Coder #2. In terms of whether the clips showed any emotion or not, 
Cohen’s Kappa varied between substantial and moderate: the values were 0.69, 0.48, 
and 0.75, for the three pairs, respectively. 
In conclusion, also the second validity check increases the trustworthiness of my 
findings. The inter-coder reliability is sufficient, indicating that I have coded the 
material in an acceptable way. When I had made the judgment that the participants’ 
reaction was emotional, also outsiders recognized an emotional reaction in the same 
video clip. Hence, my theorizing on the effects of the coach’s sensegiving on the 
seminar participants’ emotional arousal seems to build on solid enough an empirical 
foundation.  
3.4 Data Analysis, Part 2: Changes in Mental Models  
While the main theoretical focus of this thesis is in understanding the process of 
emotional sensegiving, I also analyzed if and how this process had influenced the 
seminar participants’ mental models. I used four sources of data to assess different 
types of changes in the participants’ mental models.  
3.4.1 Interviews before and after the seminar  
I assessed whether those participants that I interviewed before and after the seminar #2 
had changed their thinking. I listened and transcribed the ten before and after 
interviews. I then systematically compared the before and after statements to recognize 
any kind of changes in the participants’ beliefs and attitudes.  
The interviews allowed recognizing two different types of mental model change. The 
first type of change in mental models is the addition of a new element or relationship 
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into a mental model. For instance, an old mental model might contain a causal 
relationship from A to concepts B and C. An addition of a concept-type of a change in 
this kind of a mental model would be the addition of concept D in such a way that A 
has a causal influence on D in addition to B and C (Figure 5). I was able to recognize 
this type of changes in the interviewees’ mental models when they described a broader 
set of connections between elements and/or totally new elements in the after-the-
seminar interview, compared to the before-the-seminar interview. 
 
Figure 5: The addition of an element and a relationship to mental model 
A second type of change in the mental model is a change in the valence or quality of a 
relationship to its opposite. For instance, the old mental model might hold that “k” 
belongs to category A, whereas the new mental model would hold that “k” does not 
belong to A. In another example, a person might initially believe that communicating 
with the dead is impossible but after seeing persuasive evidence, she might start to 
believe the opposite and hold that communicating with the death is actually possible.  
In technical terms, such a flip to the opposite consists of two parts: the first part is the 
rejection of the old relationship and the new part is the addition of the new 
relationship. For instance, a person who previously believed that smoking is good 
needs to invalidate the belief that it is good and develop a new belief that smoking is 
bad. Many recent models of attitude (Bohner & Dickel, 2011) and belief (Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004) change maintain that the first part, the negation of the old belief, is 
done by adding a negation tag to the old belief. The outcome for the smoker would be 
a mental model in which smoking is associated with both good and bad, but in such a 
way that the association to good is also associated with the tag “invalid” (Figure 6 
below). As long as the associations between smoking and bad, and between good and 
invalid are stronger than the association between smoking and good, the person is 
more likely to behave according to the new belief.   
A
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C
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Figure 6: Flip to the opposite in a mental model (Adapted from Bohner & Dickel, 2011)  
Recognizing changes in which a person’s belief flips to the opposite from the 
interview data was relatively straightforward. For example, if the interviewees had 
described some activity as positive before the seminar and then described it as negative 
after the seminar, I concluded that they had developed an opposite belief to what they 
used to have. 
3.4.2 Before and after surveys 
As a second way to assess mental model changes, I used excel to analyze if the 
answers to the Likert-type survey questions that the participants of the second and 
third seminar filled before and after the seminars had changed. One row was allocated 
for the answers of each participant, so that both before-the-seminar and after-the-
seminar answers of each participant were matched on the same row.  I simply 
calculated the average change in the survey responses before and after the seminar, as 
well as how many participants had changed their thinking. 
The survey approach allowed assessing changes in the strength of beliefs rather than 
the more categorical changes in mental models depicted above. People can reinforce 
their beliefs about some relationships. For instance, a person might believe that A 
influences B. After persuasive communication supporting the idea that AB, the 
person might become more convinced that A indeed influences B, and that the 
influence of A on B is actually stronger than he previously believed (Figure 7). This 
kind of change is the most difficult to observe because the mental model does not 
change qualitatively. However, the quantitative change in the strength of the 
relationship can still have a major influence on the way the person makes sense of the 
world and acts in the future. For example, if a CEO believes initially that new 
technology is a weak threat for the company, he or she is not likely to take action. 
However, as the intensity of that belief incrementally increases, also the likelihood of 
action increases.  
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Figure 7: Increase in the intensity of a belief in a mental model 
Technically, when the averages in the participants’ level of agreement with a statement 
in the survey responses increased, I concluded that they had increased the strength of 
the corresponding belief.  
3.4.3 Two retrospective interview analyses 
I used the retrospective interview data to heuristically evaluate whether or not the 
cognitive changes created by the seminar were long-lasting. I listened to and 
transcribed the five interviews of the participants of the seminars held in 2000. I 
systematically marked each sentence in which the participants described what they 
remember of the content of the seminar and how it has (or has not) influenced their 
thinking and behaviors. Then I presented these statements in a document and discussed 
if and how they provide evidence of mental model change caused by the seminar. 
I also reread the change leaders’ interviews and underlined every sentence they made 
about the effects of the seminar on the participants. I then summarized each change 
leader’s arguments, presented them in text, and discussed which kinds of evidence the 
statements provide. Altogether, the outcomes of this assessment of mental model 
change are presented in chapter “Evidence of Mental Model Change in the Change 
Seminar.” 
3.5 Limitations in the Research Design 
There are four research design limitations and six contextual limitations that should be 
taken into account when considering the findings of this study. This section describes 
the limitations in the research design and the next section focuses on the contextual 
limitations. Even though research limitations are conventionally discussed only in the 
discussion section, I chose to follow Starbuck’s (1999) advice and Burgelman & 
Gove’s (2007) example and address the limitations already in the method section. I 
believe this allows the reader to better understand my findings and their context.  
A BA B
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3.5.1 Just one coach 
The most salient limitation of this study is that I focused only on one coach and, 
ultimately, only on one seminar. However, the unit of analysis in this kind of research 
is not actually the sensegiver but rather the sensegiving instance (see Glaser & Strauss, 
1967: Chapter V). I analyzed and compared a total of 1,252 sensegiving instances in 
the data. Some of the sensegiving instances were highly emotional whereas others 
were not emotional at all; different instances created different audience reactions. It 
was these nuanced differences between the different sensegiving instances that 
allowed me to recognize the key theoretical dimensions in the data—that some 
sensegiving tactics influence emotions whereas others influence cognitions, 
commitment, or perceptions of the legitimacy. Hence, there was mass, richness, and 
variety at the micro-level in the data that allowed generating novel and relevant 
theoretical findings. 
The influence of more macro-level factors, like the coach’s size, location of the 
seminar, and the educational level of the participants, are macro-level variables that 
are treated as contextual factors in this study, as discussed below.  
3.5.2 Measuring emotional arousal 
When I planned this study, I had no intention to focus on emotional arousal. I therefore 
did not incorporate any specific instruments to assess participants’ arousal levels in my 
data collection. Consequently, when the idea of the importance of emotional arousal 
ultimately emerged, I had to infer emotional arousal from the participants’ verbal and 
non-verbal reactions from the video and other materials. This approach to 
measurement is, obviously, suboptimal. However, I believe that the rough estimates of 
the participants’ emotional reactions that I was able to deduce from the video and other 
sources provide a sufficiently accurate description of what happened during the 
seminar. The fact that the inter-coder agreement check provided a sufficiently high 
level of agreement further corroborates this claim. By minimum, my description of the 
cognitive and emotional dynamics in the seminar is more accurate than those of the 
previous sensegiving studies that have relied only on field notes and interviews. 
Hence, despite the limitations of my way of measuring emotional arousal, it can still 
be believed that my inductive theory building is based on solid enough a foundation. 
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If I did the study again, I would use physiological measures of arousal. I would make 
the participants wear recording heart rate and GSR devices and match their time log 
with the video. This would allow me to assess the participants’ physiological reaction 
to each sentence spoken by the coach. This way I could get reliable data linking 
specific sensegiving acts by the coach to increases in participants’ emotional arousal. It 
would also allow observing emotional reactions that cannot be recognized through 
visual observation. Furthermore, such accurate measures would allow testing if those 
participants, whose emotional reactions were stronger, also changed their mental 
models more and/or whether those lessons that were accompanied by more arousal 
tactics had a larger average effect on the participants.  
One might also consider using surveys to measure the participants’ emotional arousal. 
However, they would not allow tapping the instant, momentary reactions to specific 
sensegiving tactics but only an overall assessment of emotional arousal during some 
period. For instance, the surveys could be filled every hour (how aroused were you 
during the last hour? 1…7). A second limitation of this kind of a survey approach 
would be that such repeated measures would invite self-reflection and intervene with 
the process. Hence, I would not use survey design as the primary means for collecting 
process data on emotional reactions.  
3.5.3 Assumptions about the effects of emotional arousal 
A central theoretical assumption that I am making throughout this study is that 
emotional arousal created at one moment in time can transfer to the next moment in 
time and influence the cognitive processing and its outcomes during the second 
moment. These assumptions are based on robust empirical studies (e.g., Foster et al., 
1998; Phelps, 2006), yet they were not under strong empirical scrutiny in this study: 
Yes, I recognized that the participants got aroused during the seminar and that they 
heard cognitive content just seconds after showing signs of arousal. However, I did not 
quantitatively measure their arousal levels when they were hearing the cognitive 
content; and I did not measure whether arousal experienced during the hearing of 
cognitive content moderated the effects of the cognitive sensegiving on mental model 
change.  
The first of these assumptions—the transfer of arousal—would be best assessed by the 
physiological measures discussed above. For instance, an emotional sensegiving tactic 
might increase participants’ skin conductivity and heart rate; and they both might stay 
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increased for several minutes after the emotional sensegiving, when the participants 
are already hearing cognitive content. Unfortunately, as discussed above, I was unable 
to see the need for this kind of measurement when planning the data collection of this 
study. Instead, I had to rely on the qualitative observation of signs of arousal. 
The second assumption—the moderating effects of emotional arousal on mental model 
change—would require more elaborated solutions. Above I discussed how measuring 
arousal would allow testing if the content that is lectured while participants are still 
highly aroused would be remembered better. This might be plausible, even though the 
fact that the coach used repetition a lot (and, hence, the same content was sometimes 
associated with arousal and at other times not) and explained similar ideas with 
different concepts makes the approach somewhat inaccurate.  
A second possibility for testing the effects of arousal on mental model change would 
be some kind of a control group. However, here the question of what exactly one 
should control emerges: Should we ask the same coach to teach the same content 
without telling jokes and other arousal tactics? Or should we ask a different coach to 
go through the same material? How should the empty moments be filled in the control 
conditions? It becomes apparent that such a control group is not a feasible option in the 
field setting. However, in laboratory conditions one could provide exactly the same 
cognitive sensegiving content to condition and control groups but initiate the task with 
arousing vs. non-arousing material; and, hence, test whether arousal experienced 
before hearing cognitive sensegiving influences the effects of that cognitive 
sensegiving. The implications chapter of this thesis provides a more detailed 
discussion on the potential laboratory experiments that future research could carry out. 
3.5.4 Measuring mental models and attitudes 
I measured the participants’ mental models and attitudes before and after the seminar 
to assess if the seminar succeeded in changing them. The fact that I used both a survey 
design and interviews can be considered as a methodological strength of my study. 
However, I could also have used significantly more advanced instruments for 
measuring mental model and attitude change. First, I could have used different kinds 
of cognitive mapping techniques to measure changes in the participants’ explicit 
mental models of causal and other types of relationships between different concepts 
(see e.g., Hodgkinson, Maule, & Bown, 2004; Huff & Jenkins, 2002). Such techniques 
would have allowed me to map more comprehensively how the whole structure of the 
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participants’ mental models changed or did not change during the seminar, instead of 
just assessing whether their answers to specific questions changed. 
Second, I did not measure the importance of the beliefs and attitudes for the people. 
One of my arguments is that emotional sensegiving is needed because people do not 
base their choices on their knowledge but on the feelings that knowledge produces. 
Hence, it would be desirable to measure how important people consider each belief; 
does it feel important enough to influence the way they will choose to behave.  
Third, my empirical focus was on explicit mental models and attitudes. However, 
people hold also implicit mental models and attitudes, which often influence their 
behavior more than the explicit ones (Sloman, 1996; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 
2000). Hence, it would have been relevant to find out whether or not the seminar 
influenced also implicit mental models and attitudes. I could have run, for instance, 
different content variants of the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998) to the participants before and after the seminar to see if their implicit 
attitudes were influenced by the seminar. Especially the question whether emotional 
arousal strengthens the effects of cognitive sensegiving on mental model and attitude 
change also at the implicit level is a relevant question for future research.  
3.6 Contextual Limitations 
In addition to the research design limitations discussed above, also the context of this 
study should be taken into account when considering how generalizable the findings 
are. Many contextual factors influence, for instance, the range of data that is analyzed, 
and the quality of many relationships between concepts (due to contextual moderators) 
(Rousseau & Fried, 2001). I focus here on six contextual factors and discuss how they 
might have influenced my findings and their generalizability. Table 7 summarizes this 
section. 
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Table 7: Six contextual factors that influence how the findings of this study can be generalized 
Contextual 
factor 
Relevant factors Potential influence on the seminar dynamics 
Finland Low emotionality 
 
 
 
Coach’s display of emotion seemed shocking for 
participants 
Participants’ reactions to emotional content not 
strong 
Salience of emotional dynamics in the seminar 
Organizational 
renewal 
Training framed as an 
element of org. change 
 
Participants had heard 
about the content 
before the seminar 
 
Mandatory 
participation in the 
seminar 
Positive attitude toward and perception of need of 
the seminar 
 
Higher change of accepting the cognitive content 
due to the familiarity bias 
 
 
Participants could not leave the situation even 
when they felt strong, negative emotions and 
anger toward the coach 
Participants Low education level Low acceptance threshold for cognitive content 
in terms of its factual accuracy and deepness 
Brutal language acceptable 
Seminar hotel Isolated location 
 
 
Little reflection about the seminar content with 
outsiders during the three days; hence, no critical 
viewpoints 
Easier for the coach to keep the situation under 
control 
The coach Authoritative character 
 
Working class-habitus 
Participants more like to believe 
 
Participants more likely to identify with the coach 
Seminar 
characteristics 
Three days 
 
 
 
30 participants 
The coach’s arousal tactics remained “fresh” for 
the participants 
Arousal transfer dynamics a plausible explanation 
 
Small enough to allow participation and debate 
 
3.6.1 Finland 
The first thing to note is that the study was carried out in Finland, whereas most 
published sensegiving studies have been carried out in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. There are some characteristics in the Finnish culture that are relevant 
for the analysis of emotional sensegiving. Mainly, open display of emotions is less 
common in Finland than in the US and the UK (Nummenmaa, 2010: 90). 
Consequently, the coach’s use of emotional sensegiving tactics could have been more 
shocking to a Finnish audience than it would have been for an American or British 
audience. On the other hand, it is also possible that the Finnish people reacted less 
emotionally to the coach’s emotional stories than American or British people would 
have.  
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The lack of emotionality in normal Finnish interaction also made the high emotionality 
in the seminar salient. I was able to recognize that the coach used more emotional 
tactics than was “normal” and the audience showed more emotional reactions than 
could be considered “normal.” This allowed me to ask how this emotionality 
influences the sense-receivers’ sensemaking. Consequently, I could theorize about the 
role of emotions in the process and, perhaps, explicate an important factor of 
successful sensegiving that has so far been taken for granted. 
3.6.2 Training as a Part of Organizational Renewal 
The seminars were not an isolated event but a part of a large, organizational renewal 
process. I studied the seminar in the context of three companies: the Milk Company, 
the Property Service Company, and the Sausage Company. These companies are 
briefly introduced in Table 8. My main focus evolved to be on the seminar held for the 
Property Service Company in March, 2006 (this seminar is referred to as “the seminar” 
in the thesis). The experiences of the Milk Company and Sausage Company provided 
valuable background and contextual information. The companies’ larger change efforts 
and their (un)successfulness are considered only a contextual factor in this thesis 
which focuses on the process of emotional sensegiving during the seminar and its 
immediate effects on individual participants’ mental models. 
As the seminars were part of a larger organizational change program, participation in 
the seminar made sense and was even welcomed by many of the participants who did 
not have full certainty of the change process in the firm. This positive attitude (or at 
least perceptions of legitimacy) could have influenced the participants’ attitudes 
toward the coach and the training, in a positive way. It should be noted also, however, 
that many participants were expecting to hear more concrete things about the new 
structure; some of them were surprised (some even disappointed) that the seminar did 
not directly talk much about teams. 
The change process had been going on for three years in the Property Service 
Company when the seminar that became the core focus of analysis in this study took 
place. Consequently, some of the participants had already heard some things about the 
content of the seminar and about the coach’s way of talking about the content. These 
participants might have, therefore, been less surprised by the coach’s sensegiving and, 
thus, reacted in a weaker way than participants who had not heard anything about the 
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seminar before. On the other hand, the indirect familiarity of the coach’s lessons could 
have made the participants more likely to accept and believe them. 
Table 8: The seminar was studied in the context of three companies, with the main focus on a 
seminar held for the Property Service Company 
 Sausage Company Property Service 
Company 
Milk Company 
Revenue in 2006 ~700M euro ~700M euro ~1 500 M euro 
Main area of 
business 
Meat based foods Property maintenance, 
cleaning, and waste 
management 
Milk based foods 
Start of the change 
process 
1999 Fall 2005 Fall 2004 
End point of the 
change process 
2004 Continued after I 
ended data collection 
in 2006 
Spring 2006 
Description of the 
change process 
The company 
employed the change 
agent for over five 
years and 
transformed its 
strategy and structure 
during the process. 
Company’s former 
CEO argued that the 
seminars had a 
fundamental role in 
transforming the 
organization from a 
near bankruptcy to a 
highly profitable 
organization 
The company was 
satisfied with the 
seminars and was 
starting to implement 
structural changes. 
The company’s 
development manager 
in charge of the 
process argued that 
the seminars had 
empowered the 
employees and that 
the company will 
continue to pursue the 
strategic 
transformation 
Both the change 
coach and the 
company’s 
development manager 
told that the company 
stopped co-operating 
with the change coach 
because the 
employees’ 
expectations 
regarding 
empowerment grew 
higher than the 
company was able to 
implement 
A third point to notice is that participation was mandatory for the employees. Hence, 
they were not able to leave the seminar early even if they had disliked being there. 
Consequently, the coach could push the participants hard and make them feel negative 
emotions, without the risk of losing his audience. In situations where sense-receivers 
do not have to listen to the sensegiving for a pre-determined period of time, this would 
not be the case. Instead, the sense-receivers might leave the situation before the 
sensegiver managers to cognitively reframe the emotional arousal and the sensegiving 
tactics discovered in this thesis might, therefore, fail in more open contexts. The fact 
that the coach casually mentioned that those employees who actively resist the change 
process can be laid off could also have amplified this effect.  
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3.6.3 Participants 
The participants of the seminar were cleaning managers and property maintenance 
workers. The majority of them had not taken high school but started working directly 
after school or taken vocational education. Consequently, their conceptual skills and 
knowledge were relatively low compared to people with academic education. The 
factual accuracy and naivety of the coach’s “theories” was, therefore, less critical for 
the success of the sensegiving. The participants were convinced by the cognitive 
content of the coach’s theories, even though a critical reader can recognize factual 
mistakes and logical flaws in them.  
It can also be speculated whether highly educated people would have reacted 
differently to the coach’s tactics for increasing emotional arousal. He used brutal 
language and several curse words. It might be that these factors would reduce his 
credibility in the eyes of the academic audience and, therefore, also reduce any impact 
his speech would have on them. 
The lack of logical rigor and factual accuracy in the content of the coach’s lessons 
might have caused more educated people to react in a different way in the seminar. 
After being emotionally aroused by the coach’s emotional content, the more educated 
people might have gotten angrier toward the coach, if the cognitive content was not 
believable for them. Note, however, that the basic idea of arousal transfer should still 
work for also highly educated people – the concrete tools for increasing arousal and 
cognitive reframing just need be different; suitable for their mental models and 
understandings of normal. For example, Professor Esa Saarinen, who is famous for his 
emotional lectures in Finland, uses high-culture elements, such as a video of the “three 
tenors,” that apparently increases the participants’ emotional arousal. 
3.6.4 Seminar location 
The seminar location is the fourth contextual factor that must be recognized and 
remembered when interpreting the findings of this study. The seminar was organized 
in a seminar hotel which was located in Southern Finland, 124 kilometers away from 
the capital, Helsinki. The hotel was in a small village of Hattula, about 20 km from the 
nearest town, Hämeenlinna. Hattula had 9,400 inhabitants when the seminar was 
organized. The seminar hotel itself was located in the periphery of Hattula and was 
 Data and Method 
89 
practically isolated from the outside world (Figure 8).  The participants stayed 
overnight at the seminar hotel. 
   
Figure 8: The seminar hotel was located in the periphery of the village Hattula and was about 
20 km from the nearest town, Hämeenlinna 
The isolated location of the seminar could have had effects on the participants’ 
sensemaking. First, they were less able to critically reflect the content of the seminar 
because they had little alternative perspectives provided by outsiders. Even though 
many of them did have phone conversations with their spouses in the evenings, it is 
unlikely that they had deep, critical discussions of the seminar process and content. 
However, they did have time to discuss the seminar with the other participants.  They 
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spent the evenings with each other, going to sauna and then to the bar of the seminar 
hotel (there were no other bars nearby and each participant was given four beers/ciders 
free of charge). During these evening activities they discussed the seminar content and 
its links to their work, in addition to other topics. Hence, the inputs were limited and 
they might have engaged in “encapsulated sensemaking” (Pratt, 2000; see also, Vuori, 
2011a) which can be powerful in imposing a certain view of the world. This 
encapsulation might therefore have reinforced the effects of the coach’s sensegiving. 
3.6.5 Seminar characteristics 
The duration and size of the seminar also might have influenced the sensegiving 
dynamics. First, the seminar lasted three days and was the only occasion where most 
of the participants interacted with the coach. Hence, the participants probably did not 
have time to get accustomed to the coach’s idiosyncratic sensegiving tactics. 
Emotional reactions often emerge when events deviate from expectations (e.g. Fiske 
and Taylor, 2008; Weick, 1995). Consequently, this low familiarity and short time 
period cannot be ignored: the coach’s tactics partly worked because they were novel to 
the participants. If managers would apply similar tactics in organizations to influence 
their employees regularly, the employees might develop resistance against such tactics 
and the tactics would therefore lose their power.  
 
Figure 9: The seminar classroom and the coach 
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There were 30 participants in the seminar. On one hand, the seminar was small enough 
to allow (arousal and commitment increasing) interaction between the coach and the 
participants. These interaction patterns were further facilitated by the way the tables 
were organized into a U-shape (see Figure 9). On the other hand, the seminar was large 
enough to allow some levels of crowd-like behaviors. The potential effects of these 
factors should be considered when applying the tactics discovered here in other 
contexts. 
3.6.6 The coach 
Two features of the coach possibly increased his persuasiveness in the eyes of the 
audience. First, he had features displaying high authority: his physical size was big 
(tall and somewhat overweight), he had a strong, deep voice, he dressed in slightly 
finer clothes than the participants, and he had strong confidence in his own teachings. 
Previous research (summarized e.g., in Cialdini, 1993: Chapter 6) has shown that each 
of these factors increase the likelihood that persuasion will succeed.  
Second, the coach had a similar background and general appearance as the 
participants. He emphasized that his background is in the shop floor work and that he 
has never been in a managerial position. He also used down-to-earth language and 
brutal expressions that highlighted this fact (especially compared to the firm’s top 
management and other consultants). The participants were, therefore, more likely to 
like the coach and to identify with him and, consequently, to believe him. 
Taken together, the coach had general authoritative characters and he displayed 
similarity with the participants. Earlier research has shown that both of these factors 
increase persuasiveness. Hence, when interpreting the coach’s sensegiving tactics in 
the following sections, it must be remembered that they were successful partly because 
of what the coach was like and other contextual factors. 
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4 EMOTIONAL SENSEGIVING IN THE CHANGE 
SEMINAR 
As illustrated in Figure 10 the coach’s sensegiving consisted of four main elements in 
the change seminar.  
 
Figure 10: Elements of emotional sensegiving in the change seminar 
The coach used the four main elements as follows. First, he often started teaching a 
new lesson by using a variety of tactics to increase the participants’ level of emotional 
arousal. He had six different tactics for increasing arousal that included, for instance, 
jokes and references to his relationship with his mother. Second, after increasing the 
participants’ arousal, the coach then cognitively reframed the situation so that the 
arousal was associated with work-related content. He used four different tactics for 
doing this. For instance, he often said that similar dynamics that he described in his 
mother relationship are present at the workplace and provided an example. In this way, 
he made the participants think about work-related content and construct a new work-
related mental model, while they were still emotionally aroused by the unrelated 
content presented moments earlier. Third, the coach often concluded the micro-
episodes with one of the four tactics that reinforced the participants’ commitment to 
Increasing arousal Cognitive (re)framing Reinforcing commitment
- Reference to intimate 
relationships
-Brutal claims
-Jokes
-Pushing the participants
-Work-related , provoking 
examples
-Making/allowing audience 
to generate arousal
Background process: Legitimizing sensegiving tools
- Legitimizing non-work related content
-Legitimizing aggressive behavior
-Legitimizing emotional reactions
-Linking previous illustration to 
workplace
- Re-explaining the idea
- Simple telling
- Discussing through the idea
- ”Do you find this logical?”
- Increasing efficacy
-Making audience members 
describe how they will commit
-Concrete & direct action 
instructions 
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the new element in their mental models: He, for instance, asked, “Does this sound 
logical to you?” and the participants provided affirmative answers, showing to 
themselves and others that they believed what the coach had just argued. Fourth, the 
coach also had a background process of legitimizing this somewhat unorthodox pattern 
of sensegiving. He explained, on a few occasions, why and how he will talk about 
work-unrelated content and why he will push the participants hard. He also encouraged 
the participants to show their emotions during the seminar. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds from micro to macro, from defining the four main 
elements of the coach’s sensegiving to describing how the coach combined them and 
sequenced them in time. I will first define and describe the four theoretical categories 
and their sub-categories that emerged from the analysis and illustrate them with data. 
Then I will describe and conceptualize a number of micro-episodes during which the 
coach first increased the participants’ emotional arousal levels, then cognitively 
(re)framed the arousal, and finally increased the participants’ commitment to the 
newly formed beliefs. The fourth main element, the background process of 
legitimizing emotions, was distributed throughout the seminar and, therefore, was not 
a tight part of any specific micro-episode. 
4.1 Increasing Arousal 
The coach usually started the description of a new topic or sub-topic with a tactic that 
increased the participants’ emotional arousal. He used six different tactics. The tactics 
differed in terms of the valence of the arousal they created, whether or not their 
content was related to work, in their typical duration, and whether or not they required 
the participants’ to actively engage in the construction of the tactic through speaking 
(Table 9). The content of these tactics, in a cognitive sense, was occasionally only 
loosely related to the work-related content of the seminar.  
4.1.1 Reference to intimate relationships 
I coded 134 instances where the coach referred to intimate relationships and the 
participants reacted emotionally during the three-day seminar. These instances and, 
hence, this tactic created mainly negative arousal in the participants. The coach told 
personal stories of his own marriages and his relationship with his mother and various 
generalized stories of similar relationships. The stories had no work-related content. 
They lasted from short, one-sentence references to elaborate examples that lasted 
Emotional Sensegiving in the Change Seminar 
94 
several minutes. The coach required no active participation from the sense-receivers 
but they only needed to listen to the coach for this tactic to work. 
Table 9: The coach used six different tactics for increasing the participants’ emotional arousal 
Tactic Increases 
arousal? 
Valence Content 
related to 
work? 
Typical 
duration 
Requires that 
participants 
speak 
Reference to 
intimate 
relationship 
Yes Mainly 
negative 
No From 3 
seconds to 
several 
minutes 
No 
Brutal claims Yes Mainly 
negative 
Yes and no 2-5 seconds No 
Jokes Yes Positive Mainly not 2-15 
seconds 
No 
Work related, 
provoking 
examples 
Yes Mainly 
negative 
Yes 5-60 
seconds 
No 
Pushing the 
participants 
Yes Negative Yes and no From 5 
seconds to 
several 
minutes 
Yes 
Making/allowing 
audience to 
generate arousal 
Yes Both 
positive and 
negative 
Yes and no 2-15 
seconds 
Yes 
 
References to intimate relationships can trigger emotional reactions in participants 
through four mechanisms. First, the stories themselves contained strong injustices and 
emotional events, which can directly provoke anger and sadness in people. Second, the 
suffering and anger described by the coach could have made the participants feel 
similar emotions via empathy. Third, the coach displayed emotions when telling the 
stories which could have induced emotions in the participants through emotional 
contagion (Barsade, 2002; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). Fourth, some 
participants could have associated the stories to their own life experience and 
transferred emotions from their own personal memories to the seminar situation (see 
e.g., Damasio, 2003: Chapter 2). 
There were two main relationships to which the coach referred often, his relationship 
with his mother and his relationship with his current wife. Already during the first hour 
of the seminar he described that his relationship with his mother was a difficult one. 
He told that his mother raised him with the principle, “the person who does not beat 
her children hates her children” and continued that “my mother did not hate me at all if 
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you believe in this principle. She lived her own chaotic life, and always released her 
anger and feelings of powerlessness on me. I was regularly beaten so badly that I was 
bleeding.” The participants reacted emotionally to these stories. Each of the six 
participants that are visible on the video clip which shows the above reference to the 
coach’s mother displayed cues of anxious and uncomfortable emotional reactions. 
They moved their trunk and head from side to side, readjusted their sitting position 
repeatedly in an unnatural way, and two of them also put their face down. (Tape 1, 
34:26) 
The coach regularly returned to his mother relationship and used it to amplify 
emotional arousal on various points during the seminar. The story did not evolve 
meaningfully but he always referred to the main point that the mother was tired and 
therefore beat him. For instance, during the fourth hour of the seminar, he again 
described the patterns of abuse and violence and concluded with a question, “Why? 
[pause] Why does a mother want to destroy his son?” (Tape 4, 35:34). The story and 
question also raised strong emotional reactions in the audience: a woman responds to 
the coach with a high-volume, low-pitch voice [as in anger; the content of words 
cannot be recognized from the video] and seven of the 25 people who are visible on 
the clip readjust their positions in an anxious and nervous way several times during the 
10-second period which concludes the coach’s point. (Tape 4, 35:59)  
The coach also generalized his own mother relationship to discuss how children are 
abused in general. During the afternoon of the second day, he used powerful images: 
“In the name of raising children, many things are done to children that people would 
never do to adults. [5 sec pause] Humiliate. [2 sec] Abandon. [5 sec] Physically [2 sec] 
touch. [3 sec] Gibe. Insult. We do different kinds of things. Starting from school and 
kindergarten.” Then he continued describing an example about how a mother had 
punished her children in an inhumane way. The video shows several emotional 
reactions to this sensegiving instance: already after the coach had said the first 
sentence, a fortyish male participant tilts his head down and shakes it from side to side. 
Several other participants also move their bodies in an uncomfortable way, readjust 
their positions, and shake their heads during the period. (Tape 10, 06:20) 
References to the coach’s marriage also started early in the seminar. When introducing 
himself, he said that he works together with his wife (Tape 1, 04:56). He also told how 
he found his wife from Kokemäki (a small town in Finland) and that “so, I have been 
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learning to live with her for twenty years now, in a new marriage. It’s still a new 
marriage because I am so in love with her … I will tell how difficult it is, despite the 
love ... Guilt, fears” (Tape 1, 37:59).  
More negative and provoking examples of the marital relationship soon followed the 
introductions. For instance, during the fourth hour of the seminar he told the following 
story: 
“In my own life, when there is sand on the floor of the summer cottage, I think that 
you should take that sand away immediately. […] If in our marital relationship, there 
is sand between us, you get hurt a bit by something, then the sand should likewise be 
removed instantly, we should discuss the injustice. […] People experience more 
injustices and get insulted more often that they realize […] all these injustices 
accumulate in the back of their heads. And, for instance, if we have sand on the floor 
of the cabin – or there is sand between me and [wife] – then it does not happen that 
[wife] gets the simple cleaning tools and asks that now [coach] let’s discuss. Instead, 
she goes to the outdoor toilet, takes the large bucket that is full of shit and paints the 
whole cabin – that is, our whole life – with shit. So, when in the morning I was fully a 
lovable and fantastic person, then in the afternoon I am a total asshole. ‘You have 
never done anything good for me! Not ever! I should have divorced you a long 
time ago! [the coach shouts and waves his hands aggressively when he is quoting his 
wife] You always just want to hurt and insult me [tone becomes weaker, sounds almost 
like the coach is crying]. You never consider me at all! [shouting again]’ [pause] 
Isn’t this weird behavior? […] When she behaves like this, it is really 
incomprehensible for me. How can somebody, with whom I have lived and whom I 
have loved and been kind to, suddenly feel that everything that we have ever 
experienced together, that all that is shit? [again, the coach seems to be close to 
crying].” (Tape 4, 26:13) 
Regarding the participants’ reactions to the previous example, the video shows only 
the back of the heads of four participants. Each of them shakes their heads at the peak 
moments of the story, somewhat indicating emotional reactions. In addition, I used this 
clip in the first inter-coder agreement check which focused on recognizing the 
sensegiving tactics (not emotional reactions). One of the two coders reacted in a really 
strong way to this episode, first laughing but then getting more confused and serious. 
She also wanted to further discuss the content of the episode a few hours later, 
indicating that it had really had an impact on her.  
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Marriage examples continued regularly until the very end of the seminar. Even during 
the last hour of the seminar, the coach used his wife to make the participants more 
excited: 
“[My wife] lived her first marriage in the way that safety and predictability come first. 
She wanted to have her life so well organized that it will be so unvaried that nothing 
happens in life. So that it always is predictable. When you work for the municipal 
government, have a safe monthly salary, you follow the same rules and principles 
every day, don’t kiss or hug during the day, and nothing unpredictable happens during 
the days. [Several audience members shake their heads as a reaction to these 
illustrations] Then, she thought, life is going well. But then she went and fell in love 
with me. [Audience members laugh gently] And I’m the kind of person who enjoys 
living on the edge. If I can hold on to the rope with just one finger and hang above the 
river, then I feel alive. And now [my wife] has to hang there with me.” (Tape 14, 
16:05) 
There are three separate sources of evidence indicating that the participants’ level of 
emotional arousal did indeed increase as the outcome of these intimate stories. First, 
several emotional reactions could be observed on the video as illustrated above. 
Second, some participants referred to the stories in the interviews that were carried out 
after the seminar and were still emotionally aroused. For instance, cleaning manager 
#4 said that the coach’s “discussion about his mother relationship was too much 
because that can be too much for some people due to their own issues with their 
mother or daughter.” Third, my own personal reactions were emotional when I heard 
the stories. When I was first exposed to the stories in my first seminar, I was especially 
aroused by the examples relating to romantic relationship and could recognize similar 
patterns in my own life. Even when I was recoding the video for the fifth or sixth time, 
after five years, I still felt some level of anger and sadness when I heard the stories.  
4.1.2 Brutal claims 
A second tactic that the coach used for increasing the participants’ emotional arousal 
was brutal claims. Eighty-eight of such instances were coded in the material. Also 
these tactics created mainly negative arousal in the participants and did not require the 
participants to engage in conversation with the coach or each other. The brutal claims 
differed from references to intimate relationships in two ways. The use of this tactic 
required only a few seconds (as opposed to the longer stories about intimate 
relationships). In addition, some of the brutal claims were work-related. 
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The coach often started teaching a new lesson by making a bold statement either as the 
first thing he said or after a brief introduction to the topic. The bold statements were 
such as “When facing difficulties, a woman acts like evolution has made her act. 
[Pause] She acts like a martyr and complains that nothing would go well if she didn’t 
exist” (Tape 1, 17:00). This kind of claims provoked protests and active confusion in 
the participants; as a reaction to the above comment, several participants coughed and 
shook their heads. In essence, the brutal claims increased the participants’ level of 
emotional arousal and provoked them to protest and these protests created more 
arousal among the participants.  
There are two mechanisms that explain why the brutal claims increased the 
participants’ arousal levels. The first one is the unconditional nature of the coach’s 
brutal claims: the coach said something against which the people could easily find an 
emotional counter example. This happened, for instance, when the coach said “I don’t 
even accept penitentiaries” (Tape 9, 39:23) and “Punishments do nothing but increase 
defiance” (Tape 9, 39:49). A participant generated a counter example fifty seconds 
later and asked, with an intense voice, what the coach would do to pedophiles if not 
imprisoning them (Tape 9, 40:40). The idea of not punishing pedophiles made this 
particular participant angry, which is why the unconditional claim that punishments 
should not be used succeeded in increasing her level of emotional arousal. 
The second mechanism is that some of the brutal claims directly violated the identities 
and self-esteem of the participants. Such direct identity and self-esteem threats can 
quickly trigger stress and defensive reactions, which are tantamount to increased levels 
of emotional arousal. For instance, when the coach said, “there are people who don’t 
have the qualities needed for managerial work in the new system of self-discipline” 
(Tape 16: 20:01) it was a direct threat against all the cleaning managers present in the 
seminar. The comment was followed by a period of fear and tension and their release: 
people first stopped moving completely, looked downwards, and closed their bodies 
[in a similar way as one freezes at the sight of a dangerous animal]; then, after 11 
seconds, four of the participants started readjusting their position, as if releasing 
tension and shaking away their fear.  
The brutal claims tactic was often connected to a cognitive reframing that followed the 
brutal claims. Oftentimes, the coach first made the brutal claim which was followed by 
participant protests, and a consequent, more elaborate and nuanced re-explanation by 
 Emotional Sensegiving in the Change Seminar 
99 
the coach, which also contained many disclaimers and qualifiers. For instance, during 
the third hour, he argued with a loud voice, “Good profits can be a really bad thing 
because they are used as an excuse to not fix bad management practices!” and referred 
to a specific unit in the firm (Tape 3, 02:15). This provoked several loud protests and 
questions from the audience, to which the coach reacted by re-explaining his idea with 
more elaborate details and examples (Tape 3, 02:25). 
4.1.3 Jokes 
Unlike stories about intimate relationships and brutal claims that mainly caused 
negative arousal, jokes triggered positive arousal in the participants. The coach had 
developed a long list of jokes and regularly complemented his sensegiving with them. 
I coded 61 jokes in the seminar. Oftentimes the content of the jokes was loosely 
related to the content of the current lecture and work. Hence, sometimes the coach 
could leverage the joke also cognitively in his subsequent teaching, whereas at other 
times it seemed that the arousal was the only relevant consequence of the jokes for the 
subsequent, cognitive sensegiving. The jokes usually lasted between two and 15 
seconds. There is strong evidence that the jokes did indeed arouse the participants, as 
loud laughter can be heard from the video recording after most of the jokes.  
There was a large number of jokes that did not relate to work. When the coach talked 
about communication patterns in romantic relationships, he told the following: “Men 
have one habit as well. Many men, for instance, get drunk on Saturday evenings and 
fix things. [Loud laughter from audience] That is the manly way, well, to start 
speaking only after one and a half bottles of Koskenkorva [Finnish vodka]. Start 
discussing with your wife a little about family business.” The audience reacted by 
laughing out loud. (Tape 4, 25:55).10 
Another set of jokes made fun of the coach and his seminar. For example, after 
explaining problems created by the organization’s structure and emphasizing that the 
participants must get empowered, he concluded with “and this wouldn’t be the first 
time when somebody comes back to work after the seminar and messes things up!” 
[loud laughter from audience]. (2, 59:14). In another one, he told about a guy who had 
                                                 
10
 This tactic could have been coded as “reference to intimate relationship” as well. However, 
as the categories emerged, the emotional reaction produced by the sensegiving became one of 
the differentiating dimensions and, hence, this tactic, which created positive arousal and 
laughter, rather than negative arousal, was categorized as a joke rather than reference to an 
intimate relationship  
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just started working in the firm. “He had worked for three weeks and he came to my 
seminar. He participated in the first hour of the seminar and then he quit his job. [loud 
laughter from audience]“ (Tape 2, 20:45). 
There were also jokes that related directly to work and contained the cognitive lesson 
that the coach was teaching. When he was drawing the organization chart of the firm, 
he pointed to a seeming inconsistency or unnecessary complexity in the chart. He said, 
“Here is something that I don’t understand, and the CEO could not explain it to me 
either.” Again, the audience reacted with loud laughter. (Tape 3, 34:18). This joke 
amplified and reinforced the coach’s message that the firm desperately needs to adopt 
the simpler, team-based structure that was an essential element of his teachings and the 
strategic renewal of the firm. 
In everyday thinking, jokes in seminars are seen to be used to keep the participants 
awake. While I agree with this idea, I emphasize that the arousal that the jokes produce 
has a more substantial influence than that. Sense-receivers can associate the arousal 
created by jokes with the cognitive content described to them in the next moment.  
4.1.4 Work-related, provoking examples 
The coach also used a large number of wor- related, provoking examples to increase 
the participants’ emotional arousal. I recognized and coded 81 of such examples 
during the analysis. The delivery of these examples usually varied between five and 60 
seconds. The coach claimed that these examples were true stories from the Property 
Service Company and from other firms. The examples contained descriptions of 
questionable behaviors by both workers and supervisors and also more general 
descriptions of injustices and unproductive patterns. Hence, they created mainly 
negative arousal in the participants. The examples combined both emotional and 
cognitive sensegiving in that the stories were arousing but also contained cognitive 
content that was relevant for the coach’s work-related sensegiving. The coach told the 
examples in a way that required no engagement in conversation from the participants. 
Many of the work-related stories contained elements that could  have made the 
participants feel frustration via empathy and association. When the coach was starting 
to speak about how organizational structures must be changed to increase productivity, 
he used a real-world example from the Property Service Company. He told how the 
firm had bought a small firm in Espoo. “Until they had been bought, the cleaners and 
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property maintenance workers had together taken care of the raking of leaves in the 
fall. When they became part of the Property Service Company they no longer could do 
it because the invoice system could not handle such a practice. They, therefore, had to 
abandon the smart way of working.” (Tape 5, 28:00). The one participant that is visible 
on the video reacted by first fixing his posture up and then turning his head down.  
Some of the work-related examples also directly attacked the top management of the 
firm. During the fourth hour of the seminar, the coach described problems in a specific 
unit. He also told that he had asked the top management to intervene with the problem 
but they had not. He concluded the description by saying, “Let me ask this from you. 
Why does the top management not go there when employees are asking that ‘hey, we 
need help here! Things are not working here and we want to fix this unit.’?” This story 
and question made several participants comment with intense voices. Three of the ten 
participants that are visible on the video also moved their bodies back and forth, and 
up and down while the other participants were commenting on the coach’s point. 
(Tape 4, 04:41) 
The examples that provoked direct anger toward the top management of the firm seem 
to be risky and unproductive. How could a seminar that provokes conflict between 
workers and management increase collaboration and productivity? On one level, the 
stories undoubtedly describe interaction patterns and problems that need serious 
attention from the top management and, thus, illustrate to the participants that also the 
management is carrying its weight in the change process. The participants may 
consequently feel more willing to change their own behaviors also, following the logic 
of reciprocity. In addition, on another level, the stories provoke emotional arousal that 
can transfer to the lessons of how to fix the situations. Not surprisingly, the coach 
often described his ideal solution immediately after describing the problem first.   
4.1.5  Pushing the participant(s) 
The coach pushed the participants aggressively as a fifth tactic for increasing the 
participants’ level of emotional arousal. To conceptualize this tactic, I recognized and 
coded 45 instances in the seminar video. The basic dynamic was that the coach used 
aggressive language and questions to make the participants admit that they had done 
something wrong at home, at the seminar, or at work. Hence, the tactic required active 
participation from the sense-receivers. The tactic created negative arousal: The 
participants often got seemingly angry at the coach while he was doing this, and often 
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raised their voices while providing their answers. On a few occasions, the participants 
also showed signs of sadness and seemed to be close to crying. The instances of 
pushing participants varied in duration from a few seconds to several minutes.  
The following illustrates how a typical instance of pushing the participant(s) 
proceeded. The coach first described some content and then asked a participant: “Is the 
situation different? How would you negotiate with Pekka [an indifferent male 
prototype]? [5 sec pause] What would you Pekkas say? [coach looks directly at a 
group of male participants and walks toward them] Is the situation different?” The 
coach then walked directly in front of a participant and asked him: “How would it go 
with this Pekka, Kaapo?” The participant showed non-verbal signs of discomfort [he 
moved his upper body from side to side, as if to try to dodge the coach or circle around 
him] and answered with a disgusted tone that “it would not differ much from that.” 
(Tape 5, 07:11) These non-verbal reactions indicate that the coach succeeded in 
increasing that participant’s level of emotional arousal. After having pushed the 
participant, the coach moved on to discuss his points in a more lecturing way. 
Sometimes the coach did not settle for brief moments of pushing but continued for 
several minutes. During the first hour of the third day, the coach talked about issues 
relating to working too much. He started by asking, “what do you think, what is the 
normal length of a working day for a cleaning manager at [your firm]?” (Tape 13, 
19:09). Nobody answered this question for ten seconds and the coach continued, “For 
cleaning managers? [7 sec pause] Let’s focus on this for a bit. Where is the limit for a 
humane working day? … Because we are dealing with Kerttus [a martyr-like female 
prototype], it’s extremely important to set the boundaries. Seija, where do you think 
the boundary is?” (19:38) The participant (#A) did not provide a direct answer but let 
out indistinguishable utterances and then asked, “where?” The coach replied, “Yes, in 
this service industry. Where should it be?” (19:51) The participant answered, with a 
trembling, higher pitch in her voice, “eight hours.” The coach acknowledged this 
answer but continued pushing, “But if you have to stay on duty or handle some things, 
then you will do more.” Again, the participant let out indistinguishable utterances, this 
time in protests to the coach’s claim. The coach interrupted her by saying, “but you 
keep answering your phone all day and night.” (20:10). This comment made another 
participant (#B) join the discussion. Her voice was loud and low in pitch, indicating 
anger. Before she could finish her sentence, the coach started pushing her as well, “so, 
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what do you think, then, what’s the normal length of a working day in this service 
industry?” (20:20) The coach then repeated these questions and started listening to the 
participant’s answer. The participant answered by describing how she works 
significantly more than eight hours per day, “well, I keep my phone on and I do 
answer it. I cannot leave those people alone. I think I’m doing fine.” This time her 
voice was low in volume and high in pitch, indicating fear rather than anger. The 
coach kept pushing her and then asked the audience, “So, is this the normal thing?” 
Another participant (#C) answered, “No.” This last participant also described how 
“I’m never able to stop thinking about it [work]. I have no time for myself. In 
principle, I’m at work and available for 24 hours per day.” (21:45) This triggered the 
participant #B to defend her position with a loud, high-pitch voice: “I think it’s a 
personal choice, and everyone can choose how they want to … This is the way I want 
to work.” (22:10). The coach acknowledged her comment but repeated that people 
must organize their work in a smart way and “the real question is that because this 
service industry is full of overnice people, martyrs, and Kerttus, who ruin the work 
culture, who continuously work for 15 hours per day, and live such a life that they 
don’t have their own life at all anymore. These are the issues I want to highlight.” 
(23:42) One more participant opened up emotionally as the coach kept pushing the 
participants during the discussion: she described with a trembling voice how, “I have 
cried for a few times, I’ve been thinking that I never have time for myself. That can 
this life really be like this?” (Tape 13, 26:34) Hence, the coach succeeded in 
emotionally arousing several participants during the third morning by pushing them 
hard to admit negative facts relating to their working hours. In this specific instance, it 
is also notable how the level of arousal incrementally and in an accumulative way 
increased as more and more participants became part of the discussion that was driven 
by the coach’s aggressive, pushing comments. Yet, the key to the increase in arousal 
was, again, the pushing comments by the coach. 
4.1.6 Making/allowing the audience to generate arousal 
As the seminar progressed, the coach was no longer the only one whose actions 
increased the participants’ arousal levels. I coded 29 instances where the participants 
said something that triggered arousal in the participants. The coach had a role in 
creating these participant actions, as he sometimes encouraged them directly; when he 
did not actively encourage them, he still passively promoted them by not interrupting 
the participants. This tactic resulted in both positive and negative arousal and 
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contained both work-related and work-unrelated content. The instances typically lasted 
between two and 15 seconds and required active, verbal participation from the 
participants.  
The instances of audience generated arousal consisted of two main types: jokes and 
concrete illustrations from the workplace. The jokes provoked laughter and positive 
arousal. The concrete illustrations provoked both anger and empathy/sadness. The 
participants started making these comments because (1) as the seminar progressed, it 
became more emotional and these kinds of statements became a more natural part of it, 
(2) they implicitly started copying the coach’s behaviors, and (3) they genuinely 
wanted to share some stories from their workplaces.  
Usually the audience generated arousal with simple remarks. For instance, during the 
second afternoon, the coach was discussing the relationship between sales and 
production. At some point, one participant said that, “The sales can say that ‘Listen, 
the competition is so tough that we need to sell like this. We will lose this customer 
because you are so damn negative.’” Another participant jumped in here and said 
cynically, “That sounds so familiar.” Several audience members and the coach reacted 
by laughing. (Tape 12, 33:33) 
At some points, the audience generated arousal also followed from more elaborated 
stories. For example, during the first set of presentations on the third morning, the 
issue of cleaning targets surfaced again. One participant [who was not presenting but 
commenting the discussion that was triggered by the presentation] said, “For example, 
we have this [Firm X] target, which is cleaned two times per week, for half an hour. 
And the monthly fee for them is 157 euro. That simply is not enough, already the 
gasoline will [cost more as the cleaning personnel needs to drive to the location]. It 
will never be profitable.” This comment made several audience members comment in 
a loud voice. The words are not distinguishable on the video but the volume goes up 
and the pitch goes down, indicating anger, as they try to speak over one another. Some 
participants also laugh loudly at one point of the emerging debate. (Tape 15, 28:23) 
The debate continued for a while until the coach focused attention back to the 
presentation. 
In summary, the coach used six tactics for increasing the participants’ emotional 
arousal. Four of the tactics required no active, verbal participation from the sense-
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receivers, while the latter two were dependent on the participants’ active engagement. 
The tactics also varied in terms of duration, the valence of the arousal generated, and 
whether or not they had work-related content. The tactics are compared along these 
dimensions in Table 9 above. Further data illustrating each tactic is presented in Table 
10 below. The main outcome of each tactic was an increase in the participants’ level of 
emotional arousal.  
Table 10 (1 of 4): Further evidence and illustrations of the tactics the coach used to increase the 
participants’ level of emotional arousal 
Reference to intimate 
relationships 
Illustrative data  
Sensegiving [reaction] 
 
Number of codes in this 
category: 134 
 “I have myself lived in this kind of a relationship (with ex-wife) for 
seven years.  In this relationship, my wife was not able to discuss 
difficult topics with me, unless she was angry and then insulted me. 
When she felt really bad. When the anger had accumulated. (…) There 
were three ways to communicate: insulting remarks, silent-treatment, 
or a fit of rage.” [The reactions of seven participants are visible on the 
video: four of them keep their head down, indicating some level of 
sadness. Two of them tilt their heads and bodies from side to side 
several times at the peak moment of the story, indicating a more 
anxious reaction] (4, 20:39) 
 “I had to reflect, why am I so scary person that my wife is afraid to 
speak to me?” [The video shows the back of the heads of four 
participants. The only male participant visible  moves his head, and 
apparently upper body, from side to side with strong movements] (4, 
30:42) 
 “A Finnish man needs a mother (for wife) who will take care of him 
during daytime and make sure that all chores are taken care of and so 
on. And, for the night, a man needs a tiger who will tear his back with 
nails (during love making). Some have tried to find this kind of 
women from all over the world. But I don’t know how successful that 
has been. My understanding is that such a combination does not 
exist.” [several female and two male participants move their upper 
bodies and heads from side to side, indicating an anxious or 
uncomfortable reaction to this story] (1, 35:56)  
 “For instance, in a marriage situation, there is a need to bring up issues 
when one of the spouses has become an alcoholic. He denies that he 
has become an alcoholic. Then she does not have many other 
alternatives but to pack up her stuff and walk away. She sees a 
problem and he doesn’t.” [Four of the eight participants visible on this 
video section move anxiously from side to side and back and forth as a 
reaction to the coach argumentation] (10, 38:29) 
  
Emotional Sensegiving in the Change Seminar 
106 
Table 10 continues (2 of 4) 
 
Brutal claims 
 
Number of codes in this category: 88 
 “40 to 60 percent of the work that is done in your firm is pointless!” 
[Emotional reactions are not visible on the video clip but participants 
commented this claim powerfully in informal discussions during the 
following break] (1, 27:13) 
 “To make profits, the firm screws both employees and customers!” 
[Each of the three participants that are visible on the clip shake their 
heads from side to side and back and forth as a reaction to this claim, 
indicating some level of anxiety] (1, 13:06) 
 “The production unit is lying on its face on the floor. They are being 
too nice and crying like babies!” [The video shows all 30 participants. 
Three of them shake their heads aggressively from side to side, 
indicating disagreement and possibly slight anger. Two participants 
move their bodies in up and down, indicating a more anxious reaction] 
(2, 53:07) 
 “The higher the proportion of women in the system, the more likely it 
becomes that they will not able to take care of the problem without 
external help” (Tape 14, 47:23) [the video shows no emotional 
reactions but the coach told that in an earlier seminar some participants 
had gotten extremely insulted by this “fact”] 
 “A nice person destroys herself!” (4, 24:13) [The video shows 17 
participants.  One of them starts shaking her leg powerfully and 
readjusts her position with exaggerated movements. Seven other 
participants also readjust their positions with anxious movements, four 
of them moving their heads at the same time]  
 
Jokes 
 
Number of codes in this category: 61 
 “Maintenance guys go look at the machinery [that is reported to be 
faulty]. They look at them and say, ‘they have always functioned like 
this. It’s impossible to make them any better.’ Then, when women 
complain a bit more, the men say, “Well, it’s again that time of the 
month.” [audience laughs loudly] (1, 18:42)  
 “After destroying my previous marriage with my own behavior, I 
realized that I need the most difficult person in the world to be my 
wife. Someone who will keep me under control. And then, when I 
looked into the mirror, I realized that this is not possible. I have to 
settle for the second most difficult person in the world.” [audience 
laughter] (1, 37:25) 
 “Like we know, women are usually so that they are ‘with someone.’ 
There are cliques. They build this kind of protective unit. You think 
that there is someone who is, like, how should I say, like, normal. And 
then the normal ones are together and gossip about the others.” [loud 
laugher from audience] (4, 22:11) 
 The coach first described how in another firm the employees had the 
possibility to collect credits by making initiatives and how one man 
was especially motivated to make initiatives. The credits would allow 
workers to get tangible rewards that included Iittala tableware. “His 
wife liked these tableware a lot. [audience laughter] You must 
understand that motivation was really high when he could get a double 
reward. Super-bonus (i.e. oral sex) at home [loud audience laughter] 
and and … [voice trails off] (14, 29:51) 
 Emotional Sensegiving in the Change Seminar 
107 
Table 10 continues (3 of 4) 
Work related, 
provoking examples 
 
Number of codes in this category: 81  
 
“We have tried to establish teams to the Lahti unit for three years 
now. But when nothing has changed in management practices and in 
the organization of work, then, nothing but, should I say what, has 
followed.” [Two of the six participants visible on video shake their 
heads from side to side as a reaction] (5, 23:49) 
 
“I find this situation in Imatra really interesting. The property 
maintenance workers have pushed this issue now for two months. On 
this Thursday something should happen.” [A woman participant who 
is not visible on the video comments something with loud, high-pitch 
voice, indicating some level of anxiety]  The coach continues, “The 
maintenance workers have cried for help. … The supervisors have 
done nothing.” [Two female participants’ faces are visible on this clip 
(10, 40:24): one of them has the corners of her lips down and cheeks 
pulled slightly up, indicating some level of sadness. The other one has 
pulled his hands in front of his face while her upper eye-lids are eye-
brows are pulled up, indicating surprise or fear. In addition, several 
participants move their bodies and heads from side to side in an 
anxious way during the example] (Tape 10, 39:58)  
 
The coach spoke generally about how lack of a collaborative approach 
can lead to negative consequences. Then he reinforced his point by 
telling: “This kind of cases, we have so many of them. When you 
think, for example, the paper union negations form last spring. 
Remember what followed? And now, everybody is being really 
surprised that, oh my god, we lost 3,000 jobs.” [Five of the seven 
visible participants mover their heads in anxious way as a reaction to 
this point. Two of them also move their bodies up and down] (Tape 
10, 46:05) 
 
“When I first time went to the Lahti unit and raised this [injustice] 
point, it created quite a reaction. Several people resigned and started 
looking for other jobs. They genuinely felt that that some people in the 
unit had privileges and some had really unjust work portfolios.” [four 
of the five participants visible move their heads back and forth and 
from side to side as  a reaction to this point] (Tape 13, 49:12)   
Pushing the 
participants 
 
Number of codes in this category: 45 
 
Three participants are late from lunch break on the first day. The 
coach asks, “Well, what should we do with these guys?” [Several 
audience members provide excuses for them and defend them with 
loud, lower-pitch voice] The coach continues, “I haven’t had even one 
seminar during which your people did not behave like this. [more 
defensive reactions from audience]. You know why I think it’s 
extremely important? [more audience uproar] It’s about the ability to 
respect other people.” (3, 05:55) 
 
One participant said she disagrees with the coach’s point. The coach 
then directly asked from the person, “Should we focus on developing 
productivity or on increase revenues?” The participant started 
answering [words are not distinguishable on the tape; pitch of voice 
goes high and volume increases]. As a response, the coach shouted 
loudly “No! No! No! No! No! No!” over the participant’s answer and 
then re-explained his own theory. (1, 28:44) 
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Table 10 continues (4 of 4) 
 
The coach was speaking about a new way to be more assertive with 
customers. Then he paused for a few seconds and said, “A wrinkle 
seems to have emerged on the forehead of Riita?” Riitta made an 
uttering sound in response. The coach continued, “Should I tell an 
example?” Riitta replied with loud, low-pitch voice, “No!” and also 
started saying something else but the coach spoke over her, “But I 
will tell it!” and Riitta said with lower volume, “well, OK, go ahead.” 
(7, 35:29) 
 
The coach lectured how bad work system can influence people’s 
behavior at home after work. He described an imaginary scenario in 
which someone comes home tired after work and finds that kids have 
left their clothes and toys lying around the floor, instead of putting 
them to where they belong. He then asked directly from one 
participant, “will you behave like a responsible adult in this situation 
and treat your children with respect, or will your behavior shift here 
(points “external discipline” on a slide) and you will use the logic of 
external discipline?” The participant answered with low-volume, 
high-pitch voice that she would behave in a respecting way. The 
coach continued, “so there is no risk that you would start shouting or 
get angry?” and the participant said with a voice that had an even 
higher pitch that there would be no such risk. Then the coach said, 
“Well, it actually is more likely that it will go here (again points at 
“external discipline” on the slide) than here (points at “self-
discipline” on the slide) if also the work culture is here (points at 
“external discipline” on the slide)” (6, 29:55)  
Making/allowing 
audience to generate 
arousal 
 
 
Number of codes in this category: 29  
 
An audience member describes how they would deal with a person 
who creates problems: “Beat him up at the Firm Christmas party (in 
the Finnish culture, the Christmas parties contain a lot of drinking 
and the idea of a physical fight is quite plausible).” [Each of the 
eleven participants visible on the video laugh gently and change their 
posture as a reaction to this comment] (3, 53:15) 
 
The coach asked the participants what an overly-nice woman 
(Kerttu) could do to improve her situation in a work system of 
external discipline. Someone suggested that she could find a new job. 
The coach continued, “So, she could go to (competitor 1) or 
(competitor 2), well, I don’t think that would help much.” Then a 
male participant said something that is not distinguishable on the tape 
that triggered loud audience laughter and made several participants 
readjust their posture. (6, 12:28) 
 
The coach first described some challenges between the production 
and sales in the firm. One male participant then commented this story 
by saying, “On the other hand, to defend us, I must say that at 
Tampere we have been working for six months on some targets that 
did not even belong to us.” This story triggered loud audience and 
coach laughter. (5, 11:21) 
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4.2 Cognitive (Re)Framing 
Instances of increasing emotional arousal were often followed by instances of 
cognitive (re)framing in the coach’s sensegiving. In this way, the coach was able to 
associate emotional arousal created by content that was often not related to work to 
work-related content and, thus, reinforce the persuasiveness and retention of his 
cognitive, work-related sensegiving. The tactics for cognitive (re)framing varied in 
terms of if and how they established continuity between the arousal-increasing tactics 
and the cognitive content, in their typical duration, and whether or not they required 
active participation from the participants (Table 11). 
Table 11: The coach used four tactics to deliver the cognitive content of his sensegiving 
Tactic Link to arousal tactics Typical duration Requires active 
participation 
Linking an example 
to work-content 
Asserted or implied but not 
necessarily explained 
2-10 seconds No 
Re-explaining with 
more nuances and 
qualifiers 
Provides further information 
that alters the meaning of the 
arousing words 
From few 
seconds to 
several minutes 
Signs of 
disagreement or 
confusion trigger 
Simple telling Not established  From few 
seconds to 
several minutes 
No 
Discussing through 
the idea 
Varied From 30 seconds 
to several 
minutes 
Active discussion 
or yes/no-answers 
From a theoretical point of view, a notable difference between the different tactics for 
cognitive (re)framing is that the degree of cognitive continuity from increasing arousal 
to cognitive (re)framing varied from low to high. Sometimes there was a plausible link 
from the content of the preceding arousal tactic to the work-related cognitive content 
of the following sensegiving, whereas at other times it was difficult to see a connection 
between the two. In other words, sometimes the coach linked the content of the 
cognitive (re)framing to the content of the previous increasing arousal tactics by 
saying, for instance, that similar dynamics happen also at the workplace. However, at 
other times, he simply started talking about work-related content without explaining 
how it related to his previous anecdotes and jokes. This latter pattern is consistent with 
the claim that the coach used the arousal tactics mainly to generate emotional arousal, 
irrespective of its content, to reinforce the impact of his sensegiving. 
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4.2.1 Linking an example to work content 
Many times the content of the tactics that the coach used to emotionally arouse the 
participants were loosely linked to work dynamics. I recognized 34 instances where 
the coach used these loose links to smoothen the transition from increasing arousal to 
cognitive (re)framing. He usually asserted or implied the existence of the link but did 
not explain it in a more comprehensive way. It typically took him between two and ten 
seconds to establish such links and this did not require active, verbal participation from 
the sense-receivers.  
By applying this tactic the coach used the emotional arousal that the previous story, 
joke, or claim had created to support his next point, without seeming to jump to a 
completely different topic. Even though the connections between the two were often 
weak, they still somewhat legitimated jumping between, for instance, his marriage and 
the participants’ behavior at the workplace.  This partial legitimacy could have helped 
the coach to maintain his credibility in the eyes of the participants.  
The simplest form of linking an arousing story to work was a simple assertion. For 
instance, after telling a long and arousing example about marriage dynamics, he 
concluded the example by saying, “a person makes herself look like a normal person 
so that she could criticize others’ behavior. [pause] It goes like this [pause] also in the 
workplace. [Long pause]” Then he moved on to describe how similar dynamics 
explain how latent conflicts are not surfaced and solved at workplaces and how 
productivity and well-being therefore suffer. (Tape 4, 23:07) 
Sometimes the coach also jumped from the arousing example to work content directly 
without explicitly linking the two. Yet, the connection could be seen, for example, 
from the way he framed his initial comment or rhetorical question when he started 
speaking about work content. For example, during the latter half of the fourth hour, the 
coach told how certain female behavioral patterns caused his wife to “huff, give silent 
treatment, and get anger attacks.” Then, after a six-second silence, he asked “How do 
you negotiate with a person like this at the workplace?” (Tape 4, 21:19) and moved on 
to explain the patterns in a work context.  
In sum, the coach linked the content that he used to increase the participants’ 
emotional arousal to work-related content by using a few linking words or by just 
starting to speak about work content right after telling arousing content. In this way, he 
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smoothly transformed the situation to be about work content, while the participants 
were still emotionally aroused by the less work-related content. Hence, the coach made 
it possible that the participants associated the arousal with the work-related content. 
4.2.2 Re-explaining with more nuances and qualifiers 
The arousal tactics often created confusion and disagreement in the participants. 
Sometimes the audience members could not understand why the coach told a certain 
joke or a certain example of his personal life. The most common source of confusion 
was the brutal claims the coach used to provoke debate and emotional arousal among 
the participants. When such confusion and protests emerged, the coach re-explained 
his point more comprehensively. I recognized 34 such re-explanations. These re-
explanations were less emotional and less provoking than the initial jokes, claims, or 
stories, and they contained more intellectual content and often also emphasized the 
external constraints on the participants’ work behavior. The emphasis on external 
constrains might have reduced the direct insults the participants sometimes felt after 
the brutal claims. In this way the coach could reduce the participants’ cognitive 
resistance to the claims (and make the valence of their emotions more positive), while 
still maintaining the arousal that was created by the earlier jokes, claims, and stories. 
The duration of the re-explanations varied from a few seconds to several minutes.  
The coach’s re-explanations were usually triggered by expressions of disagreement or 
confusion by the participants. For example, during the second afternoon of the 
seminar, the coach was speaking about ways to measure performance at work. He 
emphasized that outcomes should not be measured directly but that focus should be on 
measuring the quality of the work and work processes. This confused many 
participants and one of them described the measurement system in her unit and asked 
loudly, “I don’t understand what you are trying to say, why is our system wrong?” 
(Tape 12, 59:32). The coach answered, “Yeah, yeah, that’s a good question. I mean, 
you have this kind of problem in this management of work that the measurement of 
quality is such that we only measure the outcomes of quality. In other words, we are 
not measuring the quality of the work but its consequences.” (Tape 12, 59:45) and 
further explained the difference between the two approaches. Hence, he managed to 
associate the confusion and related arousal that were created by his initial argument 
with the more elaborated description of how quality should be measured at work.  
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4.2.3 Simple telling 
Simple telling refers to speech episodes where the coach simply described his content. 
I coded 328 of this kind of instances in the data. During these instances, the coach 
spoke in a similar way as teachers speak at schools, educating the participants with 
work-related content. He often also used visual aids during simple telling, mainly 
slides and a white board. The content of the simple telling varied from dry, non-
emotional technical descriptions to somewhat more emotional content that described 
positive and negative consequences of different kinds of behavioral patterns and work 
practices. The coach also used repetition a lot and recapped his core points every now 
and then. These ways of simple telling and his clear speech ensured that the 
participants had the opportunity to develop a clear, cognitive understanding of the 
coach’s message. The instances of simple telling lasted from a few seconds to several 
minutes. The coach rarely established any links between the content he described in 
simple telling and his earlier arousal-increasing words. The participants did not need to 
participate actively when the coach was doing simple telling but only listen.  
The way the coach described the transition from Taylorist organization to team-based 
organization illustrates simple telling. He showed a slide which contained a diagram 
containing three lines and their trends over time: size of units, level of motivation, and 
performance. The graph showed that before the strategic renewal of the firm, the unit 
size had steadily increased, while motivation and performance had steadily decreased. 
The graph also contained a vertical line which symbolized the transition point created 
by the strategic renewal and the seminars. The unit size started decreasing after this 
point, while motivation and performance started increasing. The coach explained how 
the old way of organizing has led to negative interaction dynamics and individual 
reactions, and how the changes that were created would make the difference. The 
audience followed the coach without distinguishable movements or sounds. (Tape 2, 
14:06) 
Part of the content that the coach presented via the simple telling way had emotional 
content. For example, when the coach was explaining his idea that high effort is no 
longer the most important thing at work but smart ways of organizing is, he referred to 
Finnish wars: “The generation that rebuilt this country after the wars. Those who 
plowed the field, started cultivating land, and produced food. That generation certainly 
did not have a choice. They had to be hard-working and work long hours. But in 
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today’s world, when we work, the effort we put in does not determine how things will 
go. Instead, how we communicate and coordinate matters much more.” (Tape 1, 
24:55) In this instance, the content that was emotionally arousing was relevant also in 
a cognitive sense for the coach’s point. Hence, also the emotional impact of these 
words was large, even though the coach’s focus was on the cognitive content. 
4.2.4 Discussing through the idea 
Discussing through the idea refers to situations in which the coach discussed with the 
participants the content of the seminar. Such discussions emerged when the coach 
directly asked the participants to contribute and sometimes when the participants 
spontaneously asked questions. The content of the discussions varied to a large extent 
and consequently also their linking to previous arousal-increasing tactics varied. I 
recognized 206 instances in the data that could be categorized into this second-order 
category. The duration of these instances varied from half a minute to several minutes.  
The discussions constitute another standard mode of teaching new content to seminar 
participants. One of their strength was that in this way the coach could link his 
teachings to the participants’ existing beliefs. The discussions also kept the 
participants a bit more active than pure lecturing and, thus, possibly helped in 
maintaining the arousal levels that had been created with the arousal-increasing tactics. 
The following dialogue illustrates how the coach asked many questions and in this way 
made the participants co-produce his description of the problems of interaction 
patterns at work (Tape 8, 05:16—06:57). 
Coach: “What does honesty mean? What is honesty in a Finnish work community? 
What does honesty mean at Finnish workplaces? What does it mean?”  
Participant: “You speak the truth.”  
Coach: “You speak the truth. Does it mean that you say as you personally think how 
things are?” 
Participant: “Yes. That’s how it should go.”  
Coach: “Well, why doesn’t it go like that?” 
Participant: “Because people get upset when you say how things are.” 
Coach: “Well, what follows from that?  
Participant: “People look at you for a bit longer and despise you.” 
Coach: “I mean, what follows from that you don’t say things?” 
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Participant: “Oh, if you don’t say things. Well, I don’t know, people stop [does not 
finish the sentence] 
Coach: “So, do we Finnish people tell each other how we think about things?”  
Participant: “No” 
Coach: “Why not?” 
Participant: “You think of other issues.” 
Coach: “So, such behavior does not belong to the workplace? Why does it not belong 
there? Is it civilized behavior?”  
Second participant: “I don’t think it is.” 
Coach: “I genuinely think that not speaking what you think is seen to be civilized 
behavior. And it is related to the fact that we have power and control-based interaction 
systems. Hence, the person who behaves in the most difficult way gets power, 
everybody must act as he wants. From this follows that we learn the kind of interaction 
system that we lie as we are expected to lie.” 
After the dialogue, the coach continued, in a more monologue way to describe his own 
solution to the problem. Yet, by discussing through the idea with the participants he 
had grounded this idea to their own beliefs. Similar patterns of defining problems and 
solutions in interaction with the participants occurred several times during the seminar, 
as illustrated in the table below. 
In summary, the coach used four main tactics for delivering his cognitive content after 
he had first increased the participants’ level of emotional arousal. These tactics for 
cognitive (re)framing varied in terms of whether and how they linked the work-related 
content they contained to the content of the preceding increasing arousal tactics, in 
terms of their duration, and if and how they required active participation from the 
seminar participants (Table 11 above). Further empirical illustrations of each tactic are 
provided in table 12 below.  
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Table 12 (1 of 3): Further data illustrating the cognitive (re)framing tactics 
Linking an example to 
work-content 
 
Number of  codes in this category: 34  
 The coach first gave a long example of external-discipline based 
marriage and its problems and concluded it with, “Human 
interaction culture in marital relationships, for some couples, the 
interaction system is that of external discipline, while for others it is 
self-disciple.” (4, 51:04)  Then he continued directly by saying, 
“Work communities, some work communities have the interaction 
system of external discipline, some self-discipline.” (4, 51:10) 
 The coach first described how he had taught his wife to not clean up 
his messes but to assertively confront him and push him to clean his 
own messes. He concluded the example with “We had tens or 
hundreds of things like this. It may feel naïve and childish but it is a 
way through which you learn to respect the other one.” Then he 
jumped, after 1 second pause, to ask “Do you know what is the 
largest problem in [your firm]?” and started describing interaction 
dynamics in the firm (10, 23:22) 
 The coach first explained how people will abuse their spouses if 
they are not able to stand up for themselves. Then he said, “and 
when we go to work organizations, where issues like self-discipline 
are central, then it becomes impossible if there are people who are 
not able to say that ‘stop, this has not been agreed with me.’” (4, 
31:42) 
Re-explaining Number of  codes in this category: 34 
 The coach explained how people must learn to behave assertively in 
order to improve their own well-being and the general work culture. 
A participant commented the explanation. This comment triggered 
the coach to re-explain the same topic with new concepts: “Yes, yes, 
yes. But I think there is a new element in this whole thing. We are 
measuring, for example, in the whole process, this thing called 
systems intelligence [the concept of systems intelligence was not 
defined or brought up earlier], which means if a person is being nice 
toward the system … the system does not enable people to do their 
work in a smart way. And people should challenge the system [i.e. 
not be nice] to make the work practices smarter.” (7, 26:13) 
 The coach was talking about the interaction and collaboration 
between sales and operations in the firm. A participant contributed 
to the discussion by describing a challenging situation and a positive 
example. The coach answered, “Yeah, yes. Again, when we go to 
the Northern Finland, the guys are so tough that the negotiations are 
really tough [tougher than in the scenario that the coach told 
earlier], they will both tell you. But they both must still have the 
strategic vision that the production unit plans targets for the sales 
that they sell with good price and lists those that must not be sold at 
all.” (12, 35:00) 
 The coach used the phrase “shitty portfolio” [paskasalkku] to 
describe the situation of some cleaning managers who had to take 
care of challenging and unprofitable set of cleaning targets. Some 
participants indicated that they found this phrase insulting. The 
coach re-explained, “I still want to defend this phrase. I mean that 
those people who have received this kind of a portfolio have the 
right cry for help. … It’s a product of the organization that has just 
been given to you.  (11, 41:52) 
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Table 12 continues (2 of 3) 
 
Simple telling 
 
Number of  codes in this category: 328 
Telling unemotional 
content (260) 
During the second hour of the seminar, the coach spoke 10 minutes 
about Taylorist organization. He started, “[Your firm] has been 
designed like Taylor built, at the beginning of the 20th century, a car 
factory; the so called Taylorism. Taylor’s job was to, nearing the 
end of 19th century, to make uneducated people work efficiently. It 
was his job. He built the assembly line.” He described more details 
and also provided concrete examples from the trained firm.  (2: 
28:00) 
 During the second afternoon, the coach showed a slide titled “initial 
working group” and explained: “The working group must describe 
the task that will then be assigned to the actual team. First, it starts 
by defining the basic task of the team…” (12, 05:11) The coach 
continued describing several required sub-elements for several 
minutes.  
Telling emotional 
content (49) 
The coach started telling about his theory of work systems during 
the first hour of the seminar. He explained how some people 
sacrifice themselves and thus enact an unhealthy work system: 
“That woman works 20 hours per day. She even covers for her sub-
ordinates and does their work as well. And she just puts more effort 
and then proudly tells about it to everyone. And this is why the firm 
has to do nothing for the shitty portfolios…” (1, 17:28) The coach 
then continued further explaining how people’s behavior influences 
which kinds of changes are made in work systems. 
 During the third hour of the seminar, the coach explained how 
increased productivity is the key to the longevity of firms. He then 
asked rhetorically, “What happens if productivity is not 
developed?” and answered, “Layoffs and bankruptcy. It will lead to 
layoffs. The paper industry is a good example of that. … Nobody 
wanted to see and fix the problems [in productivity] five years ago. 
Instead, they devalued markka [former Finnish currency] and thus 
financed their pay raises. Everyone else financed their pay raises. 
“(3, 19:06) Then he continued further explaining how he thinks 
workers should collaboratively develop their firm with 
management.  
Recaps key points (19) “I repeat this one more time. In today’s working life, 
professionalism does not mean that you let the organizational 
system control you. In today’s working life, professionalism means 
that you must influence those parts of the work organization that are 
not functioning properly.” (8, 03:20) 
 “We have now been discussing for two and a half days. We have 
developed understanding of work system things and now you know 
that your job at the work place is to influence things, not just follow 
orders.” (16, 09:02) 
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Table 12 continues (3 of 3)  
Discussing through the 
idea 
 
Number of  codes in this category: 206 
 Coach: “Why do you think we need to do this thing exactly in this 
order? Why do we need to manage this in exactly this order?”  
Participant: “Because when the four and five [numbered steps on a 
slide], it’s good that we already have done the others [numbered 
tasks]” 
Coach: “Indeed, if we are able to increase employees’ competencies, 
they can better influence and be responsible of work.” (12, 48:13) 
 During the last hour of the first day, the coach asked the participants 
to discuss what self-esteem means for five minutes. Then he asked 
the pairs to share their thoughts and commented them. (6, 04:33-
10:00) 
 Coach: “They manage the work. To manage the work, how do these 
things [points words ‘actions,’ ‘knowledge,’ and ‘understanding’ on 
the white board] go? [5 sec pause] What should come first?” 
Participant: “Knowledge” 
Coach: “Good. So every member of the team must have knowledge 
of the team’s responsibilities.” (5, 31:52) 
 
4.3 Reinforcing Commitment 
The cognitive reframing allowed the participants to form new, tentative mental models 
in their minds. The arousal that they experienced while holding that mental model in 
their working memory increased the likelihood that they encode it into their long term 
memory and make it a lasting part of their mental model. In addition, the coach 
seemed to use a handful of more focused tactics to strengthen the participants’ 
commitment to the newly learned idea. These tactics varied in terms of their duration, 
requirements for participant engagement, and the mechanism through which they 
likely increased participants’ commitment to the ideas (Table 13). 
4.3.1 “Do you find this logical?”  
The basic idea in the tactic labeled “Do you find this logical?” is that the coach asked 
the participants to publicly affirm that they believe what he had just said. It usually 
took him between one and six seconds to ask this question. The public display of 
affirmation shows both to the person making the affirmation and others who see him 
or her affirm that they have believed the coach. Hence, the new element in the mental 
model is reinforced through the logic of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). 
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Table 13: The coach used four tactics for increasing the participants’ commitment to the ideas 
they were hearing 
Tactic Duration  Mode of participation 
required 
Theoretical 
mechanism 
“Do you find this 
logical?” 
1-6 seconds Affirmative answer 
(“yes” or a nod) 
Cognitive dissonance 
Makes audience 
members describe 
how they commit to 
content 
From one to tens of 
minutes 
From few sentences 
of description to 
several slides and 
presentation 
Cognitive dissonance 
Increasing efficacy From few seconds to 
couple of minutes 
Just listening Self-efficacy and 
group-efficacy 
Concrete and direct 
action instructions 
for participants 
From few seconds to 
couple of minutes 
Providing and 
elaborating details; 
affirmation 
Goal setting theory 
 
The empirical material provides numerous instances where the coach used this tactic. 
Fifty-seven of them were recognized and coded to conceptualize this category. For 
example, during the fourth hour of the seminar, the coach first spent several minutes 
explaining that there are three ways of using power. He argued that two of them (being 
so difficult that no-one can deal with you and indifference to wrong doings) lead to 
negative outcomes, whereas the third way of using power (when the power is based on 
fair agreement between the parties) leads to positive outcomes. He then summarized 
his point and asked “don’t you agree?” and the participants nodded to show their 
agreement. (Tape 4, 43:53) As Festinger (1957) explained, people often form or 
change their beliefs to match their own behaviors to reduce the dissonance between 
their behaviors and beliefs. The effect is even stronger when other people witness it 
(see e.g., Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Hence, when the seminar participants showed 
publicly that they agree with the coach, it made them reinforce the beliefs that are 
consistent with the coach’s message. 
The coach also had a way of staying in control of the situation when the audience 
members did not provide the affirmation he was fishing for. In the 15 recognized 
occasions when this kind of rejection happened, the coach powerfully rejected their 
disagreement and aggressively re-explained his point. For example, during the third 
hour of the seminar, the coach drew the organization chart of the firm and argued that 
the position of one group of low-level managers was problematic. Then he asked, 
“Right?” and looked at the audience. One member seemed to disagree and the coach 
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said, “Somebody was shaking her head,” pointed with his finger to that person, asked 
what was wrong and then aggressively re-explained his point. (Tape 3, 42:41) In this 
way he increased the likelihood that the participants will agree with him the next time. 
Furthermore, the coach’s strong emotional reactions to critique might also have 
emotionally aroused the participants. This increased arousal could have built on top of 
the arousal that was generated earlier in an accumulative way and all the accumulated 
arousal could then have become associated with the focal, most recently heard, content 
of sensegiving. 
It is also ironical to note that the coach’s tactic of forcing the participants to eventually 
agree with him was in stark contrast with his general approach of promoting 
participation. As discussed below, in the legitimizing emotions sections, the coach 
encouraged the participants to share their views. However, when they did so, the coach 
attacked them powerfully. This pattern is consistent with the idea that the point of the 
debates was rather to amplify the emotional intensity of the seminar than to facilitative 
true dialogue and co-creation of shared understanding.  
4.3.2 Makes audience members describe how they commit to content 
In addition to using the “do you find this logical?” tactic, the coach used more 
elaborate tactics to leverage cognitive dissonance and make the participants describe 
how they will commit to his lessons. I categorized 39 first-order codes to belong in this 
second-order category. These tactics required more elaborate and active participation 
from the sense-receivers and their duration ranged from one to tens of minutes. For 
example, during the second afternoon, the coach asked the participants to first discuss 
in pairs what lessons they found the most useful during the seminar. After the pair 
discussions, the coach asked the participants to share their thoughts with the whole 
audience. As different participants had found different lessons the most important, the 
outcome was that several of the coach’s lessons were reinforced by the participants. 
(Tape 10, 45:00 – Tape 11, 23:00). Again, following the logic of cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957), the participants were likely to get more committed to these ideas. 
When they explained publicly how they will behave, it made them change their own 
beliefs about their own behaviors.  
The coach also asked the participants to carry out two group assignments and present 
their findings. The instructions for the assignments were direct and practically gave no 
alternative to the participants but to explain how they will implement the coach’s 
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lessons in the workplace, even though the illusion of free choice remained. For 
instance, when the coach gave instructions for an assignment in which the groups were 
to develop a new assessment system for the firm, he said that “getting new customers 
for the firm because you get a special reward for that [3 sec] things like that are 
probably good indicators [for measuring the right behaviors which the participants 
should list in their presentation]” (12, 51:20). Consequently, the participants presented 
how they will change their behaviors in the workplace as the coach had taught. For 
example, one group argued that they will develop “healthy assertiveness, openness, 
and courage” as visible in Finnish in Figure 11 of their presentation slide below. 
Again, the publicly made commitments showed the participants that they believe in 
and are committed to the coach’s lessons.  
 
Figure 11: Group assignments made the participants describe how they will commit to 
behaving as taught by the coach 
4.3.3 Increasing efficacy 
This tactic refers to all the ways the coach used to convince the participants that the 
organizational change will indeed happen and that the participants can indeed change 
their own behavior and the interaction dynamics in their work units. Seventy-five 
instances were categorized under this tactic. The coach described different ways how 
and reasons why the participants should believe that they can succeed in implementing 
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the change. These descriptions lasted from a few seconds to several minutes. The 
participants did not need to engage actively but just listen.   
The tactic of increasing efficacy increases the participants’ commitment to the new 
mental model through increases in self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997) and group efficacy 
(e.g., Gibson & Earley, 2007). When people believe that they can enact a work system 
as described by the coach, they start to believe that the emergence of such a system 
becomes more likely. As their belief in the emergence of the new kind of a system 
becomes more optimistic, internalization of a mental model consistent with such a 
system becomes more reasonable.  
The coach used several positive examples as the main method of increasing efficacy. 
He described, for instance, how “In Oulu, where we are now just starting the process, 
there are units in which people have gotten really active. There are many regional 
areas where things are going really well.” (Tape 3, 27:46) Thus, he provided concrete 
evidence that the change he is describing can become reality. He concluded this 
example with, “It all depends on how actively the employees challenge the 
management” (Tape 3, 27:58) and, thus, further highlighted that the participants’ own 
actions will determine the future. The increased belief in one’s (team’s) ability to 
influence one’s (team’s) future equals increased self-efficacy (group efficacy).  
A second way the coach increased the participants’ efficacy was the description of the 
support that will be provided. He, for instance, described how “the CEO is highly 
committed to this process. He has participated in this same seminar” (Tape 1, 14:33) 
and how he himself is also actively pushing the change in the firm: “I will take care of, 
absolutely, that the process will move forward” (Tape 10, 42:21). Hence, in addition to 
building a meta-level belief that they can enact the change, the participants could also 
believe that their change efforts will be supported from the top. Hence, it became even 
more likely in the participants’ subjective beliefs that the lessons taught by the coach 
will become reality. 
4.3.4 Concrete and direct action instructions for participants 
The final way the coach increased the participants commitment to his lessons and the 
new, emerging mental model, was concrete action instructions. I recognized seven 
occasions where the coach gave a specific task for the participants to be implemented 
at the workplace after the seminar. He usually described the goals in between half a 
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minute and a few minutes and required some further details and affirmations from the 
participants. By describing these concrete actions, the coach showed to all the 
participants how the new ideas can be made reality by taking simple, concrete actions. 
In other words, he provided evidence that they can become real and concrete action 
steps of how to do it. The “how to do” made it less difficult and, hence, more plausible 
to commit to the idea. In addition, concrete goals create motivation (Locke & Latham, 
1990) and, hence, commitment to new ideas. It is easier for people to commit to doing 
something if they concretely know what to do and how to do it. 
The direct action instructions were triggered by the problems the participants shared 
during the seminar. For example, during the last hour of the seminar, one of the male 
participants described how the managers of his unit were not fully supporting the 
transition to team-based organizing, but were only paying lip service. The coach 
answered this: 
“[…] We need to solve these issues and you must surface the issue and make an 
explicit crisis out of it. You must do something about it. The same lesson applies to all 
units which have similar problems. Quit the whole thing [to protest]. And let 
everybody know about it, communicate as high in the hierarchy as possible, all the 
way to the top management. It’s clear like that. It is the only way. If you cannot get 
help otherwise. This is the only way you can get help. … You have now received a 
homework assignment. Keep me updated. Please? [audience answers “Yes.”]” (Tape 
16, 21:35) 
In summary, the coach used four tactics for increasing the participants’ commitment to 
the ideas they had heard during the seminar and assumedly associated with high 
emotional arousal. The commitment reinforcing tactics lasted from one second to tens 
of minutes, required varying degrees of active participation from the sense-receivers, 
and relied on several well-known mechanisms. Further evidence of each of the 
commitment reinforcing tactics is presented in Table 14 below.  
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Table 14 (1 of 2): Further data illustrating the four commitment reinforcing tactics 
“Do you find this 
logical?” 
Illustrative quotes   
Number of codes in this category: 57+15 
Asking and receiving 
affirmation (57) 
“Does this sound strange?”  audience member: “no”  the coach: 
“It’s exactly like this.” (3, 54:06) 
 “Do you, Kimmo, agree?”  “yes” (3, 29:42) 
 “Was this a logical argument? Do you believe me?”  Affirmative 
nods and “yes” from audience members (3, 28:38) 
 Coach: “If they don’t have the resources, they are not able to do the 
things they are expected to do. These are pretty heavy words, don’t 
you think? Tell, me, what do you think?” 
Participant: “Yes, I think it is. Nice people have all those features.” 
 (7, 25:46) 
Reaction when 
participant disagrees 
(15) 
Coach: “Who is responsible for ensuring that each deal will be 
profitable?” 
Participant: “The sales unit.” 
[Coach tilts his head and upper body forward toward the participant 
and wrinkles his nose and eyebrows, as if to show that he is 
unhappy with the answer] 
Second participant: “They provide the service… [is interrupted by 
the coach] 
Coach: “No, it’s the production unit that has the responsibility. The 
production unit is responsible that each sales deal will be 
profitable.” [the coach continued elaborating his theory] (2, 35:42) 
 During the third morning, a participant said that she does not believe 
that the coach’s lesson about team based bonuses [as opposed to 
individual based] would work in her unit. The coach answered: 
“Why it would not work? You must justify your argument. What do 
think, why it would not work? If you have shared rewards, which 
reward you exactly from doing things together. So, why on earth 
you would not then collaborate.” (13, 46:20) 
(Makes) Audience 
members describe 
how they commit to 
content 
 
 
Number of codes into this category: 39 
Points made during 
general discussion 
A participant said during the general discussion of the second 
afternoon: “I have said many bad things. I think I should look at the 
mirror and think what I say [to colleagues at work]” (11, 13:46) 
 Another participant said during the same general discussion that she 
will start using the tool for developing shared understanding that the 
coach had spoken about earlier. She also showed the page from the 
course book on which the tool was described. (11, 18:20) 
Presentation of group 
assignments 
First group that presented the second assignment had written on the 
slides, for instance, that “we will challenge the old structures” and 
“the unit will build shared trust” (16, 24:18) 
 Fifth group presenting the first assignment wrote, for example, that 
“we will continuously develop our ability to perform and our 
competencies” and that “we will act with the logic of self-
discipline” (16, 06:07) 
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Table 14 continues (2 of 2) 
 
Increasing efficacy 
 
Number of codes into this category: 75 
 “He was so lazy that he didn’t want to do the same job over and 
over again. So, he decided to make an initiative of how to 
reorganize the task and make it better. He received 60.000 euro 
bonus.” (14, 24:57) 
 “The unit from Helsinki, when they were here in the seminar. It was 
the same seminar into which your CEO participated. They told how 
they had last year failed to receive annual bonuses because some 
people did not have time to fill the system. … Now, this year they 
have adopted a new way. Everybody will make sure that every 
member of the team has a stable workload. And they always ask 
each other, ‘have you had time to do your tasks or do you need 
help.’ They said that ‘now we are in a totally new level when we 
noticed how we can help each other.’” ( 5, 25:30) 
 The coach described how innovations emerge from the sub-
conscious mind and ensured that everyone can do it: “I can always 
trust it [the sub-conscious mind]. That it will work. And, I believe 
that everyone can develop this capability. “ (14, 35:45) 
Concrete & direct 
action instructions for 
participants 
 
 
Number of  codes in this category: 7 
 A participant described how people in her unit do not know how to 
behave as a team. The coach answered by lecturing for a while and 
then he said, “You must create things that the team has to do 
together. The supervisor must say that hey, this thing will be 
organized like this. You must first discuss all internal injustices. 
Then you can discuss and define  how you will handle them. Better, 
together, helping each others in doing that. … You must find those 
issues on which you need to collaborate.  You should also check the 
responsibilities of each person. Are they reasonable? Are tasks 
divided between you in a fair way?” (13, 47:36) 
 During the second hour of the seminar, a participant described a 
problematic situation at her unit. The coach explained that she must 
confront the directors and push them to fix things. He concluded, “I 
am giving you a homework assignment when you leave [the 
seminar]. And I will control that you will do it.” (2, 58:28) 
 
4.4 Legitimizing Sensegiving Tools 
I recognized three background processes—or meta-sensegiving tactics—that the coach 
used to legitimize the above described sensegiving tools and encourage emotional 
reactions to them. These meta-tactics were cold and cognitive but their inferred 
purpose was to explain to the participants that (1) the content that aroused them 
emotionally, but seemed to have no relevance for work, is still worth listening to, (2) 
the unusually aggressive way he treats the participants is necessary and acceptable, and 
(3) experiencing and showing emotions is acceptable and even desirable.  
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As illustrated in Table 15, the legitimization tactics differed from one another in two 
main ways: First, each of the three tactics focused on legitimizing a different element 
of sensegiving (content, coach’s behavior, participants’ emotions). Second, the tactics 
differed in terms of their frequency: the coach legitimized the cognitive content of the 
work-unrelated tactics only three times, his aggressive behavior about ten times, and 
participants’ emotional reactions almost 40 times. The tactics did not differ in terms of 
the participation requirements or duration. 
Table 15: The coach used three tactics for legitimizing his sensegiving approach 
Tactic Focus Frequency Duration Participation 
required 
Legitimizing 
work-unrelated 
content  
Content of 
sensegiving 
Very few From few 
seconds to half 
a minute 
No 
Legitimizing 
aggressive 
behavior 
Coach’s behavior Few From few 
seconds to one 
minute 
No 
Legitimizing 
emotional 
reactions 
Participants’ 
emotions 
Often (about ten 
times more than 
content and four 
times more that 
coach’s 
aggression  
From few 
seconds to one 
minute 
No 
 
4.4.1 Legitimizing work-unrelated content 
The coach used content that was not related to or was only marginally related to work 
to increase the participants’ emotional arousal. To avoid confused reactions from the 
participants, he needed to somehow legitimize the use of this kind of content. He did it 
by explaining that:  
“Social skills and the interaction culture under which the firm operates. They will 
determine everything. Because, through social interaction, we control the work. And it 
is in the interaction where all the mistakes are made. In my opinion, both technical 
mistakes and the mistakes you make at work [are made in interaction]. Also, in your 
firm [like in firms in general], the most crucial mistakes are not made in interaction 
with customers but in internal relationships and interaction. Internal communication is 
so much based on orders [rather than dialogue].The interaction is even abusive. [This 
causes] that people cannot commit to their work. […] These interaction systems are 
exactly similar both at home and at work. (Tape 1, 34:07)” 
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The coach provided this kind of a clear, explicit justification only three times during 
the seminar. In addition, he implicitly provided it several times by linking a previous 
marriage example with a following work example by saying that the dynamics are 
similar in both instances. In any case, the lack of high frequency in this legitimization 
tactic does not invalidate its existence. The theoretical properties of a category can be 
inferred from a single instance (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 23). Furthermore, comparison 
to its opposites—here the lack of the use of the tactic later during the seminar—can 
provide corroborative evidence. In fact, because some participants reported that they 
did not understand why the coach spoke so much about his marriage,11 it can be argued 
that there was a need for more use of this tactic. On the other hand, if the coach had 
used this tactic more, the participants would have been better prepared to hear 
anecdotes with personal content and, consequently, been less surprised and 
emotionally aroused by them.  
4.4.2 Legitimizing aggressive behavior 
The coach also justified his own aggressive behavior during the seminar. He often 
pushed the participants hard in different instances. He warned them beforehand, during 
the first hour, that he will do so; and a few more times during the seminar. He 
explained that there are two main reasons for these displays of aggression: First, he 
argued that because he is teaching values and attitudes, he sometimes must break the 
defenses and sub-conscious resistance that people have by his aggression: “I will push 
you really hard. I am an attitude and value trainer. Whenever we are in any 
community, we really easily become unable or unwilling to see those problems that 
exist in that community. This makes life easier for us, especially if the problems are 
painful. That is why I will push you really hard.” (Tape 2, 19:39) 
Second, the coach justified his behavior by referring to his sad personal background 
and weak self-esteem:  
“I have been humiliated when I was a child. A strong defiance has been physically 
beaten into me. What has followed is that, hmm, I have a really weak self-esteem. I 
can’t take it if I am at the same level with others. I’m not too nice or submissive; on 
the contrary, I will walk over people. I will push down everyone around me. I can 
spend remarkable amounts of energy to prove that I am right and win any arguments. 
                                                 
11
 Two interviewees told afterwards that they thought the coach spoke too much about his 
mother. In addition, one participant wrote in the survey after the first day of the seminar that “I 
couldn’t care less about the coach’s mother!” 
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(Tape 6, 25:44) … In this [coaching] job, the weakness of my self-esteem is my 
professional strength. It produces the most important competencies for me to do my 
job. I will push harder and take a stronger stand and persist much longer than an 
average person.” (Tape 6, 26:42) 
By providing these justifications for his aggressive behavior, the coach made it more 
difficult for the participants to protest against the coach’s behavior. Hence, the 
participants had to play along with the coach and allow themselves to be pushed. 
Consequently, they became more likely to be aroused by the coach’s aggressive tactics 
and broke through personal defenses.  
4.4.3 Legitimizing emotional reactions 
The coach used various tactics to say that it is acceptable and desirable to show 
emotions during the seminar. He started the process during the first fifteen minutes of 
the seminar and the first 30 minutes were the most active time for this process. The 
coach kept reminding the participants throughout the seminar that showing emotions is 
acceptable and even desirable, and encouraged them to do show. At later phases of the 
seminar, the importance of this cognitive tactic of legitimizing emotions reduced as the 
participants started expressing emotions more actively and openly. 
The tactics that legitimized emotional displays and reactions during the seminar can be 
categorized into two main tactics: (1) weakening resistance: those tactics that reduced 
participants’ defenses to control their emotions (i.e. showing that it is OK to show 
emotions; displaying emotions is normal and does not lead to negative outcomes) and 
(2) push: those that encourage the display of emotions (i.e. direct encouragement to 
show emotions).  
The most common way the coach communicated that showing emotions and reacting 
emotionally is OK was through examples from his own behavior. He described how he 
established his own company:  
“It was the year 1989 when it started. One industrial firm wanted me to train all their 
employees to this new collaborate approach. It was then when the situation led me to 
establish my company. I would have wanted to do the coaching as an employee for the 
union but they wanted to decrease my salary at the same time as I was generating extra 
profits for the union. And, as I was a sensitive and emotional man, I couldn’t tolerate 
that. In this way they forced me to establish my company.” (Tape 1, 08:45) 
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This story of the background of the coach and his company implicitly shows two 
things about emotional reactions. First, the mere fact that the coach has reacted 
emotionally tells that it is somewhat normal behavior. It is something that the coach 
has done and, by implication, that he would understand if someone else also behaved 
emotionally. Second, the story highlights that emotional behavior can lead to good 
outcomes. If the coach had not reacted on his emotional impulse but stayed as an 
employee of the union, he would not only have gotten an unjustified salary decrease 
but also would never have established his company. Both of these implicit messages in 
the story communicate that showing emotions and reacting emotionally is OK. 
The coach also directly encouraged the participants to display emotions and react 
emotionally during the seminar. He said things like, “if you don’t critique, challenge, 
and debate, this seminar will get boring” (Tape 2, 18:19) and that “You must have fun 
during the seminar” (Tape 1, 04:43). These encouragements essentially communicated 
that when the participants feel that the coach is saying something they do not like, they 
should react on that impulse and share their feeling. Likewise, if they see an 
opportunity for having fun, they should take it. Hence, the coach encouraged the 
participants to act on their emotions and take actions that amplify their emotions.  
In summary, the coach used three tactics for legitimizing his sensegiving tools in the 
change seminar. The inferred purpose of these tactics was to counter participants’ 
defensive reactions and withdrawal behaviors and to, instead, encourage full and 
emotional engagement in the seminar. Further illustrations of the three tactics are 
presented in Table 16 below. 
Table 16 (1 of 2): Further evidence on tactics that legitimized the coach’s sensegiving tools and 
emotions 
Legitimizing work 
unrelated content 
Illustrative quotes  
Total number of codes in this category: 3 
 
“Let’s leave the organizational content for now and continue on it 
tomorrow afternoon. Now we will focus on social skills and the 
development of your personal identities because these are essential 
things for having you behave assertively at work.” (5, 45:58) 
 
“People ask me why I keep talking so much about that [over nice 
women at home] and why I keep making them feel guilt. I do it because 
these people who participate in these seminars, they always bring it up. 
That they have this kind of problems [at work]” (13, 12:24) 
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Table 16 continues (2 of 2) 
Legitimizing 
aggressive 
behavior 
 
 
Total number of codes in this category: 9 
 
“My job is to push all the way, so that I provoke you! That is my job. I 
get my salary from doing that. It is because there are things that you 
have tolerated and bared and you have gone so far that you no longer 
want o acknowledge them. You want to deny them. My job is to is to go 
so far that I will provoke you.” (13, 29:01)  
 
“Some people may feel that I make them feel guilt. I think that feeling 
guilt is a healthy reason for starting to make positive changes.” (13, 
15:52) 
Legitimizing 
emotions 
 
Total number of codes in this category: 36 
Weakening 
resistance 
The coach described his professional history, “Then, in 1982, I 
transferred to work for the workers’ union. And, and, and, I did 
organizational development-related work there. I was a little like this 
kind of crazy person (kylähullu in Finnish). A special person. They took 
me there because I was special. They let the public see me when there 
was a need for weird and unexceptional speeches. And they carefully 
made sure that I was somewhere far away when some concrete things 
needed to be done. So that I would not disturb the normal operations. … 
They even had a special name for me; it was the ‘red general.’” (1, 
06:00) 
 Three participants are late after the lunch break on first day. The coach 
notices this and starts speaking: “It would be good to let people know if 
you take such a risk and leave the location. It is a way of 
communicating. It is extremely insulting when people behave this way 
[being late].” (1, 07:26) When the three participants finally arrive, after 
two minutes, the coach says to them [and everyone else can hear this] 
that “Here we started getting a bit angry at you and were complaining 
because you were not here.” (3, 09:30)  
 “The food here is really good. You will get as big as I am if you spend a 
lot of time here. Even though I should control my eating, I cannot do it 
because I would lose my mental health.” (1, 02:29) 
Encouraging 
emotional reactions 
“I will critique and challenge the way you and your firm are currently 
operating. You should acknowledge when you think I am right and 
challenge and criticize when I exaggerate and distort things in a wrong 
way” (2, 10:00) 
 “Be critical … The more intensive the interaction between us [the coach 
and the participants], the better this seminar will be. If you don’t 
critique, challenge, and debate, this seminar will get boring.” (1, 18:13) 
 “I will push you really hard. I am a trainer who teaches attitudes and 
values. … I will push you really hard. But, you don’t have to agree with 
me. My job is start your thinking processes.” (2, 19:39) 
 
4.5 The Micro-Pattern of Arousal-(Re)framing-Commitment in the 
Change Seminar 
In this section I show longitudinal data which illustrates how the sensegiving tactics 
conceptualized above were combined in the seminar. These combinations of the 
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sensegiving tactics over time periods of a few minutes clearly illustrate how the coach 
first increased the participants’ emotional arousal, then used cognitive (re)framing 
tactics to describe his main points and, finally, used a third set of sensegiving tactics to 
reinforce the participants’ commitment to the new ideas. These three micro-phases and 
their order are separable in the data, even though the coach sometimes moved 
iteratively back and forth between the different micro-phases. The data contained tens 
of such sequences. Three illustrations are provided in the text below and 12 additional 
illustrations are provided in Table 17.  
4.5.1 Building shared understanding among employees 
During the second hour of the first day, the coach started teaching a new lesson by 
telling a joke, “There was a new sales person in the firm. He had worked for three 
weeks and he came to my seminar. He participated in the first hour of the seminar and 
then he quit his job. [loud laughter from audience]“ (2, 20:45) He continued 
elaborating the joke, “Quit after the first hour!” which triggered more audience 
laugher. Then the coach continued elaborating even more, “The CEO said to me, 
thought, that you are not that good,” which, again, provoked more laughter. These 
three periods of loud laughter provide evidence that the coach had effectively aroused 
the participants at this point. 
Once the laughter faded, the coach started talking about a work-related topic. He said, 
“Well, it is also important to have a right frame of mind when debating. When we 
work together, and when we transition to team-based organizing, it is important that 
we are able to form a shared understanding of what our problems are, what issues we 
should solve, how we should behave so that we will achieve our goals. And that we 
have a shared understanding of our goals.” He then moved on to discuss theory of how 
beliefs are subjective and quoted an Eastern proverb, “The wise man knows that his 
knowledge are beliefs. The stupid man thinks that his beliefs are knowledge.” He 
further elaborated in a simple telling style: “So, when I express my thoughts in a 
strong way, thoughts that relate to the Property Service Company or human behavior, 
they are my beliefs but they are not knowledge. But if we agree with Riitta, we are 
doing shared things, and then it becomes our knowledge. It only then becomes our 
knowledge. It is our best possible knowledge at that point in time.” (Tape 2, 20:47 to 
22:30)  
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After the simple telling part, the coach provided a joke-like illustration and, thus, again 
increased the participants’ emotional arousal. He told an accumulating joke-like 
example about interaction difficulties, using one of the participants, Siru, as an 
imaginary partner in work interaction. He concluded the joke with, “then Siru says, ‘I 
just cannot bear with him anymore. Fuck it!’” and the audience reacted with laughter. 
(Tape 2, 22:55) 
After the joke, the coach continued to re-establish a high level of emotional arousal 
through a reference to intimate relationships. Note that while the jokes had created 
arousal with positive valence, this story created arousal with negative valence; that is, 
the valence of the arousal flipped to the opposite, whereas the level of arousal 
accumulated ever higher. The coach said, with a shaking, emotional voice, “I know 
many married couples who are really nice persons when they are not with each other. 
But even the devil will not tolerate them when they are together. When making fun of 
the other person, making him or her feel bad, is the sole purpose of the relationship. 
Some old holiday or something, when being right is the only thing that matters.” One 
of the three participants visible on the video shook his head in a powerful way from 
side to side and back and forth as a reaction to this point. (Tape 2, 23:05)  
Having again aroused the participants, the coach returned back to work-related 
content. He continued, without any linking phrases, that “It is essential that Siru and I 
try to form a shared understanding and that we both want to challenge each other [to 
find the best understanding]. This is what is important. It is not important to be the 
person who was right.” (Tape 2, 23:22) He then provided some further clarifications 
and thus ensured that the participants had the opportunity to construct a new belief 
about interaction dynamics, subjective beliefs, and shared understanding—and have 
the new belief associated with the emotional arousal that was created by his jokes and 
references to marriage.  
Finally, the coach concluded the micro-episode by using a tactic for reinforcing 
commitment. He asked, “Was that understandable?” Many audience members nodded 
and one of them elaborated the coach’s point in a constructive, affirmative way. (Tape 
2, 23:45) Again, the coach succeeded in making the participants publicly agree with 
him. Hence, the participants’ commitment to the newly formed belief was reinforced. 
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In conclusion, this micro-episode illustrates how the coach iteratively moved from 
increasing arousal to describing work-related content, and then reinforcing the 
participants’ commitment to the new content.  
4.5.2 Loving interaction at the workplace 
The last lesson of the first day also captures the arousal-(re)framing-commitment 
micro-pattern well. This episode was unique in the sense that the marriage example 
created a sense of positive urge to do things better, instead of negative arousal that the 
references to intimate relationships usually created or the general arousal that jokes 
created. This episode also illustrates well how arousal can accumulate over a ten-
minute period and become extremely high.  
The coach started the episode with several joke-like anecdotes that increased the 
participants’ arousal levels in an accumulating way. He first told how, “Men skimp 
[pihdata] on interaction all day long. They say, ‘I will let you know if there are any 
changes in me loving you.’ And, then, the men beg for sex in the evening.” [audience 
laughter] (Tape 6, 35:44) He then continued, “I have decided that I will never be so 
tired that I am not able to take care of home-related chores instantly when my wife 
asks me to. … Why do you think I behave this way? [Indistinguishable audience joke] 
In quest for rewards? [coach and audience laughter] … The way I behave toward the 
other one determines how she will behave toward me. … When I go home after work 
and my wife asks me to change the bathroom light bulb, I will do it without any fuss as 
soon as I can. And guess what follows from this? … When I go to sleep in the evening 
and put my hand like this [puts his hand vertically on his side, as if to show that there 
is a place next to him when he is lying on the bed], guess what happens? [loud 
audience laughter]. [Audience member makes an indistinguishable joke]. A tiger might 
just jump there!” [loud audience laughter]. (Tape 6, 37:22) 
A third joke, a counter-example of the positive tiger anecdote, was the third phase of 
arousal increase: “If I say that, ‘no I don’t have the energy. I couldn’t care less (about 
the bathroom light bulb).’ [audience laugher]. She has this kind of extremely long 
pajamas [loud audience laughter] that she will put on and even tie a knot between the 
legs [more audience laugther].” (Tape 6, 38:30) 
Once the laughter faded, the coach explained how unkind treatment causes people to 
sub-consciously deny their own needs for closeness and intimacy. He also said that 
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this leads to distancing behaviors and bad treatment. (Tape 6, 39:07) Then he 
concluded, “We do this to each other, every day, both at work and at home.” (Tape 6, 
39:31) Hence, he started linking the arousal created by the marriage anecdotes to work. 
He was silent for a few seconds, as if to allow the audience to think about his latest 
argument.  
After the short pause, the coach jumped back to marital relationships and asked from 
the audience, “What do you think, what is love?” (Tape 6, 40:13). A long discussion of 
the properties of love and loving behaviors followed this question. The coach took 
inputs from the audience and also pushed his own definition of love. The outcome was 
a list of the defining properties of love. The list included the following: Being in love, 
taking care of the other one, justice in everyday treatment, respect, standing by, 
kindness and warmth, forgiveness, and loyalty. Two of the three participants visible on 
this clip moved their bodies powerfully from side to side several times as the coach 
was defining the properties of love.  (Tape 6, 43:10) 
Once the coach had defined love, he returned back to his previous teachings about 
work-related interaction cultures. He explained how an interaction system of external 
discipline produces bad behaviors that are the opposite of loving behaviors. 
Conversely, an interaction system of self-discipline, he says, produces the loving 
behaviors. (Tape 6, 43:26) Hence, he again was building links between the marriage-
related arousal and work-related cognitive content.  
Even though the situation was quite aroused already at this point, the coach added 
another layer of arousal with the following story. “When I got married, I realized, at 
the second time, what it means to say ‘I do.’” [This made one of the three visible 
participants fix her position from being closed in to move upwards and then lean 
forward again, indicating increased excitement and interest] (Tape 6, 43:47). The 
coach also told how he had ruined his first marriage by selfish behaviors. He returned 
back to his second/current marriage: “Now I do these things [points at the properties of 
love] every day. I do them every day. More than my wife. … A few more kind words, 
a few more kind actions, showing more love. Then the whole interaction system (with 
the wife) becomes that of generosity and love. When you just do a bit more yourself 
than the other one does [the coach is smiling widely and looks authentic and happy].” 
He then elaborated the reasoning a bit further. (Tape 6, 44:25) The coach spoke these 
last sentences in such a personal and authentic sounding way that even the analyst 
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looking at the speech from the video felt that he wants to improve his own behavior in 
his marriage. I wrote in a memo while I was coding this section: “During the sixth 
hour, the coach describes a lot how he tries to be as good at his wife as he can. He 
describes many concrete behaviors (never too tired to fix the lamp; tries to show love 
behaviors every day and more than his wife). At least for me, these create a strong 
intent to improve my own behavior in my marriage. I want to improve and be a good, 
loving husband. […]  It's amazing; I really have an urge to act better.” (memo created 
on 2011-03-27).  
Now, when the coach had increased arousal to high levels, he again shifted back to 
work-related content. Immediately after describing his marriage philosophy, he asked, 
“The question becomes, ‘have you said more kind words and thanked more often than 
your colleagues, at the workplace?” (Tape 6, 45:20). “How would you describe a good 
work community?” Then he went to the whiteboard, on which the properties of love 
were listed. He asked, one by one, “does [this property] belong to the work place?” 
Every time the audience provided an affirmative answer. Most members visible in the 
video nodded in agreement. In addition, one member answered “yes it does” with loud, 
emotional voice to each question. [This person was cleaning manager #2 who was 
really affected by the training, see section “Evidence of mental model change in the 
seminar”; Table 18]. (Tape 6, 44:58) Hence, the coach not only associated the high 
arousal created with marriage examples with work-related content but also made 
people publicly affirm that they believe in the work content. In essence, he went 
through the arousal-(re)framing-commitment micro-pattern. 
4.5.3 Removing structural constraints from cleaning managers  
In some instances, the micro-pattern of arousal-(re)framing-commitment took a longer 
time period to become completed and the arousal almost got out of control. The coach 
increased the participants’ level of emotional arousal at the beginning of the second 
hour of the second day by arguing that cleaning managers’ work is bad:  
“Because we have temporary work contracts, it means that when you go to work, for 
example, when a young person goes to work in a place like that, then she must kiss her 
boss’s ass repeatedly, otherwise it will not work. If you don’t submit yourself to the 
system, if you get this shitty portfolio, there’s nothing else you can do but smile and 
be nice. If you protest, they will pretty fast say that ‘you don’t fit into this profession.’ 
In this profession, you must tolerate and submit yourself to others. If there are 
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problems, you are not supposed to speak about them. It is how cleaning managers 
work. We have these kinds of work communities.” [There are four participants visible 
on the clip as the coach tells this point. The three women move their bodies and heads 
from side to side and back and forth during the episode in an anxious way. One of 
them also visibly moves her hands in an anxious way. The male participant that is 
visible shows anxious head movements from side to side but with lower intensity than 
the female participants.] (Tape 8, 08:00) 
The coach further continued discussing how the firm must now improve these kinds of 
communities. (Tape 8, 08:05) In essence, having aroused the participants with a 
provocative work-related example and brutal claims, he moved on to cognitive 
(re)framing.  
The coach moved on, lecturing his theory of different kinds of interaction systems and 
discipline. A new participant entered the seminar room and the coach spent several 
minutes discussing how she and the coach had already implemented some of the 
coach’s lessons. The first signs that the arousal created by the coach was about to get 
out of his control are visible in the video during this discussion. Some of the cleaning 
managers had been insulted by the earlier brutal claim. Three cleaning managers seem 
to be openly discussing amongst each other, even though the coach and the new 
participant are having a public discussion that everyone is supposed to be following 
(Tape 8, 14:10). A few minutes later, one of them leans her forehead on the table, 
directly showing that she is not paying attention (Tape 8, 25:41). Another ten minutes 
later, when the coach is showing a slide about interaction culture, the same person 
sinks down in her chair, so that only her head and shoulders are above the table, again 
communicating disinterest (Tape 8, 34:03). While these behaviors are visible on the 
tape, the coach did not address them. 
After four more minutes, when the coach was explaining a new point on the white 
board, he noticed the lack of interest by these participants [the camera is zoomed in on 
the coach so I cannot say how the participants protested]. The coach stopped his 
lecturing and was silent for 18 seconds, directly looking at the cleaning managers. 
Then he asked, “were you following me?” (Tape 8, 38:36). He also said that this kind 
of behavior is insulting toward him and gave an analogical example from the 
workplace. After that, he returned to the point he was lecturing and continued speaking 
about it for eight minutes. 
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After the eight minutes, the coach again noticed that the same participants were not 
paying attention to his lessons. He said sarcastically, “The amount of excitement that I 
can see on your faces is amazing. Some of you are so really engaged in the seminar. 
You are showing with your behavior that you could not care less.” (Tape 8, 47:37) He 
then gave an emotional speech of how he is really committed to the seminar and how it 
hurts when people behave badly.  
The coach concluded his commitment speech by asking if the participants have any 
further comments (Tape 8, 48:57). This question made several cleaning managers open 
up. They described with crying-like voices how the coach’s arguments hurt. One of 
them said, “You said cleaning managers are doing a worthless job. You said that we 
are all worthless.” Another one continued, “Because they don’t have the rights to do 
things.” Then several participants started simultaneously speaking with loud voices 
and the content becomes undistinguishable. (Tape 8, 49:15).  The coach reacted to 
these comments by first apologizing, then thanking that they spoke up, and finally re-
explaining his point how bad culture and resource constraints put the cleaning 
managers into an impossible situation. He further continued that this dynamic is why 
the organizational change and training are needed, so that they could improve the 
cleaning managers’ situation. The cleaning managers seemed to be relieved and 
positive about the coach’s re-explanation. They, for instance, commented on the 
coach’s re-explanation in agreement when the coach asked them if they were happy 
with the re-explanation (Tape 8, 52:55). They also did not show any protest behaviors 
during the rest of the seminar and two cleaning managers (#1 and #2) confirmed later 
in an interview that they were satisfied about this episode; they also remembered the 
coach’s re-explanation accurately and believed it. The outcome? The members now 
became to associate the high arousal with the coach’s theory of cultural dynamics that 
prevent doing good work and the changes needed to make things better. This 
association was made even though the emotional arousal had been created by the 
brutal claim that the participants had initially perceived as a personal insult. Again, the 
coach had gone through the arousal-(re)framing-commitment pattern. 
In sum, the three micro-episodes I have described in this section showed how the 
coach first increased the participants’ level of emotional arousal by using tactics that 
created both positive and negative arousal. The valence of the arousal also flipped to 
the opposite during some of the micro-episodes. After having emotionally aroused the 
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participants, the coach moved on to describing work-related content. As the 
description of work-related content occurred immediately after the coach had 
increased the participants’ level of arousal, the emotional arousal became associated 
with the work-related content. The episodes also showed how the coach used tactics 
for increasing the participants’ commitment to the new ideas in several ways after he 
had first aroused them and described the work-related content. Table 17 below 
provides another 12 illustrations of the arousal-(re)framing-commitment episodes from 
the data. 
Table 17 (1 of 8): Illustrations of sensegiving micro-episodes, during which all the three 
elements were intertwined and closely connected in time 
Episode Increasing arousal Cognitive 
(re)framing 
Reinforcing 
commitment 
1.Assertive 
behavior  
1. The coach has asked 
everyone to describe 
which content has so far 
influenced the 
participants most. On her 
turn, cleaning mgr#3 says 
with crying voice that “I 
am too nice … I just want 
to please everyone else.  I 
have always thought that 
it would be a good thing.” 
[Four of the visible 11 
participants move their 
bodies in uncomfortable 
ways while listening to 
the first participant. Two 
others move their hands 
in anxious ways] (11, 
19:20) 
 
2. The coach comments, 
“do you remember how I 
said yesterday, I think 
that an overly nice person 
is also extremely mean 
towards the people 
closest to her” and 
describes several patterns 
[Four of the eight visible 
participants move their 
bodies from side to side. 
One of them 
aggressively, three others 
in more moderate ways. 
Two others move their 
heads] (11, 19:43) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The coach says: 
“The wrong kind of 
niceness, you must get 
rid of it. I repeat it 
again, the kind of 
organizational 
niceness, that there are 
people who think that 
being overly nice is 
normal [stops the 
sentence] I think those 
people are normal who 
challenge things and 
maintain good values” 
and continues 
describing the right 
kinds of behaviors (11, 
20:00). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The coach gives an 
example of a person 
who learned to be more 
assertive by following 
the rule, “show this 
sign [paper which has 
the text ‘no’] four times 
per day, every day” 
(11, 20:39)  
 
5. Cleaning mgr#3 
spontaneously 
reinforces the point: 
“As if my own effort 
would save the unit” 
(11, 21:27) and the 
coach affirms 
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Table 17 continues (2 of 8) 
2. Discussing 
problems is a 
good thing 
1. The coach tells a long 
story of a work unit in 
which an employee wrote 
an anonymous letter about 
problems to management. 
The coach had emphasized 
that the focal manager 
should focus on confirming 
the existence of the 
problems and solving 
them, not on who had 
written about them. Yet, in 
the coach’s words: “guess 
on what topic they focused 
on in the meeting? 
[audience member says 
‘finding who wrote it’]. 
Right, after 15min, the guy 
finally turned read” 
[Audience reacted with 
loud laughs] (3, 55:14) 
 
2. The coach says: “And 
guess what happened, the 
person was crucified right 
there. … It took over three 
months to fix that person 
emotionally and mentally” 
[two of the five visible 
participants pull their 
heads down] (3, 56:45) 
 
3. The coach tells a joke: 
“The supervisor ended the 
meeting by saying that if 
this kind of things are 
raised again, he will call 
the police.”[audience 
laughs] (3, 57:39)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The coach 
describes how it 
would actually be 
really good thing to 
be able to discuss 
problems and find 
solutions to them. (3, 
58:21) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. The coach says: “If 
zero conflicts and 
disagreements have 
been dealt at work 
place in five years, then 
things are pretty bad, 
don’t you agree?” (3, 
58:24) [the video is 
zoomed into the coach 
and does not capture 
participants’ reactions] 
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Table 17 continues (3 of 8) 
3. Male 
indifference  
1. The coach  says: “What 
happens to a man, at 
home, when his wife starts 
complaining when the 
man does do his chores, 
what happens to the man? 
[pause] Mia, what do you 
think? [audience member 
answers with laughter] . 
Well, not necessary, but 
the man increases his 
indifference, ‘what the 
hell, what’s the point of 
putting effort when I can 
survive with less!’ 
[Audience members 
comment spontaneously]. 
If the wife keeps 
complaining at home, the 
man repositions himself to 
the couch. The body will 
lie there while the mind 
has gone somewhere else 
a long time ago. He 
watches more sports TV 
and goes out with friends. 
Buys a motorcycle. Goes 
to the summer cottage 
more often. This is what 
happens.” [Three of the 
four visible participants 
shake their heads from 
side to side with moderate 
intensity] (1, 19:35) 
 
 
2. The coach continues 
directly, “At the 
property maintenance 
unit, this means that, if 
things don’t go as they 
are supposed to go, 
[many details], then 
coffee breaks get 
longer, men start 
walking slower, do 
lower quality work, 
get less done. Men 
always increase 
indifference when 
things go bad. (1, 
20:39) 
 
3. The coach gives 
several more examples 
from industry and the 
focal firm  (1, 21:20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The coach says: 
“There wasn’t 
anything familiar in 
these examples, was 
there?” [both audience 
and the coach laugh, 
indicating agreement 
in addition to 
increased arousal] (1, 
22:27) 
4. Importance 
of fair 
treatment 
1. The coach  says: 
“When I first time went to 
the Lahti unit and raised 
this (injustice) point, it 
created quite a reaction. 
Several people resigned 
and started looking for 
other jobs. They 
genuinely felt that that 
some people in the unit 
had privileges and some 
had really unjust work 
portfolios.” [Four of the 
five visible participants 
move their heads as a 
reaction; two of them also 
move their bodies] (13, 
49:12)   
 
2. The coach explains 
his theory of how 
unfair treatment has a 
negative influence on 
mental health and 
mood. “It’s the most 
challenging situation 
when a new cleaning 
target is received. 
Then people can get 
upset if you don’t have 
shared understanding 
of how to handle the 
issues.” (13, 50:02) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The coach says: 
“It’s not like that you 
would have these 
kinds of discussions at 
your work place, is 
it?” [It’s not clear 
from the video 
whether participants 
agreed or not] (13, 
50:33) 
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Table 17 continues (4 of 8) 
5. Kerttu (a 
woman who is 
too nice and 
therefore 
abused)  
 
 
 
 
 
3. The coach says: 
“Believe or not, this story 
is actually over 20 years 
old. … I want to help 
women. I have had to 
work really hard with 
myself to understand why 
my mother loved me in a 
so strange way. … This 
has been kind of therapy 
for me on how I can 
forgive my mother. This 
way I can learn to live 
better.” [Six of the 30 
visible participants move 
their bodies back and 
forth and up and down as 
a reaction. Two others 
move their hands in 
anxious ways.] 
(4, 17:30) 
 
7. The coach tells a Kerttu 
example from his 
previous marriage, told 
with emotional tone [The 
coach seems to be about 
to cry; the video shows 
seven participants. Two 
of them move their heads 
from side to side in 
powerful ways; three 
others move their heads in 
smoother but still 
somewhat anxious ways] 
(4, 20:39) 
 
8. The coach tells a 
generalized marriage 
example [Four of the 
seven visible participants 
pull their heads down] (4, 
22:28) 
 
 
1. The coach asks 
audience members to 
read the description of 
Kerttu from textbook 
(4, 15:42) 
 
 
 
 
4. The coach discusses 
Kerttu in work context 
(4, 18:14) 
 
5. The coach tells an 
example of how 
Kerttu is not able to 
stand up for herself 
and negotiate with 
supervisor (4, 19:37) 
 
6. The coach tells 
another example of 
Kerttu at work and 
summary (4, 20:05) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. The coach 
continues the previous 
example with, “this 
happens also in the 
work place” and 
explains details (4, 
22:50) 
 
2. The coach says: 
“Have you seen a 
person like this in your 
firm?” [Affirmative 
answers] (4, 17:14) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. The coach says: 
“Do you think standing 
up for herself is part of 
Kerttu’s repertoire?” 
[audience shake heads 
+ more discussion with 
audience] (4, 23:31) 
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Table 17 continues (5 of 8) 
6. External 
discipline vs. 
self-discipline 
 
 
2. The coach says with 
intense voice, “It’s 
absolute. If you are not 
afraid, you will not do 
what I say. I must scare 
and humiliate you so that 
you will be afraid of me. 
… It’s about teaching 
fear.” (4, 42:25) [Two 
audience members react 
by commenting with 
loud, low-pitch voices. 
Several members also 
move their bodies in 
anxious ways] 
 
3. Audience is confused 
about the concepts and 
several members raise 
their voice (4, 42:51) 
 
 
6. The coach continues 
after further description 
of the concepts, a few 
minutes later, “Human 
interaction culture in 
marital relationships, for 
some couples, the 
interaction system is that 
of external discipline, 
while for others it is self-
disciple.” [Three of the 
three visible participants 
move their heads from 
side to side] (4, 51:04) 
1. The coach outlines 
the difference between 
external-discipline and 
self-discipline (4, 
41:41) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The coach re-
explains his point and 
answers audience 
questions (4, 43:34) 
 
 
 
7. The coach continues 
directly from previous 
sentence: “Work 
communities, some 
work communities 
have the interaction 
system of external 
discipline, some self-
discipline.” (4, 51:10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. The coach 
summarizes the core 
features of external 
discipline and its 
negative outcomes, 
then asks, “right?” and 
audience members nod 
(4, 43:53) 
  
8. The coach says: 
“The question 
becomes, which kind 
of interaction system 
we want, do we want a 
system where we 
respect each other or 
one that is full of fear, 
humiliation, and 
insults?” [The coach is 
is silent for several 
seconds to allow 
audience reflect] (4, 
51:20) 
7. Reward 
system and 
behavior in 
interaction 
1. The coach says: “These 
problems emerge because 
lower level cleaning 
managers do not get 
performance based 
bonuses while higher 
level managers cleaning 
do get them.” [several 
audience members protest 
with loud voice; also 
aggressive hand and body 
movements are visible] 
(8, 54:48) 
 
2. After discussing 
with the audience, the 
coach thanks them and 
re-explains how the 
system rewards wrong 
kinds of behaviors and 
therefore causes 
systemic problems (8, 
55:25) 
 
 
 
3. The coach concludes 
his re-explanation by 
asking “Do you 
agree?” directly from 
one audience member 
who says, “yes, we 
agree with you.” (8, 
57:17) 
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Table 17 continues (6 of 8) 
8. Handling 
of violations  
 
 
 
3. The coach says: “The 
more you punish, 
chasten, and humiliate, 
the worse the counter 
reaction. A strong 
defiance has been beaten 
to me during my life (by 
mother). It has been the 
biggest challenge in my 
life.” [5 second silence, 
audience members keep 
their heads down, as in 
sadness] (4, 53:10) 
 
5. The coach says with 
intense voice: “If my 
wife always cleans my 
mess, it means that she 
wants to make me so 
helpless that she can 
complain that she ‘must 
live with a pathetic loser 
like that’” [participants 
are not visible on the 
video] (4, 53:48) 
1. The coach discusses 
how people should 
react in civilized ways 
when somebody 
breaks rules. He 
emphasizes that 
humiliation and 
retaliation are not 
proper ways. (4, 
51:55) 
 
4. The coach continues 
directly from the 
arousal sentence, “the 
most important thing is 
that the one who 
makes the mess, cleans 
the mess” (4, 43:16). 
Then he describes the 
idea that how it creates 
a negative pattern if 
people don’t 
assertively demand 
that everybody follow 
the shared rules 
 
6. The coach defines 
the word 
“vastuuttaminen” 
which refers to a 
specific way of 
behaving when rules 
are violated (4, 54:18) 
and provides several 
examples and answers 
audience questions (4, 
55:26) 
 
2. The coach says: 
“What should we do in 
a situation like this 
[somebody broke the 
rules]? Humiliate? 
[audience replies ‘no’] 
Chasten? [audience 
replies ‘no’] Punish? 
[audience replies ‘no’]” 
(4, 52:43) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. The coach recaps the 
basic idea of 
“Vastuuttaminen” (4, 
56:48) and asks, “Do 
you find this logical?” 
(4, 57:28) [audience 
members answer “yes” 
and nod their heads] 
9. How 
supervisors 
should 
support the 
newly formed 
teams  
1. The coach says: 
“When teams are 
established, I would 
compare that to skiing 
with my grandson. Who 
has never done downhill 
skiing before and is four 
years old. I take him on 
top of the hill with the 
lift. Put on the little skis 
to his feet and take away 
the rods…” [Four of the 
six visible participants 
lean their bodies to one 
side, as if they were 
feeling warm feelings 
and listening 
empathically](12, 23:40) 
 
 
2. The coach says: 
“Developing a team is 
similar [to teaching the 
grandson ski]. The 
coaching supervisor 
must help the team to 
take their first steps. 
So that the team learns 
to do those things that 
I have taught here” 
[continues describing 
content] (12, 24:31) 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The coach says: 
“That’s the message I 
want to convey [5 sec 
pause], isn’t this right, 
Seija?”  The 
audience member 
makes “mmmhhh” 
sound to indicate 
agreement (12, 24:55) 
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Table 17 continues (7 of 8) 
10. From 
subjective 
understandings 
to honesty and 
creative 
problem solving 
1. The coach tells a 
provocative, work–
related example about 
bad interaction patterns. 
He concludes with a 
provocative claim, 
“people who behave this 
way destroy the whole 
work community.” [The 
video shows five 
participants.  Four of 
them move their bodies 
back and forth and from 
side to side in short 
movements. The fifth one 
moves her body back and 
forth with long, strong 
movements] (8, 29:27) 
 
3. After explaining his 
idea conceptually, the 
coach gives an arousing, 
work-related example 
from the firm about how 
major changes were 
communicated only via 
email, without asking the 
employees opinion [A 
cynical laughter is 
audible on the video; the 
video does not show the 
participants] (8, 34:14)  
 
4. The coach says: “It is, 
at least in marriage, 
sometimes really 
annoying when you are 
telling something really 
important and notice that 
the other person says 
‘yes, yes’ but does not 
pay any attention.” [three 
of the four visible 
participants tilt their 
heads backwards as a 
reaction; also mild, 
gentle laughter is audible 
on the video.] (8, 34:55) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The coach tells in a 
simple telling style 
about the way 
conflicting views 
should be reconciled in 
the firm (8, 31:01) He 
also discusses this tool 
with the audience (8, 
32:25) and re-explains 
it with another slide (8, 
33:27) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. The coach re-
phrases his points: 
“Situations where 
people are abused or 
where communication 
is not handled properly 
should no longer 
happen.” (8,  
35:49) and elaborates a 
bit more 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. The coach 
concludes by asking, 
“do you find this 
logical?” (8, 37:15) 
and “What do you 
think, Raila?” (8, 
37:27). [Both 
questions provide 
affirmative answers] 
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Table 17 continues (8 of 8) 
11. The 
purpose of 
team based 
organizing 
1. The coach says: “Raise 
your hand if you belong 
to a team. Or let’s say 
like this, those who 
belong to an entity that is 
called a team.” [Many 
audience members raise 
their hands. While this 
act is not an emotional 
reaction, physical activity 
can increase the level of 
arousal; see chapter 6] (2, 
01:41) 
 
2. The coach says: ”I 
don’t believe that there 
are many functional 
teams” [15 of the 30 
participants visible on the 
video pull their bodies 
backwards as an 
immediate avoidance-
reaction; Several 
audience members also 
protest with loud voices] 
(2, 01:53) 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The coach re-
explains and 
elaborates the 
previous claim that 
provoked strong 
reactions: “Yes, yes, I 
don’t mean that teams 
could not work if they 
are not called teams 
(examples and 
concrete behaviors)”. 
(2, 02:30) 
 
4. The coach refers to 
a critical newspaper 
article the participants 
have placed on office 
information board and 
explains that the 
purpose of team work 
is to create an 
organization that is 
better for the 
employees, not to 
make more profits by 
abusing them (2, 
03:01) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. The coach recaps the 
positive goal and says 
that they will together 
try to reach it [goal 
setting + increasing 
efficacy] (2, 3:41) 
12. Principle 
of increasing 
productivity 
1. The coach describes 
practicalities and 
schedule: “Then we will 
have a break and you will 
empty your rooms—from 
your own property 
[audience laughter] “ (13, 
31:42) [Many 
participants join in joking 
about stealing stuff from 
the hotel rooms and 
audience laughs loudly] 
(13, 32 :11) 
 
2. Once the laughter 
fades, the coach says, 
“Good. The first and 
most important thing 
that I keep repeating 
here is that we are 
doing this through the 
development of 
productivity” (13, 
32:30) and continues 
lecturing with a slide 
for two minutes 
 
 
3. The coach concludes 
the episode by 
increasing efficacy: 
“We will continuously 
do things so that we 
need to put less effort 
tomorrow, we learn to 
control this service 
process better, we will 
take care of the holistic 
management of the 
work. We will have 
higher well-being for 
employees who are 
better in anticipating 
things. In this way 
things will get much 
better.” (13, 34:55) 
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5 EVIDENCE OF MENTAL MODEL CHANGE DURING 
THE SEMINAR 
Above I have described and analyzed the tactics the coach used to influence the 
change seminar participants’ emotional arousal and mental models. In this section, I 
describe evidence that shows that the participants’ mental models did indeed change as 
the outcome of the above described sensegiving. The evidence is presented in four 
parts. The first part summarizes evidence from the interviews that were carried out 
with ten seminar participants one to two weeks before and after the seminar. The 
second part consists of Likert-type surveys that the participants of two seminars filled 
before and after the seminars. The third part reports retrospective reflection of the 
effects of the seminar by five participants of a seminar in which they participated five 
years before the interview. The fourth part consists of the retrospective reflections of 
four change leaders who used the coach’s seminar to support the implementation of 
strategic change in their firms. Each type of evidence shows that the participants’ 
mental models did indeed change during the seminars. 
5.1 Evidence from Interviews Carried Out Before and After the Seminar 
Ten persons were interviewed before and after the seminar in which they participated. 
This was the same seminar which was video recorded and analyzed in the previous 
chapter. In the interviews, I asked questions relating to the interviewees’ everyday 
work behaviors and the way they thought about their work and role in the firm. The 
same questions were asked both before and after the seminar. This allowed 
recognizing if and how the interviewees’ thinking had changed during the seminar. 
There was strong or moderate evidence of change in the thinking of seven 
interviewees, weak evidence of change in the thinking of one interviewee and there 
was no evidence of change in the thinking of two interviewees. The evidence is 
summarized in Table 18 below. 
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es
s.
”
 
  ”
A
 
n
as
ty
 
pe
rs
o
n
 
is 
n
o
t 
a 
st
ro
n
g 
pe
rs
o
n
,
 
lik
e 
I 
pr
ev
io
u
sly
 
th
o
u
gh
t, 
bu
t 
ha
s 
a 
w
ea
k 
se
lf-
es
te
em
.
 
Pr
ev
io
u
sly
 
I 
av
o
id
ed
 
co
n
fro
n
tin
g 
n
as
ty
 
pe
rs
o
n
s 
bu
t 
n
o
w
 
I 
ha
v
e 
be
en
 
m
o
re
 
as
se
rt
iv
e 
an
d 
th
in
gs
 
ha
v
e 
w
o
rk
ed
 
be
tte
r.
”
 
 
St
ro
n
g 
ev
id
en
ce
 
o
f c
ha
n
ge
 
*
*
*
 
Th
e 
pe
rs
o
n
 
se
em
s 
to
 
ha
v
e 
be
en
 
o
v
er
co
m
m
itt
ed
 
to
 
he
r 
w
o
rk
 
pr
io
r 
to
 
tr
ai
n
in
g,
 
re
al
iz
in
g 
th
at
 
it’
s 
ha
rm
fu
l f
o
r 
he
r 
w
el
l-b
ei
n
g 
bu
t 
fe
el
in
g 
po
w
er
le
ss
 
to
 
ch
an
ge
 
an
yt
hi
n
g.
 
A
fte
r 
th
e 
se
m
in
ar
 
sh
e 
ha
s 
fo
u
n
d 
co
n
v
ic
tio
n
 
to
 
st
ar
t 
ac
tin
g 
di
ffe
re
n
tly
,
 
an
d 
re
po
rt
s 
to
 
ha
v
e 
do
n
e 
so
 
 
 Th
e 
pe
rs
o
n
 
w
as
 
co
n
ta
ct
ed
 
se
co
n
d 
tim
e 
by
 
ph
o
n
e 
tw
o
 
m
o
n
th
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
se
m
in
ar
 
an
d 
sh
e 
sa
id
 
he
r 
be
ha
v
io
rs
 
st
ill
 
w
er
e 
di
ffe
re
n
t d
u
e 
to
 
th
e 
se
m
in
ar
,
 
m
o
st
 
im
po
rt
an
tly
 
sh
e 
“
ha
d 
le
ar
n
ed
 
to
 
sa
y 
‘
n
o
,
’
”
 
as
 
ta
u
gh
t i
n
 
th
e 
se
m
in
ar
 
Cl
ea
n
in
g 
m
an
ag
er
 
#2
 
“
I 
sh
o
u
ld
 
le
ar
n
 
to
 
sa
y 
‘
n
o
.
’
 
O
th
er
w
ise
 
I 
w
ill
 
br
ea
k 
do
w
n
 
bu
t 
a 
hu
m
an
 
be
in
g 
ca
n
n
o
t 
be
 
to
u
gh
.
 
[..
.
] 
Th
er
e 
is 
n
o
th
in
g 
th
at
 
I c
an
 
do
 
to
 
m
y 
de
ep
er
 
n
at
u
re
.
”
 
 
Te
lls
 
an
 
ex
am
pl
e 
o
f h
o
w
 
sh
e 
w
as
 
as
se
rt
iv
e 
w
ith
 
an
 
em
pl
o
ye
e 
an
d 
sa
id
,
 
“
he
re
 
is 
yo
u
r 
job
.
 
D
o
 
it 
an
d 
st
o
p 
cr
yi
n
g.
”
 
 
   
M
o
de
ra
te
 
ev
id
en
ce
 
o
f c
ha
n
ge
 
*
*
 
Th
is 
pe
rs
o
n
 
re
co
gn
iz
ed
 
th
e 
da
m
ag
in
g 
ef
fe
ct
 
o
f 
he
r 
la
ck
 
o
f 
as
se
rt
iv
en
es
s 
o
n
 
he
r 
w
el
l-
be
in
g 
bu
t a
lso
 
sa
id
 
it’
s 
im
po
ss
ib
le
 
to
 
ch
an
ge
.
 
A
fte
r 
th
e 
tr
ai
n
in
g 
sh
e 
ha
s 
fo
u
n
d 
m
o
re
 
ag
en
cy
,
 
be
lie
v
in
g 
th
at
 
sh
e 
ca
n
 
ac
t d
iff
er
en
tly
 
in
 
th
es
e 
sit
u
at
io
n
s 
(an
d 
ha
s 
al
so
 
do
n
e 
so
; s
he
 
co
n
fir
m
ed
 
in
 
ph
o
n
e 
th
at
 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
ha
d 
la
st
ed
 
al
so
 
tw
o
 
m
o
n
th
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
se
m
in
ar
) 
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co
n
tin
u
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(2 
o
f 3
) 
Cl
ea
n
in
g 
m
an
ag
er
 
#3
 
”
M
y 
st
re
n
gt
h 
is 
th
at
 
I 
ge
t 
al
o
n
g 
w
ith
 
cu
st
o
m
er
s 
w
el
l [
…
] I
 
al
w
ay
s 
pu
t 
o
th
er
s’
 
n
ee
ds
 
in
 
fro
n
t o
f m
in
e.
”
 
 ”
I 
he
lp
 
m
y 
co
lle
ag
u
es
 
a 
lo
t. 
A
lso
 
th
is 
w
ee
k 
I 
ha
v
e 
ca
rr
ie
d 
o
u
t 
th
e 
w
o
rk
 
o
f 
o
th
er
s 
al
l t
he
 
tim
e.
 
I 
ha
v
en
’
t 
ha
d 
tim
e 
to
 
do
 
m
y 
o
w
n
 
job
,
 
ag
ai
n
.
”
 
 ”
If 
a 
co
lle
ag
u
e 
do
es
 
n
o
t 
ta
ke
 
ca
re
 
o
f 
so
m
et
hi
n
g 
th
ey
 
ha
v
e 
pr
o
m
ise
d 
to
 
do
 
o
r 
th
ey
 
ar
e 
su
pp
o
se
d 
to
 
do
,
 
th
en
 
I 
w
ill
 
ta
ke
 
ca
re
 
o
f t
ha
t jo
b 
m
ys
el
f.”
 
”
I h
av
e 
di
sa
gr
ee
d 
w
ith
 
pe
o
pl
e.
 
B
ef
o
re
 
I u
se
d 
to
 
be
 
to
o
 
n
ic
e 
an
d 
di
d 
as
 
o
th
er
s 
to
ld
 
m
e 
to
 
do
.
 
N
o
w
 
I h
av
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d 
m
y 
o
pi
n
io
n
 
m
o
re
 
as
se
rt
iv
el
y.
”
 
 ”
I 
n
o
tic
ed
 
th
at
 
I 
am
 
be
ha
v
in
g 
ex
ac
tly
 
as
 
th
at
 
K
er
ttu
.
 
I l
ea
rn
ed
 
th
at
 
I h
av
e 
to
 
ha
v
e 
th
e 
co
u
ra
ge
 
to
 
sa
y 
‘
n
o
’
.
 
I 
sa
id
 
al
re
ad
y 
th
er
e 
th
at
 
th
e 
fir
m
’
s 
pr
o
fit
s 
w
ill
 
n
o
t 
ge
t 
an
y 
be
tte
r 
ev
en
 
if 
I 
w
o
rk
 
15
 
ho
u
rs
 
pe
r 
da
y 
an
d 
ki
ll 
m
ys
el
f d
o
in
g 
so
.
”
 
St
ro
n
g 
ev
id
en
ce
 
o
f c
ha
n
ge
 
*
*
*
 
B
ef
o
re
 
th
e 
se
m
in
ar
 
th
is 
pe
rs
o
n
 
w
as
 
pr
o
u
d 
to
 
be
 
th
e 
m
o
st
 
he
lp
fu
l (
ev
en
 
ab
u
se
d) 
pe
rs
o
n
 
in
 
th
e 
w
o
rk
pl
ac
e.
 
A
fte
r 
th
e 
tr
ai
n
in
g 
sh
e 
ha
s 
re
al
iz
ed
 
th
e 
pr
o
bl
em
s 
in
 
su
ch
 
a 
pa
tte
rn
 
an
d 
is 
co
m
m
itt
ed
 
to
 
ch
an
gi
n
g 
he
r 
be
ha
v
io
r 
 Tw
o
 
m
o
n
th
s 
af
te
r 
th
e 
tr
ai
n
in
g,
 
th
e 
pe
rs
o
n
 
is 
st
ill
 
ex
ci
te
d 
ab
o
u
t 
th
e 
tr
ai
n
in
g 
an
d 
sa
ys
 
th
at
 
it 
ha
s 
he
lp
ed
 
he
r 
to
 
se
t b
o
u
n
da
rie
s 
at
 
w
o
rk
 
M
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
 
w
o
rk
er
 
#1
 
“
M
y 
job
 
in
flu
en
ce
s,
 
w
el
l, 
m
ai
n
ly
 
o
n
 
cu
st
o
m
er
s 
[…
] 
pe
rh
ap
s 
al
so
 
to
 
m
y 
su
pe
rv
iso
r,
 
[…
] c
u
st
o
m
er
s 
co
m
pl
ai
n
 
an
d 
he
 
n
ee
ds
 
o
rg
an
iz
e”
 
[d
o
es
 
n
o
t 
m
en
tio
n
 
co
lle
ag
u
es
 
at
 
an
y 
po
in
t] 
 “
I 
do
n
’
t 
se
e 
an
y 
pe
rs
o
n
al
 
th
re
at
s 
in
 
th
e 
w
o
rk
pl
ac
e 
[…
] I
 
ha
v
en
’
t 
re
co
gn
iz
ed
 
an
y 
w
ea
kn
es
se
s 
in
 
[th
e 
fir
m
].”
 
“
I 
st
ill
 
th
in
k 
th
at
 
m
y 
job
 
in
flu
en
ce
s 
cu
st
o
m
er
s 
an
d 
su
pe
rv
iso
rs
,
 
an
d 
al
so
 
m
y 
co
lle
ag
u
es
”
 
 “
W
he
n
 
I 
he
ar
d 
al
l 
th
e 
st
o
rie
s 
[…
] q
u
ite
 
la
rg
e 
pr
o
bl
em
s 
ex
ist
.
 
Ev
en
 
th
o
u
gh
 
a 
la
rg
e 
fir
m
,
 
m
an
y 
th
in
gs
 
ar
e 
st
ill
 
re
al
ly
 
ba
dl
y 
do
n
e 
“
 
M
o
de
ra
te
 
ev
id
en
ce
 
o
f c
ha
n
ge
 
*
*
 
Th
e 
pe
rs
o
n
 
se
em
s 
to
 
ha
v
e 
de
v
el
o
pe
d 
n
ew
 
be
lie
fs
 
ab
o
u
t 
hi
s 
o
w
n
 
in
flu
en
ce
 
o
n
 
hi
s 
co
lle
ag
u
es
 
 
 H
e 
al
so
 
se
em
ed
 
to
 
ha
v
e 
de
v
el
o
pe
d 
a 
bi
t 
m
o
re
 
cr
iti
ca
l v
ie
w
 
to
w
ar
ds
 
th
e 
fir
m
’
s 
cu
rr
en
t 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
M
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
 
m
an
ag
er
 
#1
 
 
[N
o
 
st
at
em
en
ts
 
th
at
 
w
o
u
ld
 
ha
v
e 
be
en
 
re
v
ise
d 
in
 
th
e 
po
st
-
tr
ai
n
in
g 
in
te
rv
ie
w
]  
“
Th
e 
id
ea
 
o
f t
ak
in
g 
m
o
re
 
pe
rs
o
n
al
 
re
sp
o
n
sib
ili
ty
 
w
as
 
im
po
rt
an
t 
fo
r 
m
e.
 
I 
ha
v
e 
tr
ie
d 
to
 
ap
pl
y 
it 
n
o
w
.
”
 
 “
Th
e 
ex
am
pl
e 
o
f 
th
e 
to
o
 
n
ic
e 
w
o
m
an
 
w
as
 
ill
u
m
in
at
in
g.
 
It 
m
ad
e 
m
e 
th
in
k 
w
ha
t 
I 
co
u
ld
 
do
 
di
ffe
re
n
tly
 
so
 
it 
w
o
u
ld
 
n
o
t h
ap
pe
n
 
to
 
m
e.
”
 
W
ea
k 
ev
id
en
ce
 
o
f c
ha
n
ge
 
Co
m
pa
ris
o
n
 
o
f 
pr
e-
 
an
d 
po
st
-
tr
ai
n
in
g 
st
at
em
en
ts
 
di
d 
n
o
t r
ev
ea
l c
ha
n
ge
s.
 
H
o
w
ev
er
,
 
th
e 
pe
rs
o
n
 
ar
gu
ed
 
in
 
th
e 
in
te
rv
ie
w
 
af
te
r 
th
e 
se
m
in
ar
 
th
at
 
he
 
ha
d 
ch
an
ge
d 
hi
s 
th
in
ki
n
g 
in
 
tw
o
 
w
ay
s 
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M
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
 
w
o
rk
er
 
#2
 
 
“
If 
so
m
eb
o
dy
 
w
o
u
ld
 
be
 
ru
de
 
w
ith
o
u
t 
a 
re
as
o
n
 
to
w
ar
d 
m
e,
 
I w
o
u
ld
 
gi
v
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
tr
ea
tm
en
t b
ac
k”
 
“
[m
y 
job
 
in
flu
en
ce
s] 
th
e 
cu
st
o
m
er
s,
 
w
ho
 
liv
e 
in
 
th
e 
ho
u
se
s 
th
at
 
I 
m
ai
n
ta
in
.
 
W
el
l, 
m
ay
be
 
al
so
 
th
e 
m
an
ag
er
s,
 
th
ey
 
ge
t 
lo
t 
o
f 
cr
ap
 
if 
I 
do
n
’
t 
do
 
m
y 
job
 
w
el
l. 
Th
e 
cu
st
o
m
er
s 
an
d 
m
an
ag
er
s,
 
n
o
-
o
n
e 
el
se
,
 
th
at
’
s 
m
y 
o
pi
n
io
n
.
”
 
D
es
cr
ib
ed
 
ho
w
 
he
 
re
al
iz
ed
 
th
at
 
he
 
sh
o
u
ld
 
n
o
t b
e 
ru
de
 
ba
ck
 
w
he
n
 
pe
o
pl
e 
ar
e 
ru
de
 
bu
t 
tr
y 
to
 
de
al
 
th
e 
sit
u
at
io
n
 
in
 
a 
m
o
re
 
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
w
ay
 
[fr
o
m
 
m
y 
n
o
te
s,
 
re
co
rd
in
g 
o
f t
he
 
in
te
rv
ie
w
 
fa
ile
d]
 
 M
en
tio
n
ed
 
ho
w
 
hi
s 
w
o
rk
 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
 
al
so
 
in
flu
en
ce
s 
co
lle
ag
u
es
 
[fr
o
m
 
m
y 
n
o
te
s] 
 
M
o
de
ra
te
 
ev
id
en
ce
 
o
f c
ha
n
ge
 
*
*
 
Th
e 
pe
rs
o
n
 
se
em
ed
 
to
 
ha
v
e 
st
ar
te
d 
th
in
ki
n
g 
di
ffe
re
n
tly
 
ab
o
u
t 
in
te
rp
er
so
n
al
 
co
n
fli
ct
s 
an
d 
in
te
rd
ep
en
de
n
ci
es
 
at
 
w
o
rk
 
M
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
 
w
o
rk
er
 
#3
 
[N
o
 
st
at
em
en
ts
 
th
at
 
w
o
u
ld
 
ha
v
e 
be
en
 
re
v
ise
d 
in
 
th
e 
po
st
-
tr
ai
n
in
g 
in
te
rv
ie
w
] 
“
Th
er
e 
w
as
 
n
o
t 
re
al
ly
 
n
o
th
in
g 
n
ew
,
 
w
ha
t 
I 
di
dn
’
t 
kn
o
w
 
o
th
er
w
ise
 
…
 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 
al
l 
th
is 
ab
o
u
t 
he
lp
in
g 
co
lle
ag
u
es
 
an
d 
su
ch
 
bu
t 
th
at
’
s 
w
ha
t 
I 
ha
v
e 
al
w
ay
s 
be
en
 
do
in
g.
 
I 
ha
v
e 
he
lp
ed
 
co
lle
ag
u
es
 
ev
en
 
w
ith
o
u
t t
he
 
se
m
in
ar
.
”
 
No
 
ev
id
en
ce
 
o
f c
ha
n
ge
 
Th
is 
pe
rs
o
n
’
s 
m
en
ta
l 
m
o
de
l 
o
f 
w
o
rk
 
w
as
 
sim
ila
r 
to
 
th
e 
m
o
de
l 
pr
es
en
te
d 
in
 
th
e 
se
m
in
ar
.
 
It 
is 
po
ss
ib
le
 
th
at
 
th
e 
o
ld
 
be
lie
fs
 
ab
o
u
t 
go
o
d 
be
ha
v
io
r 
w
er
e 
re
in
fo
rc
ed
 
bu
t 
th
er
e 
is 
n
o
 
qu
al
ita
tiv
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 
o
f t
hi
s 
Cl
ea
n
in
g 
m
an
ag
er
 
#4
 
[N
o
 
st
at
em
en
ts
 
th
at
 
w
o
u
ld
 
ha
v
e 
be
en
 
re
v
ise
d 
in
 
th
e 
po
st
-
tr
ai
n
in
g 
in
te
rv
ie
w
] 
“
B
u
t 
th
o
se
 
ar
e 
se
lf-
ev
id
en
t 
th
in
gs
 
[th
at
 
th
e 
co
ac
h 
w
as
 
te
ac
hi
n
g]
”
 
 “
W
he
n
 
yo
u
 
ha
v
e 
th
e 
re
sp
o
n
sib
ili
ty
,
 
yo
u
 
jus
t 
ha
v
e 
to
 
do
 
th
e 
job
.
 
Th
is 
is 
n
o
t b
ei
n
g 
to
o
 
n
ic
e 
bu
t 
re
as
o
n
ab
ly
 
fle
x
ib
le
”
 
 
No
 
ev
id
en
ce
 
o
f c
ha
n
ge
 
Th
is 
pe
rs
o
n
 
ha
d 
o
v
er
 
20
 
ye
ar
s 
o
f e
x
pe
rie
n
ce
 
an
d 
sh
e 
sa
w
 
th
at
 
th
e 
tr
ai
n
in
g 
pr
o
v
id
ed
 
n
o
 
n
ew
 
kn
o
w
le
dg
e.
 
In
 
fa
ct
,
 
sh
e 
re
fle
ct
iv
el
y 
di
sa
gr
ee
d 
w
ith
 
th
e 
co
ac
h 
o
n
 
th
e 
po
in
t 
ab
o
u
t 
be
in
g 
to
o
 
n
ic
e 
v
s.
 
fle
x
ib
le
 
Cl
ea
n
in
g 
m
an
ag
er
 
#5
 
“
[O
n
e 
w
ea
kn
es
s] 
I h
av
e 
is 
th
at
 
I t
ak
e 
to
o
 
m
u
ch
 
st
re
ss
 
fro
m
 
th
in
gs
 
th
at
 
do
n
’
t 
be
lo
n
g 
to
 
m
e 
…
 
I 
sh
o
u
ld
 
fo
cu
s 
o
n
 
m
y 
o
w
n
 
ta
sk
s 
…
 
B
as
ic
al
ly
,
 
I’
m
 
n
o
t 
u
sin
g 
m
y 
su
pe
rv
iso
r 
po
w
er
 
en
o
u
gh
”
 
“
Ea
rli
er
 
I 
sp
en
d 
a 
lo
t 
o
f 
tim
e 
cl
ea
n
in
g 
m
y 
su
bo
rd
in
at
es
’
 
m
es
se
s 
bu
t 
n
o
w
 
I 
ha
v
e 
st
ar
te
d 
to
 
re
qu
ire
 
th
em
 
to
 
ta
ke
 
ca
re
 
o
f 
th
ei
r 
o
w
n
 
m
es
se
s 
by
 
th
em
se
lv
es
 
…
 
Th
e 
tr
ai
n
in
g 
pr
o
ba
bl
y 
en
co
u
ra
ge
d 
m
e 
o
n
 
th
is”
 
M
o
de
ra
te
 
ev
id
en
ce
 
o
f c
ha
n
ge
 
*
*
 
Th
e 
pe
rs
o
n
 
ha
s 
re
in
fo
rc
ed
 
he
r 
be
lie
f 
ab
o
u
t 
as
se
rt
iv
e 
be
ha
v
io
r 
 
H
ig
he
r 
le
v
el
 
cl
ea
n
in
g 
m
an
ag
er
 
#1
 
“
W
e 
ha
v
e 
di
al
o
gu
e 
fo
r 
th
at
 
pu
rp
o
se
 
[h
an
dl
in
g 
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
ts
]. 
Tw
o
 
pe
o
pl
e 
ta
lk
 
an
d 
ex
pl
ai
n
 
th
ei
r 
v
ie
w
s.
”
 
 
“
Th
is 
w
as
 
w
ha
t 
I 
co
pi
ed
 
al
re
ad
y 
th
er
e 
[a 
fra
m
ew
o
rk
 
fo
r 
co
n
st
ru
ct
in
g 
sh
ar
ed
 
u
n
de
rs
ta
n
di
n
g]
,
 
I 
ha
v
e 
th
es
e 
cl
ea
n
in
g 
m
an
ag
er
s 
an
d 
th
ey
 
ha
v
e 
di
sa
gr
ee
m
en
ts
.
 
In
 
th
e 
fu
tu
re
 
I’
m
 
al
w
ay
s 
go
in
g 
to
 
u
se
 
[th
e 
fra
m
e-
w
o
rk
] …
 
W
e 
w
ill
 
st
ar
t 
m
ee
tin
g 
to
ge
th
er
 
m
o
re
 
o
fte
n
.
 
W
e 
m
et
 
o
n
 
Fr
id
ay
 
an
d 
it 
w
en
t r
ea
lly
 
w
el
l.”
 
 
M
o
de
ra
te
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en
ce
 
o
f c
ha
n
ge
 
*
*
 
Th
e 
pe
rs
o
n
 
el
ab
o
ra
te
d 
he
r 
m
en
ta
l m
o
de
l o
f 
co
n
fli
ct
 
re
so
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The strongest evidence of change came from two cleaning managers. They both 
changed their thinking in two ways: (1) from seeing assertive behavior as impossible 
to seeing assertiveness as possible and (2) from thinking that sacrificing their own 
well-being for the good of other employees is a good thing to thinking that the 
sacrificing behaviors are bad. Before the seminar, both training manager #1 and #3 
were helping their colleagues a lot, at the expense of their own work and well-being. 
Both of them recognized this tendency and took pride of it, listing it as their strength: 
“I help my colleagues a lot. Also this week I have carried out the work of others all the 
time,” cleaning manager #3 said, with pride in her voice. However, after the seminar, 
both of them had recognized that their way of working was not a sustainable solution 
for themselves and not useful for the workplace either (the other employees were 
abusing them, leaving their work to the managers). They consequently had decided to 
change their behavior and also reported specific instances where they had acted 
according to the new belief. Most concretely, cleaning manager #1 told how she had 
“come home yesterday at 1:30” when her 7.5 hours of work were done, even though 
someone had asked her to handle an extra task at the office. She had told the person 
that he or she should handle the task independently and this had gone fine.  These two 
persons also confirmed in a phone interview carried out two months after the seminar 
that they had maintained the new behaviors.  
There was moderate evidence of cognitive change in the mental models of five 
interviewees. Many of the changes related to the recognition of additional 
interdependencies at the workplace. For instance, before the seminar maintenance 
worker #1 said that his work only influences customers and his immediate supervisor. 
After the seminar, he added his colleagues to the list and explained how his actions can 
make their work easier or more complicated and how his behavior influences the mood 
of the co-workers and the atmosphere of the whole working place. Another way the 
participants added concepts to their mental models related to ways of handling 
interpersonal conflicts: two of the interviewees [maintenance worker #2 and higher-
level cleaning manager #1] recognized new ways of behaving in situations where 
parties disagree strongly and may even use offensive language.  
An important observation is that many of the interviewees understood their job as 
taught in the seminar already before the seminar. That is, their basic understanding of 
how their own behavior and their job are connected to other things and their basic 
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attitudes toward work and interpersonal relations were consistent with the coach’s 
teachings. Consequently, there were little new ideas in the seminar and there was 
therefore no evidence of the addition of concepts in their mental models or changes 
into believing opposite things. As one of the maintenance workers described: “He 
taught really basic things, how you should behave with the customer and so on. It was 
really simple things, like common sense. It is obvious that you should behave that 
way.” However, there was tentative evidence that the strength of some beliefs 
reinforced in two interviews. Cleaning manager #5 and higher-level cleaning manager 
#1 reported that the seminar did not really provide new ideas but they still spoke in a 
clearer and more convinced way of the themes that had been discussed during the 
seminar. The quantitative survey responses discussed in the next section provide 
further evidence indicating that even though some participants did not develop new 
beliefs or flip to believing the opposite, they still reinforced some of their beliefs. 
5.2 Evidence from Likert-Type Surveys Filled before and after the 
Seminar 
A second source of evidence of change comes from Likert-type surveys the 
participants of two seminars filled before and after the seminars. The first of the two 
seminars was the seminar analyzed above and the second seminar was organized about 
one month later for the same Property Service Company in Oulu. The surveys 
contained questions that were designed to measure the participants’ beliefs and 
attitudes relating to content taught in the seminar. They were used to assess changes in 
the strength of beliefs. Quantified surveys are suitable for this purpose as they assess 
the answerers’ degree of agreement with a certain claim on a quantitative scale. Hence, 
they can be seen to measure the strength of a certain belief rather than its existence or 
quality. 
The data shows that the participants’ answers to most of the survey questions changed 
into the direction the coach’s sensegiving was supposed to change them. The small 
sample size limits the ability to make strong generalized inferences; yet, the overall 
patterns do provide support for the claim that the seminar participants’ mental models 
changed during the seminar to be aligned with the sensegiver’s message. There were 
23 questions and answers to 19 of them changed into the anticipated direction, 
consistent with the claim that the coach’s sensegiving in the seminar influenced the 
participants’ mental models. 
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5.2.1 Data from Petäys seminar 
Table 19 shows data from the survey collected in the seminar held in Petäys in March 
2006. This is the same seminar that was analyzed in the previous chapter. Averages to 
several questions changed substantially during the seminar. Questions #1 and #5 
measured the participants’ beliefs about the legitimacy of revenge and showed a large 
(-.35 & -.68 on scale from 1 to 5) decrease, aligned with the coach’s teachings. Related 
questions #10, #12, and #16 further discussed interpersonal and emotional dynamics in 
the work community and the answers changed (+.65; +.16; and -.29) as taught by the 
coach. Question #7 focused on problem awareness. The answers to it increased on 
average .35 points, consistent with the training. Question #11 assessed if the 
participants identified personal consequences with the company’s success and there 
was an increase of .26, again aligned with the coach’s teachings.  
There were also three questions in which there was a nontrivial change in the opposite 
direction of what the coach had taught. The coach taught that people’s emotions do not 
result from other people’s actions but that people can independently determine how 
they will feel. It seems that the participants got a counter reaction to this lesson of the 
coach and reinforced the opposite belief (question 14). However, note that this 
negative change does not invalidate the main argument of this dissertation which 
assets that emotional arousal reinforces the effect of sensegiving—emotional arousal 
can indeed reinforce also the negative/defensive reaction if the content of the actual 
sensegiving message is not convincing. It is also possible that people emphasized 
others’ influence on their emotions because the coach spent most of the time 
describing interdependencies between people and interaction dynamics that cause 
negative emotions.  
Similar changes in the unexpected direction can be seen in answers to questions 8 and 
11. In question eight, the change in average suggests that people got de-motivated 
during the seminar. However, it can be seen that only five out of the 30 participants 
gave a lower score the second time and that only a few participants could have given a 
higher score because most participants had given the highest score already when they 
answered the survey before the seminar.  A similar situation of high initial scores 
explains the unexpected changes in the answers to question 11. 
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Table 19: Changes in participants’ answers to questions relating to the content of the seminar 
held at Petäys in March, 2006 (N=30).12  
Question Scale Average 
Before 
Average 
After 
Average 
Change 
N 
change* 
1. If a colleague makes a mistake that 
harms me, I  have the right to yell at 
him/her (negative change expected) 
1…5 1.97 1.61 -.35 -9 
+2 
2. Imagine that you are certain about 
something but your supervisor 
disagrees. How convinced you would 
be to think that “the supervisor is 
wrong” (negative change expected) 
1…5 3.65 3.54 -.10 -9 
+6 
3. I am interested in my work 1…5 4.58 4.74 .16 -4 
+7 
4. You cannot influence your own 
emotions (negative change expected) 
1…5 2.26 2.35 .09 -8 
+10 
5. If somebody insults me verbally, I 
have the right to insult him/her back 
(negative change expected) 
1…5 2.52 1.84 -.68 -5 
+15 
6. I am able to recognize when 
someone has done something 
intentionally (negative change 
expected) 
1…5 2.90 2.90 0 -8 
+10 
7. There are problems in my work 
community 
1…5 3.13 3.48 .35 -3 
+14 
8. I want to do my work well 1…5 4.94 4.77 -.16 -5 
+1 
9. My own work influences the success 
of the firm 
1…5 4.65 4.61 -.032 -5 
+4 
10. I have to demand my colleagues to 
behave better if they are constantly in a 
bad mood 
1…5 3.87 4.52 .65 -2 
+18 
11. The success of the company 
matters to me 
1…5 4.48 4.74 .26 -3 
+9 
12. If there are problems at the 
workplace, it is useful for me to talk 
about them with the person in charge 
1…5 4.52 4.68 .16 -3 
+8 
13. The way I talk with my colleagues 
influences my work 
1…5 4.68 4.81 .12 -2 
+5 
14. Others’ actions determine my 
emotions (negative change expected) 
1…5 2.65 3.10 .45 -4 
+11 
15. It is beneficial for me to make my 
colleagues happy 
1…5 3.97 4.13 .16 -6 
+10 
16. It is better to not stand up for 
yourself so that others will not 
consider you as a difficult person 
(negative change expected) 
1…5 2.06 1.77 -.29 -14 
+5 
* The last column shows how many participants gave a lower answer (numbers beginning with 
“–“) or a higher answer (“+”) after the seminar 
                                                 
12
 Small sample size makes using statistical tests somewhat inappropriate and I have therefore 
not reported T-test in the table. For those interested, a one-tailed pair-wise t-test would have 
shown the following p-values:  Q1: .047*; Q2: .30; Q3: .18;Q4: .35; Q5: .0045**; Q6: .5; Q7: 
.039*; Q8: .048*; Q9: .37; Q10: .00069***; Q11: .036*; Q12: .067┴; Q13: .11; Q14: .025*; 
Q15: .16; Q16: .076┴; (*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, ┴ p<.10) 
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5.2.2 Data from Oulu seminar 
Table 20 shows answers from the seminar held for the Property Service Company in 
Oulu on April, 2006. This seminar was similar to the one analyzed above in terms of 
the content and process of the seminar and provides complementary evidence of the 
effects of emotional sensegiving on sense-receivers’ mental models. As can be seen in 
the table, the averages changed in the predicted direction in each question asked from 
the participants.  
Table 20: Changes in participants’ answers to questions relating to the content of the seminar 
held at Oulu in April, 2006 (N=24)13 
Question Scal
e 
Avrg. 
Befor
e 
Avrg. 
After 
Avrg. 
Change 
N 
change
* 
1. If my supervisor does not do his or her job 
properly, I must intervene 
1…7 5.73 6.31 .58 -4 
+13 
2. I deserve better than what the situation 
currently is at my workplace  
1…7 4.73 5.19 .46 -4 
+11 
3. I am lucky to work in this firm 1…7 4.58 4.77 .19 -6, +9 
4. In this firm, my supervisors and I have 
shared goals that benefit us all 
1…7 5.62 5.69 .077 -7 
+7 
5. This can change for the better only if the 
management takes the initiative (negative 
change expected) 
1…7 3.54 2.65 -.88 -14 
+5 
6. I must comply to all customers’ requests 
even though they harmed the firm and were 
repeated (negative change expected) 
1…7 3.04 2.15 -.88 -13 
+3 
7. It is beneficial for me to be interested in 
other people at work and ask how they are 
doing 
1…7 5.65 5.73 .077 -4 
+7 
* The last column shows how many participants gave a lower answer (numbers beginning with 
“–“) or a higher answer (“+”) after the seminar 
The change was largest for questions #5 and #6 and large for questions #1 and #2. 
Questions #1 and #5 assessed beliefs about the role and responsibility of managers vs. 
employees in ensuring effective functioning of the firm. The coach emphasized that 
employees should and can take more responsibility. As can be seen, the employees 
seemed to change their beliefs to be more aligned with this idea. Question #6 assessed 
the employees’ attitude toward ‘complicated’ customers. The coach taught that the 
employees should teach the customers to behave better so that the overall productivity 
of the value chain would be increased. Thus, the employees should not comply with 
                                                 
13
 The results of a one-tailed pair-wise t-test would have shown the following significance 
levels Q1: .013*; Q2: .064┴; Q3: .26; Q4: .42; Q5: .016*; Q6: .0012**; Q7: .38; (** p<.01, * 
p<.05, ┴ p<.10) 
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the most exotic demands. As can be seen, this message was also well received. 
Question #2 assessed the employees’ desire for change by asking if they believed that 
they deserve their workplace to be better than it currently is. The coach emphasized 
that they indeed do deserve better and it seems that the employees reinforced their 
desire for the better. The remaining questions assessed the employees’ satisfaction 
with working in the firm, perceptions of shared goals, and the importance of showing 
interest to other employees.  
5.3 Anecdotal Reflection from Individuals Who Participated in the 
Seminar Five Years Earlier 
One way to assess whether a seminar has any effect on participants’ mental models is to assess 
whether they remember the seminar and its content several years later. While this method does 
not directly measure change, it can be used to assess whether or not sense-receivers have stored 
some sensegiving content in their long term memory. If sense-receivers do not remember any 
content of a seminar held a long time ago, it can be concluded that they did not encode any 
content in their long term memory during the seminar. Conversely, if they do remember some 
content, it can be concluded that it is plausible to believe that they did encode some seminar 
content in their long term memory. Of course, it is impossible to say if the participants 
remember the actual seminar or whatever corporate communication that has been carried out 
after the seminar to reinforce the change message. Yet, in combination with the prospective 
data presented above and the anecdotal data presented below, data showing that the participants 
did indeed remember the content of the seminar also several years after the seminar provides 
corroborating evidence for the claim that their mental models changed during the seminar. 
As can be seen from Table 21 below, each of the five interviewees remembered some content 
from the seminar. The memories of the three employees were related to interdependencies and 
interpersonal relations at work. They remembered that the training had emphasized the 
importance of understanding others’ needs and behaving in an assertive and respectful way 
toward them. The two supervisors remembered that the training had had an effect on the 
behavior of other participants but not on themselves. The first supervisor felt that the effect of 
the seminar was positive on the thinking and behavior of the production organization even 
though it had less impact on product development. The second supervisor felt that the effects of 
the training on the employees’ thinking and expectations were negative because the new 
content was somewhat decoupled from the reality. In sum, however, these five interviews 
provide further support for the claim that the seminars influenced the participants’ mental 
models. 
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Table 21: Participants remembered some seminar content five years after participating in it 
Interviewee Quotations Comment  
Employee #1 “I remember the example about feeding 
the Kerttu [when you don’t finish your 
job, an overly nice person will finish it 
for you and suffer]. Everybody should 
do their own job well” 
One major addition to this 
person’s mental model was the 
increased understanding of 
interdependencies at work and 
how his own actions influence 
the well-being of others 
Employee #2 “After the training, I started paying 
more attention to interpersonal relations 
at work” 
This person also seems to have 
extended his mental model 
regarding interpersonal dynamics 
by recognizing new links 
between himself and others into 
his mental model 
Employee #3 Reports that he has ambiguous feelings 
about the seminar: “really good 
thoughts but they do not work in 
practice.” Content-wise, he remembers 
“the example that you should go to the 
hallway to calm down when you are 
about to get pissed off.” 
While the person does not believe 
in the feasibility of the new ideas 
taught in the seminar, he seems to 
have maintained some of them in 
his mental model 
Supervisor #1 Says that the seminar had no major 
influence on herself because she was in 
product development but “for the 
people in the production organization it 
clearly created a new way of thinking.” 
No evidence of the effects of the 
seminar on the mental model of 
the interviewed person. Indicative 
evidence that the training 
changed others’ mental models 
Supervisor #2 “The hysteria that [the coach] caused is 
not good, he criticized supervisors too 
much … he gave the wrong image to 
the employees by emphasizing 
employee autonomy too much” 
Remembers that the training 
emphasized employee 
empowerment a lot and sees that 
the effect was negative for the 
company 
 
5.4 Anecdotal Evidence from Change Leaders 
I interviewed four change leaders from three companies who had used or were using 
the coach’s services. The three companies were the Property Service Company for 
which the seminar analyzed in the previous chapter and the third seminar in which I 
participated were held, the Sausage Company from which the five persons described in 
the previous sub-section who had participated in the seminar five years earlier came 
from, and the Milk Company for which the first of the three seminars in which I 
participated was organized. The interviewees included the development managers of 
each of the three companies and the retired CEO of the Sausage Company.  
The purpose of these interviews was to assess if the companies perceived whether the 
training had an effect on the employees’ thinking and behavior. Each of the four 
interviewees was convinced that the seminar had a major impact on the participants’ 
beliefs and attitudes. They also emphasized that the organizational context is a major 
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factor influencing whether the mental model change that is created in the seminars 
transforms into organizational success. Obviously, this data does not prove 
conclusively that the seminars influenced the participants’ mental models, as it only 
describes the perceptions and interpretations of four individuals (who may suffer from 
bias because they had an active role in hiring the change coach). However, the data 
provides ecological validity for the claim in the sense that it shows that practitioners 
found the seminar useful in promoting organizational change; and combined with other 
sources of data, it increases confidence in the claim that the seminar did indeed cause 
the participants’ mental models to change. 
The development manager of the Property Service Company was positive that the 
seminar had had an influence on the participants’ mental models. She recognized two 
main strengths in the coach and seminars. The first was the level of standardization: 
“The three-day seminars are always exactly alike. The examples and everything are 
exactly the same. We know that each employee will get the same new basic 
understanding.” The second strength “is [the coach’s] ability to convince people. He is 
a strong communicator. He says things in a persuasive way, and they become reality. 
They become reality, for example, for maintenance workers.” She also told that “you 
can see from the seminar feedback, from the answers to open-ended questions, that for 
some individuals the seminar has been a really powerful experience; it has awoken 
them in terms of both work and life.” 
The retired CEO of the Sausage Company was convinced that the seminar was 
effective. He said: “I indeed think that [the coach] was the right person to handle our 
case, he had the ability to create the change.” He described how the company was in a 
desperate need for change because employee commitment and trust between 
employees and management were low: “At the beginning [of my term as a CEO], the 
situation was horrible. I remember how one union representative told me that ‘it would 
be good if [our company] went bankrupt; that there would always be someone else 
who wants to produce food.’ – This was the level of commitment to the firm.” 
However, the firm’s employees went through the seminars and the seminars had a 
major role in changing their thinking: “The employees reacted positively to the 
seminars … I’m confident that many of them changed their attitudes instantly.” He 
was also confident that the coach’s special style had a major role in explaining why the 
seminars were so successful: “Because it does not help if consultants, wearing white 
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shirts and ties, come here and, and, and, they come here and speak nicely and leave … 
It was really an insightful moment for me when I got to know [the coach]. … His 
habitus is such that you can’t really call him a gentleman.” 
The development manager of the Sausage Company, who had a major role in the 
implementation of the organizational change program, shared the same positive view 
of the coach with the company’s former CEO. The development manager emphasized 
that “The role of the seminars is to energize the company-wide change [by making 
employees understand and excited about the new way of organizing]. … The basic 
training sets the starting point [for organizational change].” He also provided concrete 
examples of how the seminar had fueled the company-wide change process. The 
number of employee initiatives increased from zero to over 2000 in four years, and 
“there was this woman who had been on maternity leave for five years. When she 
came back, she said ‘this is like a new company.’”  
The development manager of the Milk Company also saw that the seminar succeeded 
in changing the thinking of the participants. The main concern for his company was, 
however, that they were not able to change the structures of the organization fast 
enough to be consistent with the employees’ new way of thinking. Consequently, what 
happened was that the employees changed their understanding of work in the seminar 
and developed high expectations but then experienced major disappointments when 
things did not go as they expected after the seminar. He stated:  
“Our employees have reacted positively to the seminar, it goes really well. The big 
problem for us has been the pacing. […] We haven’t been able to adapt the 
organization.  […] After the seminar, employees have big expectations, that now 
things will rapidly change. […] The employees have been expecting more 
organizational changes than we have been able to design and implement.” 
Despite the challenges caused by the high expectations, the milk company’s 
development manager still maintained that the “overall effect of the seminar was 
absolutely not negative. It gave us a shared language and a shared understanding, [that 
was] really good. Shared understanding of where we are now, what we should do, 
what the role of each individual is.” 
Overall, the four change leaders were all convinced that the seminar influenced and 
changed the thinking of the seminar participants. The development manager of the 
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Property Service Company saw that the seminars were really powerful in changing 
how the participants understand their work and even life. The former CEO of the 
Sausage Company emphasized its impact on employee attitudes and commitment and 
the development manager of the same company highlighted the positive expectations 
the new understanding developed during the seminar created. The development 
manager of the Milk Company stated that the seminar creates a new shared 
understanding of a better future.  
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6 A PROCESS THEORY OF EMOTIONAL SENSEGIVING 
Emotional sensegiving is defined in this thesis to refer to sensegiving that leverages 
emotions during the process of sensegiving to create a stronger cognitive change and 
to associate more affect on the new cognitions. When the empirical findings described 
in the previous chapters are combined with the existing literature, a theoretically 
generalizable process theory of emotional sensegiving can be created.  
At a macro-level, the process of emotional sensegiving consists of dozens of three-
phase micro-sequences that ultimately lead to changes in sense-receivers’ mental 
models (Figure 12). The three micro-phases are increasing arousal, cognitive 
(re)framing, and reinforcing commitment. The arousal created in the first micro-phase 
decays slowly and becomes associated with the cognitive content delivered in the latter 
two micro-phases, increasing their effect. Each three-phase micro-sequence creates 
one change in beliefs in mental models. Dozens of micro-sequences will change and 
reinforce several beliefs in mental models and, thus, lead to a mental model change.  
 
Figure 12: A macro-level view of emotional sensegiving 
The micro-sequences of arousal-(re)framing-commitment are supported by a 
background process of legitimizing sensegiving tools. This background process 
justifies the ways a sensegiver is going to influence sense-receivers. This helps in 
countering the sense-receivers’ resisting and defensive reactions to unorthodox, 
surprising, or uncomfortable sensegiving tactics. For instance, in the empirical material 
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of this thesis, the sensegiver explained that he will provoke and push the sense-
receivers because that is his job. In this way he countered in a pre-emptive way any 
resistant reactions to his tactics that were to increase emotional arousal. In addition to 
this kind of meta-communication provided during sensegiving, the sense-receivers’ 
mental models influence how they will respond to sensegiving acts. For example, the 
same sentence can make one person angry if it conflicts his mental model while 
another person may not react to it because it is consistent with her mental model. 
The nano-dynamics inside the micro-sequence of arousal-(re)framing-commitment 
explain why and how increasing emotional arousal before cognitive (re)framing and 
reinforcing commitment increases the effectiveness of sensegiving. Each sensegiving 
act has an influence on both the sense-receivers’ emotional state and their cognitions, 
as indicated by the two arrows starting from each of the three sensegiving cubes in 
Figure 13 below. In the figure, one of the two arrows starting from each sensegiving 
cube indicates the influence of the sensegiving act on the sense-receivers’ emotional 
state and the other arrow indicates the influence of the sensegiving act on the sense-
receivers’ conscious thinking (the three cubes marked with “S” in Figure 13 below 
refer to sensegiving and correspond to the three rectangles in Figure 12 above).    
6.1 Micro-Phase 1: Increasing Arousal 
Sensegiving tactics for increasing arousal refer to the ways sensegivers try to increase 
the sense-receivers’ emotional arousal. Any tactic ranging from jokes and provoking 
stories to more exotic means illustrates such tactics. In the empirical part of this study, 
I recognized six tactics that the sensegiver used to increase the seminar participants’ 
emotional arousal. These tactics were references to intimate relationships, brutal 
claims, jokes, pushing the participants, work-related provoking examples, and 
allowing/making participants generate arousal. Other potential tactics for increasing 
emotional arousal are discussed below in the section “Additional factors in the 
emotional micro-process.” 
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Sense-receivers’ emotional reaction to the increasing arousal tactics is increased 
emotional arousal, as illustrated by the arrow from cube S1 (S=sensegiving) to the 
cube E1 (E=emotional reaction) in Figure 13. High emotional arousal refers to a “state 
of the central nervous system experienced as a subjective feeling and peripheral 
correlates” (Russel, 2003: 154) where the subjective “feeling is one’s sense of 
mobilization and energy” (p. 148). The state of the central nervous system refers to 
specific images in the brain that are influenced by both messages from the body and 
the brain itself (Damasio, 1994: Chapter 7). In the empirical part of this study, the 
observation of the peripheral correlates of emotional arousal in the sense-receivers—
laughter and crying, body movements (de Meijer, 1989), changes in the pitch and 
volume of voice (Sobin & Alpert, 1999), and facial expressions (Ekman, 2003)—
provided evidence that their emotional arousal increased as a reaction to the 
sensegiver’s tactics. 
A central characteristic of emotional arousal is that it decays slowly (e.g., Fiske & 
Taylor, 2008: 319). Once the level of emotional arousal has been increased, it will 
usually take several minutes before the level of arousal becomes low again. Damasio’s 
work (1994: Chapter 7; 2003: Chapters 3; see also, Bechara & Damasio, 2005) 
provides a physiological explanation of why it decays slowly. Emotional arousal 
causes the brain to send hormones and nerve signals to the body which cause 
physiological reactions such as increased heart rate and circulation. The brain will also 
receive nerve and hormonal signals from the body and construct images of the body. 
These images are essentially images of emotional state. The images will also cause 
further activation in the body, constructing a circular loop between body activation and 
brain images of the body. This causes that emotional states can become self-
reinforcing for short periods of time.  
The behavioral manifestations of the slowly decaying arousal can be illustrated in 
many ways. The laboratory studies discussed in the literature review showed how 
arousal created by one source transferred into the next moment and became associated 
with something else; for example, sexual arousal was turned into anger (Zillman, 
1971), fear was turned into sexual arousal (Foster et al., 1998), and chemically induced 
arousal into specific emotions (Schachter & Singer, 1962). Everyday experience also 
provides an illustration of how arousal tends to decay slowly: when one is scared by a 
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near car accident, it usually takes several minutes before his or her heart stops beating 
rapidly after the incident.  
Taken together, the physiological qualities of emotional arousal and the dynamics of 
emotional arousal revealed by the laboratory studies and everyday experience have an 
explanatory role in the process theory of emotional sensegiving. Tactics that increase 
emotional arousal in the first phase of the micro-sequence of emotional sensegiving 
will influence the base level of emotional arousal for the duration of the whole few-
minute-long micro-sequence. Once the level of arousal has become high, it will remain 
high for several minutes. 
Sense-receivers’ cognitive reaction to tactics that increase emotional arousal is to start 
thinking about the content that was used for increasing arousal. This content can be 
work-unrelated and a typical cognitive reaction to the increasing arousal tactics is, 
therefore, the thinking of work-unrelated thoughts, as indicated by the arrow from 
cube S1 to cube T1 (T=thinking) in Figure 13. For example, if a sensegiver tells a 
story of his mother to emotionally arouse sense-receivers, like the coach analyzed in 
the empirical part, it is likely that the sense-receivers will start thinking about the 
sensegiver’s mother or their own mothers.  
However, unlike emotional arousal, conscious thoughts in people’s working memory 
can disappear or change quickly. The capacity of the working memory for conscious 
thinking is limited and new thoughts can replace old thoughts in a relatively 
straightforward way (e.g., Miller, 1956). The content of the increasing arousal tactics 
does not, therefore, extensively constrain the set of thoughts that can be thought during 
the micro-process of emotional sensegiving.   
6.2 Micro-Phase 2: Cognitive (Re)Framing 
Sensegiving tactics for cognitive (re)framing refer to the tactics a sensegiver uses to 
change the way sense-receivers think of any relevant (typically work-related) issues. 
Cognitive (re)framing is a conscious and reflective process which involves making 
arguments and providing justifications, illustrations, and evidence. In the empirical 
part, I recognized four tactics that the sensegiver used for cognitive (re)framing. These 
tactics were linking previous illustration to work, re-explaining an earlier argument, 
simple telling, and discussing through the idea. Existing sensegiving research has also 
recognized a large number of tactics that are used for delivering the cognitive content 
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of sensegiving (e.g., Dunford & Jones, 2000; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Foldy, Goldman, & 
Ospina, 2008; Hill & Levenhagen, 1995; Rouleau, 2005; Rouleau & Balogun, 2011; 
Sonenshein, 2006). 
Sense-receivers’ emotional reaction to cognitive (re)framing is less extensive than to 
the tactics for increasing arousal. Even though the main purpose of cognitive 
(re)framing is to influence the cognitions of the sense-receivers, they still react also 
emotionally. This reaction is illustrated by the arrow from the cube S2 to the cube E2 
in Figure 13. Almost everything humans hear or see triggers some emotional reaction 
in them (Damasio, 2003: 60-61). These reactions can be so small that they do not reach 
conscious awareness; for example, when an argument made by a lecturer is slightly 
interesting or annoying. However, the marginal increases in emotional arousal 
produced by cognitive (re)framing build accumulatively on top of the arousal that was 
created by the increasing arousal tactics. This happens because emotional reactions 
always change the current state rather than aim at a certain absolute state (see Bechara 
& Damasio, 2005; Damasio, 2003: Chapter 2). Hence, the cognitive content heard 
during cognitive (re)framing produces a relevantly high emotional reaction if it is 
preceded by tactics for increasing emotional arousal. 
The level of emotional arousal will be quite high after the incremental increases but 
not necessarily as high as it was immediately after the use of the increasing arousal 
tactics. The incremental increases in arousal may not lead to higher levels than the 
initial arousal because the level of arousal decays constantly. Still, even if the 
emotional reaction to cognitive (re)framing was approaching zero, the level of 
emotional arousal after hearing the cognitive (re)framing message will be substantially 
higher than zero due to the slowly decaying arousal left over from the previous 
moments. This pattern is illustrated in the Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Cognitive (re)framing produces incremental increases in decaying emotional arousal 
High arousal produced 
by increasing arousal 
-tactics
Incremental increase 
in arousal produced by 
cognitive (re)framing 
-tactics
Arousal
Time
Arousal decays slowly 
when it is not increased
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In my empirical material, this pattern of emotional reactions to marginally arousing 
content could be seen from the sense-receivers’ reactions. The sense-receivers felt 
strongly about work-related content that was delivered to them seconds and minutes 
after they had first been emotionally aroused. Conversely, the external coders, whom I 
used for validity checks, who viewed the same episodes without having first been 
emotionally aroused, did not perceive these clips as emotionally arousing. 
Sense-receivers’ cognitive reaction to cognitive (re)framing is to start thinking about 
work-related cognitive content, as illustrated by the arrow from cube S2 to cube T2 in 
Figure 13. The ideas that the sensegiver communicates during cognitive (re)framing 
will occupy most of the working memory of the sense-receivers. When sense-receivers 
hear the words spoken by the sensegiver, the words already take up some working 
memory capacity. In addition, when the sense-receivers process the words, the new 
content will consume even more working memory capacity. Consequently, there will 
be little capacity left for the previous, work-unrelated thoughts produced by the 
increasing arousal tactics. Hence, work-related content replaces the work-unrelated 
content in the working memory during cognitive (re)framing.  
Consequences of the simultaneous emotional and cognitive reactions to cognitive 
(re)framing preceded by increasing arousal are what makes emotional sensegiving 
effective. Emotional arousal has a positive effect on how well the content of 
sensegiving is internalized into mental models. The words that sense-receivers hear 
during sensegiving are temporarily maintained in the working memory. Some of the 
content of the working memory is encoded into the long term memory, where mental 
models reside (Carlston, 2010; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Emotional arousal enhances 
this encoding of content from the working memory into the long term memory (Finn & 
Roediger, 2011; MacKay & Ahmetzanov, 2005; Phelps, 2006) and, thus, into mental 
models. 
Laboratory studies have verified the effect of arousal on memory in behavioral terms 
(Finn & Roediger, 2011; MacKay & Ahmetzanov, 2005) and the process can be 
explained in neurological terms. The amygdala is a central part of the brain for both 
memory and emotions (Phelps, 2005). Emotional arousal results in amygdala 
activation; the amygdala in its turn, enhances hippocampal processing  and this 
increased processing leads to enhanced storage of the processed information (Phelps, 
2006: 34). These dynamics inside the brain explain why and how emotions provide a 
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gateway to cognitions, and how and why emotional arousal can improve the process of 
adding new beliefs to mental models. 
The importance of enhanced encoding from the working memory to the long term 
memory can be illustrated by comparing two hypothetical cases. Let Case Low 
Arousal refer to a sensegiving situation with no emotional arousal and Case High 
Arousal refer to a sensegiving situation with high emotional arousal. Let us first 
consider the case of low arousal (Figure 15).  
The situation in the Case Low Arousal starts with the sense-receivers being in a low 
arousal state. At moment “Time 1”, the sensegiver speaks thoughts “a, b, c.” These 
thoughts occupy the sense-receivers’ working memory and they think about them in a 
conscious way. Some of the thoughts are also automatically encoded into mental 
models in the long term memory. However, the fraction of thoughts encoded into the 
long term memory is likely to be small because the sense-receivers are in a state of low 
emotional arousal, meaning that the amygdala is inactive and not promoting 
hippocampal processing. Then, at “time 2,” the sensegiver moves on and speaks 
thoughts “x, y, z.” These thoughts again occupy the sense-receivers’ working memory. 
Importantly, the new thoughts, “x, y, z” replace the older thoughts, “a, b, c” in the 
working memory due to its limited capacity. A small fraction of the new thoughts “x, 
y, z” is, again, encoded into the long term memory. Crucially, however, most of the 
thoughts “a, b, c” have now been forgotten—they were replaced by the new thoughts 
in the working memory and only a small fraction of them were encoded into the long 
term memory. Hence, at a later “time N” in the workplace, when the situation would 
call for action “b” taught by the sensegiver, the sense-receivers are not able to recall 
and implement such behavior because it does not exist in their mental models. 
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 The case of high arousal differs from the case of low arousal in a substantial way 
(Figure 16). At “Time 1,” the sensegiver’s words (“a, b, c”) again put thoughts (“a, b, 
c”) into the sense-receivers’ working memory. However, this time a large portion of 
these thoughts is automatically encoded into mental models in the long term memory, 
as illustrated by the thick arrow from the working memory to the long term memory in 
Figure 16 below. This happens because arousal activates the amygdala which enhances 
hippocampual procsessing which encodes thoughts from the working memory to the 
long term memory (Phelps, 2006: 34). Then, at “Time 2,” the sensegiver’s new words, 
“x, y, z” again replace the old thoughts in the sense-receivers’ working memory. 
However, because the old thoughts have already been encoded into the long term 
memory, they are not forgotten. In addition, also the new thoughts are encoded into the 
long term memory, again due to high arousal. Consequently, when a future situation, at 
“Time N,” requires a specific action “b,” described by the sensegiver at “Time 1,” it is 
likely that this thought surfaces into the sense-receivers’ consciousness from their 
mental models and they implement the thought.  
In addition to making it more likely that the required, specific thoughts surface 
consciousness at “Time 3,” the arousal associated with the thoughts also has another 
positive effect. As people’s choices are based on their affective reactions to choice 
alternatives (Bechara & Damasio, 2005), those thoughts that trigger affective reactions 
are more likely to be implemented than thoughts that do not trigger affective reactions. 
Hence, thoughts that are associated with high arousal during sensegiving and encoding 
are (1) more likely to be remembered at later times and (2) more likely to influence 
choices when they are remembered. (In addition, contents of the long term memory 
can have a subconscious influence on behaviors; see Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack 
& Deutch, 2004; Carlston, 2010). 
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One potential limitation of the emotional arousal approach to sensegiving needs to be 
discussed here: It will take some time to build up emotional arousal before the “Time 
1” discussed above. The process theory of emotional arousal is based on the 
assumption that this extra time pays off because much less repetition is needed during 
cognitive (re)framing for making a lasting change in the mental models in the long 
term memory. Arousal can be increased rapidly, within seconds or minutes. However, 
the question of balance between the time invested in increasing arousal versus 
cognitive repetition is an empirical question, open for future research. 
In conclusion, the co-occurrence of emotional arousal and work-related thoughts 
increases the effectiveness of sensegiving. New thoughts and beliefs that are heard 
during cognitive (re)framing will be better internalized into mental models if they are 
accompanied by high emotional arousal triggered by increasing arousal tactics than if 
they are not accompanied by such arousal. Likewise, new thoughts and beliefs are 
likely to have a stronger influence on sensemaking in future situations if they are 
associated with high arousal than if they are not. 
6.3 Micro-Phase 3: Reinforcing Commitment 
Sensegiving tactics for reinforcing commitment refer to tactics a sensegiver uses to 
make sense-receivers more committed to thinking and acting in ways as the content 
provided during cognitive (re)framing indicates. These tactics should produce 
intentions to act and think according to the new cognitive content of the sensegiving. I 
recognized four tactics in the repertoire of the sensegiver analyzed in the empirical part 
of this study. These tactics were the question “do you find this logical?”, making 
sense-receivers describe how they will act on the ideas, increasing efficacy, and direct 
action instructions. While these four tactics capitalized mainly on cognitive processes 
of commitment building, also more emotionally focused tactics could be used, as 
discussed below in the section “Additional factors in the emotional micro-process.” 
Sense-receivers’ emotional reactions to tactics for reinforcing commitment are similar 
to their emotional reactions to tactics for cognitive (re)framing. The reinforcing 
commitment tactics trigger emotional reactions in sense-receivers that build in an 
accumulative way on the slowly decaying emotional arousal that is still left from 
previous moments. This effect is illustrated by the arrow that goes from cube S3 to 
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cube E3 in Figure 13. While the emotional reactions to reinforcing commitment tactics 
were incremental in the empirical part of this study, the sense-receivers’ emotional 
reactions could be higher if sensegivers used more emotional tactics, discussed in the 
section below.  
Sense-receivers’ cognitive reactions to tactics for reinforcing commitment include the 
repetition and elaboration of work-related thoughts, and the development of new 
efficacy beliefs, meta-cognitions of one’s beliefs and attitudes, and specific action 
intentions. These effects are illustrated by the arrow from cube S3 to cube T3 in Figure 
13. In the empirical part of the study, the verbalizations of the previously heard 
sensegiving content illustrated how the sense-receivers were recapping and also 
elaborating the ideas communicated by the sensegiver. Likewise, the way the 
participants showed agreement to concrete instructions illustrate how they developed 
intentions to think and act in certain ways in the future. The public displays of 
agreement were also likely to generate meta-cognitions in the participants that 
reinforced the change message: as they heard what they said, they became more likely 
to believe that they think and feel that way (cf. Festinger, 1957). 
Consequences of the simultaneous emotional and cognitive reactions to reinforcing 
commitment tactics are similar to the consequences of the cognitive (re)framing 
phase—a higher likelihood to think and act in the specified ways in the future. The 
high emotional arousal produced by the increases that build on top of the slowly 
decaying earlier emotional arousal co-occurs and co-exists with action and thinking 
intentions. This co-occurrence has similar consequences as does the co-occurrence of 
work-related thoughts and high arousal during cognitive (re)framing. The co-
occurrence makes it likely that the individuals will associate the high arousal with the 
action and thinking intentions. Hence, they are better remembered and more likely to 
resurface into consciousness (e.g., Phelps, 2006). Furthermore, the intentions to think 
and act in a certain way will feel important. This feeling makes it more likely that they 
are implemented when they do occur in mind because people’s choices are much 
influenced by their affective reactions to their knowledge (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 
2005; Damasio, 1994). 
*** 
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One micro-sequence of increasing arousal, cognitive (re)framing, and reinforcing 
commitment is likely to create one change in mental models: the process can add one 
belief in a mental model, add an invalid tag on a belief in a mental model, or 
strengthen a belief or link between concepts in a mental model. When dozens of 
micro-sequences are carried out, the whole mental model will transform since many of 
its elements have been transformed. Hence, successful emotional sensegiving consists 
of dozens of micro-sequences of arousal-(re)framing-commitment that follow the 
nano-dynamics discussed in the pages above. This process should be supported by 
tactics for legitimizing the tools that sensegivers use during each micro-sequence. In 
addition, the participants’ mental models should be taken into account when thinking 
which kinds of sensegiving tactics to use.  
The model described above outlined the basic elements of the process theory of 
emotional sensegiving. The following sub-sections will elaborate and further expand 
this basic model. The sub-sections will recognize some boundary conditions, introduce 
potential moderators into the model, and discuss various qualitatively different tactics 
for carrying out the different phases of emotional sensegiving. 
6.4 Emotional Micro-Process 
The most fundamental insight in the process theory of emotional sensegiving is that 
emotional arousal that is created with one content can transfer to the next moment and 
influence how sense-receivers internalize the information provided during the next 
moment. Existing laboratory studies show that arousal can indeed transfer from one 
situation to the next one (Dutton & Aron, 1974; Zillmann, 1971) and that arousal 
indeed has a positive effect on the internationalization of information (Finn & 
Roediger, 2011; MacKay & Ahmetzanov, 2005). The empirical data analyzed in this 
thesis showed that the sensegiver used one type of content to increase the participants’ 
emotional arousal and described other, work-related content to them immediately after 
that. Hence, the sensegiver used the ways emotional arousal behaves and influences 
the internalization of information to increase the effectiveness of his sensegiving. No 
other study has recognized this kind of way of using and leveraging emotions in 
sensegiving.  
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6.4.1 Valence of the arousal 
The valence of emotional arousal can vary from extreme negative to extreme positive 
(Russell, 2003). In my empirical material, the coach balanced between positive and 
negative arousal but favored negative arousal; he created positive arousal by telling 
jokes, whereas his other tactics mainly created negative arousal. This triggers two 
questions, why did the coach use mainly negative arousal? And how do negative and 
positive arousals differ in terms of their dynamics and effects? 
One reason why the coach used more negative than positive arousal can be that 
negative arousal is easier to generate than positive arousal. People tend to react to 
negative information and events more strongly than to positive information and events 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001). This 
tendency is generally explained by evolutionary terms: strong reactions to threats have 
ensured the survival of the species (see e.g., Damasio, 1994). Hence, when the goal is 
to produce emotional arousal in people, the negative route produces a higher payoff for 
any level of effort than the positive route.  
The valence of the arousal also influences how people interpret information, however. 
Several laboratory studies have shown that positive mood tends to make people more 
open-minded and creative, whereas negative moods make people think more critically 
and less creatively (Fredrickson, 2005). The main implication of this effect is that 
positive valence should be used when sensegivers try to make sense-receivers 
internalize complex, new thoughts. Conversely, if sensegivers try to make sense-
receivers internalize relatively simple thoughts, the narrowing effects of negative 
valence are acceptable. 
The desired effects of negative and positive arousal can also be combined. As was 
shown in the literature review, there are findings that “the valence of the prior 
experience is irrelevant; only the arousal transfers” (Fiske & Taylor, 2008: 320). 
Hence, it might be possible that sensegivers first create high levels of emotional 
arousal by delivering negative content and then flip the valence of that arousal into 
positive by telling jokes or using other types of tactics that have positive elements. 
This positive arousal could then be used to ensure that sense-receivers are open-
minded enough to accept the cognitive content of sensegiving. In addition, the positive 
arousal would become associated with the cognitive content of sensegiving and, hence, 
increase its impact.   
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There might be more fine-grained limitations to which emotions can flip into which 
emotions, however. For instance, Bechara & Damasio (2005) noted that some 
emotional states are physiologically different from one another. At the same time, the 
empirical studies that have demonstrated that negative  arousal can transfer into 
positive have studied specific combinations of emotions, such as from anger to urge 
(Brehm, 1999), from fear to sexual arousal (Dutton and Aron, 1974), and from neutral 
arousal to some specific emotions (Schachter & Singer, 1962). Hence, there might be 
some plausible emotional paths that can be used, whereas other combinations of 
negative and positive emotions are less likely to work. The recognition of plausible 
paths remains a question for future research; at this stage it can be said that some level 
of continuity between different phases of the process is probably needed.  
6.4.2 Intensity of the arousal 
The increase in the level of emotional arousal is a fundamental part of emotional 
sensegiving. The intensity of this arousal—exactly how high arousal is created—will 
influence how sensegiving will unfold. While quite high levels of emotional arousal 
are needed to produce the positive effects on memory, too high levels of arousal can be 
harmful for sensegiving for two reasons. 
The first risk of extremely high arousal is that people can lose control over their 
behavior. When they are in a highly aroused state—when emotions and emotional 
impulses are extremely strong—it becomes more and more difficult for them to control 
their own behavior. Hence, highly aroused people may start reacting emotionally and, 
for instance, leave the sensegiving situation in an angry outburst or even act violently. 
The arousal levels should therefore not be increased higher than the specific 
sensegiving context allows controlling.  
The second reason why extremely high levels of emotional arousal can hinder 
sensegiving is that high arousal reduces cognitive capacity (Strack & Deutsch, 2004: 
Thesis 3; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). Cognitive capacity refers to available cognitive 
resources, especially the working memory that people can use for holding information 
in their consciousness and reason with it (see e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000). When 
cognitive capacity is low, people are unable to construct complex thoughts or process 
much information in a deliberate way. Hence, sensegiving can fail due to extremely 
high arousal if it prevents people from understanding the content of the sensegiving.  
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6.4.3 Duration of the micro-phases 
Emotional arousal typically decays in a few minutes. The purpose of the micro-
sequences of arousal-(re)framing-commitment is to associate the arousal generated in 
the first micro-phase to the cognitive content delivered in the second micro-phase and 
further reinforce this association in the third phase. It is therefore essential for the 
success of emotional sensegiving that the duration of the micro-sequences is not longer 
than a few minutes. Especially, the duration of the second phase, cognitive 
(re)framing, should not exceed the time that is needed for the arousal to decay. Instead, 
the second micro-phase should last only for a few minutes before it is concluded with 
tactics that reinforce commitment.  
It might also be possible to delay the decay of the emotional arousal created in the first 
micro-phase. The delivery of the cognitive content of sensegiving can be 
complemented with emotionally arousing content. Such content can directly relate to 
the cognitive content of sensegiving or casually refer to earlier, arousing content. Such 
minor re-establishments of emotional arousal might make it possible to keep sense-
receivers’ arousal levels high for extended periods of time. In the empirical material, 
the sensegiver often used this kind of a tactic as he enriched the delivery of the 
cognitive content with emotionally arousing examples or interactive periods. However, 
such longer sequences of high arousal without conclusion can be especially consuming 
and, hence, shorter micro-sequences might therefore be more effective.  
6.4.4  Tactics for generating emotional arousal 
In the empirical material, the coach mainly used words to generate emotional arousal 
in the participants. He used four word-based tactics to generate the arousal effects: 
references to intimate relationships, brutal claims, jokes, work-related provoking 
examples; and two interaction-based tactics: pushing the participants and 
making/allowing the participants to generate arousal. These tactics constitute only a 
mere illustration of possible tactics that could be used for increasing sense-receivers’ 
emotional arousal. Different kinds of word content and interaction patterns might work 
equally well or even better. For example, dream building (Pratt, 2000) can produce 
strong positive excitement and discussions of world politics might provoke anger and 
fear.  
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Word-generated emotional reactions are not the only way to influence people’s core 
affect. According to Russell (2003), core affect consist of the two dimensions of 
valence and arousal. Some arousal states are currently labeled as emotions whereas 
others are not. However, from the point of view of core affect, all arousal is similar; 
for example, a person who is feeling sleepy is low in arousal and a person who is 
doing intense physical activity is high in arousal. Even though these states are not 
conventionally considered emotional, the basic neurological state of arousal is still 
similar to emotional arousal (Russell, 2003: 148). Hence, in addition to telling 
emotionally provoking stories and jokes, sensegivers could use music, videos, physical 
activities, different chemicals, and oxygen levels and ionization of the air to generate 
arousal in sense-receivers.  
Music and video clips are the least extreme ways of generating emotional arousal in 
sense-receivers. Music (e.g., Kenealy, 1988; Pignatiello, Camp, & Rasar, 1986), 
images (e.g., Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005), and video clips (e.g., Tice, 
Baumeister, Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007) are routinely used in psychological 
experiments to induce emotional arousal in research subjects. In addition, even a 
casual observation of many presentations, self-management, and religious seminars 
shows that sensegivers routinely use these kinds of tools in their sensegiving. They 
might not have an explicit theory of emotional arousal transfer and memory effects on 
their minds when using the tools, yet they seem to have a practical understanding that 
such tools work. Some of them might even explicitly recognize that videos and music 
give energy to the seminar and make people more active. I have theorized in this thesis 
why such tactics work and how they could be applied even better in practice (few 
managers and consultants can directly apply the manipulations used in the laboratory 
experiments).  
Physical activities constitute a bit more unconventional method for increasing arousal 
than music and videos. For example, self-management seminars (consider the self-help 
guru Anthony Robbins14) illustrate how using physical activities is possible and can 
increase arousal. The basic forms of physical activity are simple, such as clapping 
hands and jumping, but also more complex forms can be envisioned. For example, 
                                                 
14
 see http://www.tonyrobbins.com/ [accessed 2011-05-25]. The video clips of the seminars that 
are available on this website as well as in YouTube show how people are jumping and clapping 
their hands during the seminar 
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different games that consist of running around a seminar room or making more 
complex physical gestures might be considered (depending on the context, of course). 
Exotic forms of influencing arousal levels include the use of chemicals. Caffeine is a 
commonly used chemical for manipulating arousal levels (see e.g., Sawyer, Julia, & 
Turin, 1982 on the physiological and psychological effects ). Other easily imaginable 
chemicals include sugar, nicotine, and alcohol. Sensegivers could intentionally time 
the delivery of the most important content so that the positive effects of such 
chemicals can be harnessed. The systematic use of these and other chemicals for 
sensegiving should also be studied further. As an extreme example, some researchers 
have recently studied the applicability of LSD in therapy (see, Griffiths & Grob, 2010, 
for a generic discussion).  
In addition to chemicals, also the oxygen and ionization levels of the air constitute 
exotic ways of manipulating emotional arousal. A high supply of oxygen and high 
ionization of air make people more aroused (see Russell, 2003). The opening of 
windows during lectures is a conventional way of utilizing these effects. Again, also 
more systematic ways for leveraging the effects of air on people’s arousal levels in 
sensegiving could be envisioned, applied, and studied further. For example, extra 
oxygen might be pumped into the room during the most important phases of 
sensegiving or the persuasiveness of counter-perspectives might be reduced by 
shutting down the ventilation system during their presentation. 
6.4.5 Tactics for reinforcing emotional commitment 
The process theory of emotional arousal also contains the element “reinforcing 
commitment.” In the empirical material, the coach used mainly cognitive tactics for 
increasing the participants’ commitment to the ideas he had already told. Specifically, 
he capitalized on cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), efficacy (Bandura, 1997), 
and goal-setting (Locke & Latham, 1990). However, also emotional tactics for 
reinforcing commitment could be envisioned.  
One potential way for increasing emotional commitment to ideas is “savoring”. In 
another study (Vuori, 2011b), I recognized that some teams reached an agreement of 
what the team was to do about 20 minutes before ending their meeting. They then 
spent the remaining 20 minutes discussing the positive outcomes of the idea and 
repeating how good the idea and the plan were. They were also showing positive 
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emotions. I theorized that this kind of practice made them associate positive emotions 
with the idea and, therefore, increased their faith and commitment to it. Sensegivers in 
general could apply a similar approach; once they have told the sense-receivers their 
message, for example, about a new organizational direction, they could spend some 
time describing, in an emotionally appealing way, the positive consequences of the 
idea.  
In addition to using savoring and other word-based tactics, sensegivers could also 
leverage the other ways of generating arousal when increasing sense-receivers’ 
emotional commitment to new ideas. For instance, they might make sense-receivers 
sing songs whose lyrics describe the desired content. To illustrate the feasibility of this 
idea, consider how it is currently used by military organizations: the official song of 
the US Army15 contains: “First to fight for the right, / And to build the Nation’s might, 
/ And The Army Goes Rolling Along,” supporting the military ideology. Likewise, the 
Finnish Jäger March16 contains similar elements: “it is sweet to pass the fates of war. / 
A new tale of Finland is to be born, / it grows, it rushes, it wins.” 
6.5 Cognitive Micro-Process 
The main contribution of the process theory of emotional sensegiving is in describing 
how emotional arousal can be used to increase the effectiveness of sensegiving. 
Several important factors influencing the success of this process were discussed above. 
In addition, there are cognitive factors that influence the unfolding of the process and, 
hence, the success of emotional sensegiving.  
6.5.1 Cognitive continuity 
Cognitive continuity is defined here to refer to a perception that two pieces of content 
are related to each other. The opposite of cognitive continuity is a perception that a 
latter piece of content has no relation to a previous content; this kind of a situation 
produces a perception of discontinuity or an illogical jump. For example, there was 
some degree of cognitive continuity in the seminars that I analyzed: the coach argued 
that the interaction dynamics he described in his marital relationship were similar to 
those that occur at work. Consequently, most of the seminar participants did not get a 
                                                 
15
 http://www.hampton.lib.nh.us/hampton/history/military/legionpost35/armedforcessongs.htm 
[Accessed, 2011-05-25] 
16
 http://www.gridcogames.com/HOI%20Stuff/Jaakarimarssi_lyrics.htm [Accessed, 2011-05-
25] 
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feeling of discontinuity when the coach suddenly jumped from describing his marriage 
to describing work processes.  
Some level of continuity between arousal tactics and the actual content of sensegiving 
is needed to make emotional sensegiving successful. Cognitive continuity is needed 
because if there is no link between two phases, sense-receivers can get confused or 
think that the sensegiver is mentally instable and, consequently, stop paying active 
attention to the sensegiver.  
To generate the necessary cognitive continuity, sensegivers should develop arousal-
increasing tactics that are somehow related to their actual cognitive message. The link 
can be loose, as was often the case in my empirical material. For example, when the 
main purpose of sensegiving is to help the company react to a competitive threat, any 
images of war as a tool for increasing arousal might be sufficiently close to the 
following organizational content.  
In addition to loose links, meta-communication provided by tactics that legitimize the 
emotional sensegiving approach can provide cognitive continuity. For example, the 
coach that I analyzed told the seminar participants at the beginning of the seminar that 
he will talk a lot about his marriage because he thinks that it is relevant for work. 
Regardless of how relevant the marriage stories are for understanding work-related 
content, this statement generated an abstract bridge from the marriage examples to 
work. Hence, it made it look like the two contents are related.  
When building cognitive continuity by using legitimizing tactics, there is a risk of 
ruining the effect of surprise. If a sensegiver provides several warnings that he will 
describe some type of content, the emotional impact of that content might be 
weakened. Sensegivers should therefore not overdo the justification of their 
sensegiving content. The fact that the coach that I analyzed explicitly justified the 
references to intimate relationships only three times during the seminar is consistent 
with this warning.  
6.5.2 Sense-receivers’ mental models 
Sense-receivers’ mental models have an active role throughout any sensegiving 
process (see e.g., Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Mantere et al., 
in press  and the sub-section “cognitive maps” in the literature review). Even though 
change is often analyzed by comparing before-the-change and after-the-change states 
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(here, mental models), the actual changing happens between those states (Tsoukas & 
Chia, 2002). For instance, in the empirical context of this study, the seminar 
participants’ mental models existed throughout the seminar and changed incrementally 
during every hour of the seminar. Moreover, mental models also constantly influence 
the sensegiving process itself in many ways.  
In terms of cognitive continuity, it is ultimately the sense-receivers’ mental models 
that determine whether the perception that two pieces of content are related to each 
other emerges. Mental models consist of elements and relationships between those 
elements. If the first content described by a sensegiver activates elements in sense-
receivers’ mental models that are linked to elements in their mental models that are 
activated by the sensegiver’s second content, then sense-receivers will perceive a link 
between the two contents described by the sensegiver. (Note that the sensegiver may 
have established the links in the sense-receivers’ mental models by using legitimizing 
tactics only minutes earlier). Conversely, if sense-receivers’ mental models do not 
contain a link between the elements activated by a sensegiver’s content, then they will 
not perceive cognitive continuity. The unfolding of sensegiving is therefore influenced 
by the sense-receivers’ mental models: if a sensegiver relies on associations that do not 
exist in the sense-receivers’ mental models, the sensegiving process is more likely to 
suffer from the sense-receivers’ perceptions of discontinuity. Hence, sensegivers 
should rely on associations that already exist in sense-receivers’ mental models or 
build such associations before using related arousal tactics.  
Sense-receivers’ mental models also influence how they will affectively react to a 
sensegiver’s words and actions. What is extreme and unacceptable for some people 
can be normal and acceptable in others’ mental models. For instance, the Danish 
cartoons about Mohammed published in 200517 produced a wide range of reactions. 
Those people whose mental models maintained Mohammed as sacred and any funny 
images of him as blasphemy got extremely angry. Conversely, people who did not 
possess such beliefs did not react in an emotional way.  
Similar to the reactions to the Mohammed cartoons, different organizational groups 
and individual members can react differently to different kinds of arguments. For 
                                                 
17
 Original images from the newspapers’ website have been removed. However, the episode is 
well documented in Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jyllands-
Posten_Muhammad_cartoons_controversy [accessed 2011-05-26] 
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example, it can be imagined that labor union activists are more likely to react strongly 
and negatively to news about financial bonuses for CEO’s who have laid off people to 
ensure company profits than business school students would react. Any arousal tactics 
must therefore be matched with the sense-receivers’ mental models. 
Also the acceptability of sensegivers’ arguments is influenced by sense-receivers’ 
mental models. People are more likely to believe arguments that are consistent with 
their mental models or conflict them only in minor ways (see e.g., Crano & Prislin, 
2006). In addition, the deepness of the arguments, compared to the deepness of mental 
models will have a central role: People are able to internalize thoughts that are slightly 
more complex and advanced than their current understanding; if the new ideas are too 
difficult to comprehend in light of the old mental model, people are likely to reject 
them (Gardner, 2004: 59). Likewise, people who are knowledgeable in a certain area 
may react negatively if a sensegiver’s arguments show a lack of deep knowledge in the 
area. These considerations should be taken into account when planning which kind of 
cognitive content is to be delivered through cognitive (re)framing in emotional 
sensegiving.  
6.6 Generalizability of the Theoretical Model 
Qualitative research typically aims at analytical generalizability (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Yin, 2003). This means that the theoretical logic of how things 
unfold can be generalized to other settings. The understanding of the mechanisms of 
how one thing leads to another thing is assumed to remain consistent in different 
settings. Analytical generalizability is not to be confused with statistical 
generalizability which refers to inferences that population characteristics are similar to 
sample characteristics when the sample is representative of the population. In this 
thesis, the idea of generating and transferring emotional arousal to enhance the 
effectiveness of sensegiving is to be analytically generalized. I am not arguing that 
concrete sensegiving dynamics in other seminars are similar to the seminar that I 
analyzed. However, I am arguing that similar causal mechanisms exist in a latent way 
in other settings as well; regardless of whether the other sensegivers are actually 
leveraging emotional dynamics now, they have the potential to do so and the effects 
and dynamics of emotional arousal would follow the mechanisms recognized above. 
The above extensions of the basic empirical finding likewise can be applied in other 
settings as well, like the many illustrations above indicate. 
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Even though the mechanisms of the process theory of emotional sensegiving are 
generalizable, the specific context should be considered when applying the empirical 
findings of this thesis in other settings. Each of the coach’s sensegiving act might have 
had a different effect depending on the national culture, organizational context, sense-
receivers’ education level, relative isolation of the sensegiving location, sensegiver 
characteristics, and seminar size and duration (see section “Contextual limitations”). 
Each of these factors creates boundary conditions that need to be considered in 
sensegiving. For example, a tactic that might arouse people in one context might be 
considered lame and boring in another one. Analyzers and practitioners must 
understand the context in which they are operating when thinking which kind of tactics 
would work best. Again, this note applies to the applications of the empirically 
observed tactics as well as to the theoretically developed extensions of the model. 
Despite the contextual boundary conditions, a healthy human brain works in the same 
way in different contexts; this means that emotional arousal will always transfer from 
the first moment to the next one and that amplifying arousal should always have a 
positive effect on memory. The actual tactics for generating arousal, cognitive 
reframing, and commitment building, as well as for legitimizing the sensegiving 
process might vary in different contexts, however. Scholars and practitioners should 
therefore generalize the abstract idea of the arousal-reframing-commitment process 
from this thesis rather than the concrete tactics the specific sensegiver analyzed used. 
The ideas that I have discussed provide starting points for envisioning what might 
work best in any particular setting.  
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7 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND RESEARCH 
Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) created the concept of “sensegiving” 20 years ago. Their 
seminal paper has inspired plenty of research and the understanding of organizational 
sensegiving has become ever deeper and richer. Nineteen years after the original 
sensegiving paper was published, Gioia et al., (2010) combined their inductive 
findings with the existing literature and recognized three dimensions that are 
fundamental to the process of identity construction and, by implication, to sensegiving. 
The dimensions they recognized are (1) a cognitive dimension, (2) a verbal or 
discursive dimension, and (3) an action dimension. Gioia et al. also argued (p. 41) that 
“important phenomena in the social domain are rooted in the interplay of cognitive, 
verbal/discursive, and action-oriented processes. These deep processes are common to 
many, and perhaps any, human organizing phenomena.”  
The three dimensions recognized by Gioia et al., (2010) describe the state of the 
sensegiving research well. Scholars studying sensegiving have recognized three 
important dimensions influencing the outcomes of sensegiving and they have 
developed ever deepening understanding of these dimensions. For example, it has 
recently been discovered that (1) framing historical continuity increases the 
effectiveness of sensegiving [the cognitive dimension] (Brunninge, 2009), (2) 
managers’ discursive competence consists of several sub-elements [the discursive 
dimension] (Rouleau & Balogun, 2011), and (3) making employees donate money 
increases their commitment [the action dimension] (Grant et al., 2008). However, a 
fourth dimension—emotions—which is fundamental to human perception, reasoning, 
decision making, and social behavior (Damasio, 1994; Elfenbein, 2007; Hodgkinson & 
Healey, in press; Loewenstein et al., 2008) has so far been largely ignored. The 
purpose of this thesis has been to explore how the fourth dimension could be 
integrated with our current understanding of sensegiving.  
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7.1 The Process Theory of Emotional Sensegiving  
The process theory of emotional sensegiving shows how sensegivers can change 
sense-receivers’ mental models effectively by making them go through a series of 
micro-sequences during which their emotional arousal is first increased through a 
variety of tactics; then the cognitive sensegiving message is delivered, and finally 
reinforced. The smooth flow of such micro-sequences is supported by a background 
process which legitimizes the tools the sensegiver is using and counters resistance 
towards them in a pre-emptive way. The emotional arousal the sense-receivers 
experience will become associated with the cognitive content of sensegiving through 
arousal transfer and misattribution and, hence, increases the impact of the cognitive 
sensegiving. 
The process theory of emotional sensegiving addresses the gap recognized in the 
existing sensegiving literature. The model describes an emotional basic mechanism 
that can increase the effectiveness of sensegiving as well as several factors that can 
further influence the quality of emotional sensegiving. The model constitutes a starting 
point for a theoretical and empirical research program that increases the understanding 
of the fourth dimension of sensegiving in organizations, emotions. 
7.1.1 “Increasing Emotional Arousal” as a Sensegiving Tactic 
As the previous chapter showed, giving a central role to emotional arousal in 
sensegiving makes one see several current practices in a new light. Several everyday 
practices received a new meaning when their emotional impacts were considered: it 
can now be understood that seemingly irrelevant stories, music, jokes, coffee, physical 
activities, and fresh air can have a major role in explaining the effectiveness of 
sensegiving. Sensegiving is an emotional and even embodied (physical arousal) 
process, not merely a cognitive one. Tactics that increase sense-receivers’ emotional 
arousal reinforce the impact of sensegiving, regardless of anyone’s intentions or 
conscious awareness.  
Factors that influence emotional arousal influence the outcomes of sensegiving. This 
realization changes the current, cognition-centered understanding of sensegiving in a 
radical way: the set of factors influencing the process becomes significantly larger. We 
can envision an ever larger repertoire of tactics for increasing emotional arousal as a 
part of sensegiving, as was discussed above. Future research can further investigate 
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which kinds of tactics and things might be used to increase emotional arousal during 
sensegiving and compare their effects. As the clear goal of increasing arousal has now 
been defined for a subset of sensegiving tactics, researchers can focus their efforts and 
make remarkable advances in our understanding of sensegiving. 
7.1.2   Nuances in the Process of Emotional Sensegiving 
The process theory of emotional sensegiving also pointed to several more detailed 
factors that can influence the success of sensegiving but have not been considered by 
previous research. The emotional tone of sensegiving can vary from positive to 
negative; a negative tone is likely to narrow down the thinking of individuals, whereas 
a positive tone can be good for more open-ended and complex situations (cf. Forgas, 
1992; Fredrickson, 2005). While the basic insight about the narrow effects of threat 
perceptions (a form of negative state) has been recognized in terms of managerial 
sensemaking (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), the insight has not previously been 
considered in the sensegiving context. If leaders want to change the direction of their 
organizations by using negative images, they should first ask if they can afford the 
narrow-mindedness produced by the negative emotions they are about to produce. 
Given that negative content is more efficient in increasing emotional arousal 
(Baumeister et al., 2001), finding a suitable trade-off between positivity/lower-
arousal/open-mindedness and negativity/higher-arousal/narrow-mindedness can be 
difficult. 
The pacing of sensegiving actions can also be seen from a new angle due to the 
process theory of emotional sensegiving. A central physiological fact is that emotional 
arousal normally decays in a few minutes (e.g., Damasio, 2003). Hence, when aiming 
to leverage emotional arousal, sensegivers should deliver their most important content 
within minutes after having first emotionally aroused the sense-receivers. Further 
content can be delivered after the few minutes but then it should be recognized that the 
effects of arousal have already diminished. On the other hand, arousal can be kept high 
by using arousal-increasing tactics every few minutes. None of these more detailed 
implications of the arousal decay nor the arousal decay itself have been discussed by 
the existing sensegiving theory. By having described these effects and constraints, I 
have increased our understanding of the phenomenon of sensegiving.  
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7.1.3 Empirical opportunities provided by the process theory of emotional 
sensegiving 
The process theory of emotional sensegiving can be corroborated or falsified 
empirically. Even though it is slightly against the convention, I will discuss in detail 
how different empirical settings could be used to test and advance the theorizing 
carried out in this thesis. I believe this discussion will help in evaluating the testability 
of my argumentation and in planning for future research.  
Controlled laboratory studies provide the most robust way of testing the main causal 
assertion made in the model; that emotional arousal transfers from the first moment to 
the next moment and then reinforces the impact of cognitive sensegiving. One could 
have two groups—a condition group and a control group—in an experiment. The 
condition group would first watch an emotionally arousing video and then a cognitive 
sensegiving video explaining causal dynamics and a conclusion supporting an issue. 
The control group would first watch an emotionally neutral video and then watch the 
same cognitive sensegiving video as the condition group. The mental models of both 
groups would be measured before and after watching the two videos. If the emotional 
arousal produced by the first video for the condition group indeed reinforced the 
impact of the cognitive sensegiving—as assumed in the process theory of emotional 
sensegiving—then the mental model change should be larger for the condition group 
than for the control group.  
To ensure that the emotional arousal indeed transfers from the first video to the second 
video, the research subjects’ heart rate and skin conductance could be measured 
throughout the study. If the condition group’s HR and GSR were higher during the 
cognitive sensegiving video, it could be concluded that the arousal did indeed transfer 
to the next moment. It would also be possible to accurately determine how long time 
delays between the generation of arousal and the delivery of the actual cognitive 
message are plausible. To further test the claim that high arousal reinforces the impact 
of cognitive sensegiving, the correlation between the arousal level and mental model 
change could be calculated. If this correlation was positive, it would indicate that the 
higher the emotional arousal experienced, the higher the effect of cognitive 
sensegiving on mental models.  
Besides verifying the basic idea of the process theory of emotional sensegiving, 
laboratory studies could be used to elaborate the details of the model. The effect of 
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different emotions on the impact of cognitive sensegiving could be investigated. This 
could be done by varying the video that is to produce emotional arousal in the 
experiment: for instance, one could compare whether anger-provoking, sad, happy, or 
sexually arousing videos have the strongest impact. Furthermore, one could also vary 
the cognitive content of the second video and investigate whether some emotions are 
better suited for some content while other emotions are better suited for other types of 
content.  
Also “emotion paths” could be investigated empirically. This would make it possible 
to test the idea that in addition to leveraging the arousal provided by a previous 
moment, a sensegiver might actually flip the valence of that arousal from negative to 
positive. For example, research subjects might first watch a sad video, then an 
angering video, then a funny video, and finally, a video containing the cognitive 
sensegiving content. It might be that the combination of these emotions produces a 
stronger positive arousal than a funny video alone and, consequently, has a stronger 
reinforcing effect on the cognitive sensegiving as well. Also several other 
combinations of emotions could be studied in a similar way.  
Even though laboratory studies are important, the real value of this dissertation has 
been in describing how emotions can be leveraged in sensegiving in real 
organizational situations. This focus on the live settings can also be maintained in the 
future. Scholars can use qualitative methods and investigate how different managers, 
change agents, and consultants generate and leverage emotional arousal in a variety of 
settings ranging from casual conversations on hallways to team meetings and 
conference presentations. Several new tactics of emotional sensegiving can be 
recognized in this way. Collaborative research approaches can further generate totally 
new ways for increasing arousal: researchers can first develop some ideas through 
conceptual reasoning and then have some managers try them out in real settings and 
researchers can then observe their effects and further develop the tactics.  
The recognition and development of alternative arousal-increasing tactics would also 
make it possible to compare their effects, either in the field or in the laboratory. There 
are several relevant dimensions along which different arousal-increasing tactics could 
be compared. The first one is feasibility: how feasible is the given tactic for 
organizational actors who must carry out their sensegiving in normal situations in 
normal organizations? Further dimensions include the strength of the arousal that can 
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be created with a given tactic, how much cognitive damage (cf. identity threats) the 
tactic creates, and how easily sense-receivers develop tolerance against the tactic. Cues 
regarding each dimension can be collected through qualitative field studies and more 
controlled research designs can be used to develop more accurate estimates of each 
parameter.  
7.1.4 Further theoretical expansions 
The process theory of emotional sensegiving can also inspire even broader expansions 
in sensegiving research. To understand how emotions can be generated, someone 
could study the aesthetics of sensegiving. There are several areas in the fields of arts 
and entertainments in which the management of emotions is central. Sensegiving 
scholars could investigate the tacit and explicit knowledge of the process possessed by, 
for instance, TV comedy writers, striptease dancers, opera performers, and rock stars. 
How do they ensure that their audiences will be fully engaged in the performance and 
experience the strong emotional reactions that keep making them come back for the 
next show? Can organizational sensegivers leverage those ideas? And can the formal 
theory of emotional sensegiving be expanded to include some of these factors? 
The understanding of sensegiving that goes beyond conscious cognition to emotions 
could also be expanded to other non-conscious cognitive areas. The recent 
developments in the areas of social cognition (Deutsch & Strack, 2010), social-
cognitive neuroscience (Lieberman, 2007), and neuro-economics (Loewenstein et al., 
2008) have all pointed to the importance of sub-conscious processes on human 
behavior. For instance, subliminally presented stereotypes (Banaji, Hardin, & 
Rothman, 1993) and goals (Latham, Stajkovic, & Locke, 2010) have a significant 
influence on people’s behavior. Likewise, different priming tactics, such as giving a 
warm cup of coffee (vs. cold, iced coffee) to a person can make him or her like 
(dislike) a person because of warm (cold) feelings toward that person (Williams & 
Bargh, 2008). It might be possible to leverage these kinds of sub-conscious effects on 
human information processing in sensegiving in a more systematic way. The ultimate 
outcome could be a process theory of “full-brain” sensegiving. This theory would 
include the emotional effects discussed in this thesis and complement them with other 
non-conscious cognitive dynamics.  
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7.2 Identity-Based Sensegiving Theory and Research 
The identity-based ideas in sensegiving research start with the assumption that identity 
void or confusion is needed to facilitate cognitive change. It is seen that sensebreaking 
(Pratt, 2000) or ambiguity-by-design (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) are necessary first 
steps in sensegiving. The extant theorizing assumes that when people lack clear 
meaning due to a void or too many meanings, they are more likely to accept a new 
meaning. When theorized in this way, factors influencing the process are cognitive, 
even though the scholars have recognized that it has emotional consequences and side 
effects: sensebreaking can trigger strong negative emotions (see, Ashforth et al, 2008: 
329 on how identity threats create strong emotional reactions) and the whole process 
can ultimately lead to emotional commitment to a new idea after sensegiving (see e.g., 
Pratt, 2000). 
However, the identity scholars have not discussed the possibility that the emotions 
triggered by sensebreaking can have a more fundamental role, instead of just being a 
side effect of the cognitive process. If communicating new ideas is closely associated 
in time with sensebreaking, sense-receivers can be emotionally aroused due to 
sensebreaking when hearing the new ideas. It is possible, then, that what seems to be a 
cognitive effect of sensebreaking on the persuasiveness of the new ideas is actually an 
emotional effect. Emotions created by sensebreaking can have a reinforcing effect on 
the internalization of the new ideas independent of the cognitive identity 
considerations. It might just be that sensegivers have learned to use identity threats 
through trial and error but that they work because they create strong emotions. 
Retrospective theorizing, based on the words remembered or recorded, has then 
generated a cognitive, meanings and identity -centered explanation of the processes.  
The existing sensegiving studies report activities of identity breaking and then 
activities of sensegiving that are supposed to fill the meaning void created by identity 
breaking (see e.g., Ashforth et al., 2008; Corley & Gioia, 2004; Mantere et al., in 
press; Pratt, 2000). However, they do not describe in detail the time delays between the 
different activities; it is not clear from the reporting of the findings whether the 
delivery of new content was often preceded by reminders of identity threat or not and 
whether sensebreaking was often followed by the description of new content. It might 
be that in the original cases, sensegiving was often preceded by minor reminders of 
identity threat. If this is the case, the emotional reactions that result from identity threat 
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would be a plausible explanation for the effectiveness of sensegiving. Note that the 
reminders of identity threat might only consist of a few words or even non-verbal 
gestures that point, for instance, to luxury watches (the dreams in Pratt, 2000). A half-
a-second finger point at one’s Rolex would remind others that they have not yet 
reached their dream of being rich, hence causing negative emotional arousal or 
excitement about the dream. Such small reminders might be easy to miss when making 
field notes or analyzing data. The possibility that the main emphasis shifts over time 
from sensebreaking to sensegiving in organizations can make observing the small 
reminders of identity threat even more difficult: a researcher is likely to focus on 
recognizing the main phases when aggregating and abstracting data.   
Due to the lack of detailed description of the time-delays in the pacing of 
sensebreaking and sensegiving, the data reported in the existing sensegiving studies is 
consistent with both identity and emotional arousal explanations. The existing studies 
have recognized that sensebreaking preceded sensegiving and that sensebreaking also 
caused some emotional reactions. The studies have not reported whether sense-
receivers were emotionally aroused when they were exposed to sensegiving or not. 
However, given the other facts the studies have reported, the assumption that they 
were emotionally aroused during at least occasionally during the sensegiving is 
plausible. Consequently, both the identity void and the emotional arousal explanations 
are plausible for explaining why sensegiving reported in these studies was effective.  
The data analyzed in this thesis further shows that in addition to identity dynamics, 
sensegiving processes contain significant emotional dynamics. Some of these 
emotional dynamics observed, such as jokes, had no relation to people’s identities. 
These observations mean that the identity perspective does not explain the sensegiving 
analyzed in this thesis comprehensively. The emotional perspective provides a 
rationale why the tactics for increasing arousal might be instrumental in sensegiving. 
When one also takes into account the laboratory findings on the memory effects and 
transfer dynamics of emotions, the emotion-based theory seems like a plausible 
explanation. The emotion explanation is as simple as the identity explanation and it 
explains more facts than the identity-based explanation does.  
However, more research is needed to determine whether the identity and emotion-
based views are alternative or complementary explanations. It might be that only 
emotional arousal caused by identity threats is instrumental in sensegiving. 
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Alternatively, it might be that the identity-based view explains macro-level patterns 
whereas the emotion-based view is more suitable for explaining micro-level patterns. 
Future studies can contrast these alternatives by envisioning designs in which differing 
theories provide different predictions. 
7.2.1 Contrasting identity and emotional arousal explanations empirically 
Again, even though it is somewhat unconventional, I will provide detailed ideas of 
how my arguments could be tested by future research. In addition to facilitating theory 
development, the concrete experimental settings described below show how it matters 
concretely in practice whether and how identity and emotions are alternative or 
complementary explanations.  
Future studies can develop experimental settings that provide an empirical answer to 
the question of whether identity, emotions, or both best explain the effectiveness of 
sensegiving. A study could contrast situations in which emotional arousal is produced 
by identity threat (condition group) or by identity-unrelated means (control group). 
The arousal should then be followed by cognitive sensegiving. The effects could be 
measured by assessing sense-receivers’ mental models before and after the treatment. 
If identity dynamics do not matter, there should be no difference between the two 
groups. Conversely, if identity threats and voids are needed for increasing the 
effectiveness of sensegiving, then the identity/condition group should show a larger 
change in mental models.  
The most straightforward way of carrying out the above described study would be a 
laboratory test. However, also field settings can be envisioned. Two groups of 
managers could be recruited from an organization(s) that is (are) undergoing a radical 
change. Both manager groups would receive training in sensegiving: one group would 
be taught identity-based arousal tactics and the other group would be taught identity-
unrelated arousing tactics. The managers would then apply these lessons in their daily 
work as promoters of organizational change. Researchers would measure the mental 
models of the employees who work for the managers. This measurement would be 
conducted at two points in time and assess change in them. Also other relevant factors, 
such as work satisfaction, could be measured. Comparison of the effects of the two 
forms of sensegiving (identity threat generated arousal vs. non-identity related arousal) 
would show which explanation better explains sensegiving dynamics: if there were no 
difference between the two groups, then arousal alone would be a sufficient 
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explanation; if the identity group showed better results, then it should be chosen as the 
better explanation. This kind of a research design would also allow evaluating the size 
of the negative effects of identity threats compared to identity-neutral sensegiving. 
The effects of identity threat and emotional arousal could also be compared by 
studying if the effects of an identity threat are the same regardless of whether people 
are emotionally aroused or not. If an identity threat has the same effect on the 
effectiveness of sensegiving regardless of emotional arousal then it can be concluded 
that emotional arousal does not explain why identity threats improve the effectiveness 
of sensegiving. The problem with this kind of a setting is, however, that a successful 
identity threat always causes an emotional reaction; it is the threat that triggers the 
emotion (Ashforth et al, 2008: 329). Time delay between creating the identity threat 
and delivering the actual sensegiving message might be one solution to this problem 
but it remains uncertain how much the arousal produced by the memory of the identity 
threat influences information processing during the second moment. Alternatively, 
arousal reducing medicine might be used to keep emotional arousal low. If this 
approach was chosen, special attention should be put to the choice of the medicine: it 
should reduce arousal but have no effects on cognitive processing. Given that emotion 
and cognition are intertwined (Damasio, 1994), this may not be an easy task. Despite 
the challenges of studying identity threat without emotional arousal, this kind of 
studies might provide valuable information and complementary evidence. 
The potential complementary effects of identity threats and emotional arousal could 
also be investigated. If the two perspectives do indeed complement each other, it is 
most likely that the identity perspective explains the macro-structure of sensegiving 
whereas the emotional arousal perspective explains micro-level dynamics. To test if 
the combination of these two ideas is more effective than either one of them alone, 
researchers should carry out the following experiment: they should first create a basic 
sensegiving episode for the experiment. The macro-structure of the episode should 
first create an identity threat and then fill the emerging identity void with new 
cognitive content. At the micro-level, sensegiving should consist of arousal-
(re)framing-commitment cycles. This basic combination should be compared to 
situations in which the same macro-structure is maintained but at the micro-level, the 
arousal effects are replaced by non-arousing sensegiving content during the micro-
sequences and to situations in which the identity threat is removed at the macro-level 
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and replaced by neutral cognitive content, while the arousal-(re)framing-commitment 
micro-sequences are maintained. Again, participants’ mental models should be 
measured before and after the sensegiving episode. If it turns out that the research 
subjects’ mental models change more in the first condition that contains both identity 
and emotion dynamics than in the conditions in which either emotions or identity are 
removed, it can be concluded that the identity and emotional arousal perspectives 
complement each other.  
If a series of experiments provides evidence that the emotion-based view can replace 
the identity-based explanations of sensegiving, sensegivers need to cause less 
existential suffering in the future. Instead of generating emotional arousal by breaking 
the sense-receivers’ identities, managers could produce emotional arousal through 
other means, such as music and physical activity, as discussed above. The research on 
positive organizational scholarship (Cameron, Dutton, & Quinn, 2003) and 
appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider & Srivastva, 1987) has shown that at least in some 
instances these kinds of more positive approaches are possible. On the other hand, if 
the identity and emotion perspectives turn out to be complementary, emotional arousal 
can be used to increase the effectiveness of sensebreaking and subsequent delivery of 
the cognitive message. For instance, when convincing their followers that the firm is 
on a burning platform, managers could first increase the employees’ arousal levels 
through work-unrelated ways. Consequently, the impact of the actual identity 
threatening communication could be more effective.  
7.3 Relation to Existing Emotion-Related Ideas in the Management 
Research 
While the majority of sensegiving research has not given a central role to emotions, 
there are a handful of publications in which emotional dynamics have been discussed 
in contexts that are relevant for sensegiving. As I will show below, these studies have 
recognized the importance of emotions but not considered emotional dynamics from 
the same perspective as I have done in this dissertation. The main purpose of this sub-
section is to show that my findings and the emergent theoretical model are unique and 
add to the existing research. I will describe the existing ideas and then explain how my 
arguments differ from them. 
The first set of publications suggested using metaphors and concrete illustrations. Hill 
and Levenhagen (1995) suggested that sensegivers should use metaphors because they 
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trigger emotions and, hence, commitment to ideas. Essentially, they suggest delivering 
both the emotional and cognitive content through the same message—the metaphor. 
Likewise, in a practice-oriented book, Heath and Heath (2010) suggested 
communicating the content of sensegiving in an emotionally appealing way to make it 
more effective. They emphasized the importance of identity links and concreteness in 
making the message emotionally appealing.  
In contrast to Hill & Levenhagen and Heath & Heath, I am arguing that sensegivers 
can trigger emotions with one content and then deliver the cognitive message with 
different content. This is a fundamental insight as it simplifies the sensegiving task 
significantly. One does not need to be able to generate a message that simultaneously 
produces strong emotions and communicates the core idea in a clear way. Instead of 
trying to satisfy the two difficult goals at once one can first mainly focus on the first 
one and then on the second one. One can first maximize the impact on emotional 
arousal and then maximize the impact on cognition. The need to make compromises 
diminishes substantially.  
The second set of studies has focused on matching the emotional tone of sensegiving 
with the mood of the sense-receivers. DeSteno et al. (2004) found that people tend to 
overvalue those justifications that are consistent with their emotional state when 
hearing and considering the justifications. They do this because they overestimate the 
likelihood that those consequences that match their own emotions will occur in the 
future. For example, when people are sad, they estimate it to be more likely that not 
increasing taxes will lead to sad outcomes such as health care problems and 
unnecessary deaths. Sad people therefore are more supportive of a tax increase than, 
for example, angry people who hear and process the same message. The implication of 
DeSteno’s research is that sensegivers should read the sense-receivers’ mood and 
emphasize justifications that are consistent with their mood. A similar idea has been 
applied in the management context. Rouleau (2005) found that middle managers 
tended to match their emotional tone with the emotions of sense-receivers when trying 
to give sense to them.  
A straightforward difference between this thesis and the studies by DeSteno et al. and 
Rouleau is that my research puts less emphasis on reading the sense-receivers’ mood 
and more emphasis on manipulating their mood. I found a set of concrete tactics that 
the sensegiver used and abstracted mechanisms and several principles that sensegivers 
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can use to increase the participants’ level of emotional arousal. Hence, my focus was 
on how sensegivers can generate emotional arousal to make things happen, whereas 
DeSteno et al. and Rouleau focused more on how sensegivers should adapt to sense-
receivers’ emotions.  
The idea of emotional balancing constitutes the third segment of existing studies that 
have somehow linked emotions and sensegiving. Huy (2002) investigated how middle 
managers carry out emotional balancing. The basic finding was that successful units 
had both managers who pushed for new behaviors and managers that emphasized the 
change-related negative emotional reactions. The units that balanced between pushing 
and empathy were successful. When reflected against the identity-based sensegiving 
studies, it can be argued that Huy described a successful way of coping with the 
emotional side effects of cognitive change; one must address the negative emotions but 
not kill the change momentum. However, the possibility of leveraging the negative 
emotional arousal remained unexplored. It should also be noted that the focus of Huy’s 
paper was not on sensegiving per se, but rather on coping with and managing 
organizational change. 
Fourth, the idea of showing “the right” emotions as a sensegiving tactic has emerged 
most recently. Huy & Zott (2010) described tactics that sensegivers used to generate 
trust in stakeholders. Unfortunately, their paper suffers from the same methodological 
limitation as most sensegiving papers: it analyzes words written on paper rather than 
the actual events those words are used to describe. The difference is that this time 
these words contain descriptions of emotional dynamics. However, they are still 
retrospective accounts of events that have contained much more than people can 
consciously recognize, let alone remember in an interview. Despite these limitations, 
the core idea of the paper is worth discussing here.  
Huy & Zott (2010) found that entrepreneurs tried to show, for instance, confidence and 
passion to stakeholders. They argued that the entrepreneurs’ emotional displays made 
the stakeholders perceive them as more entrepreneur-like and, consequently, make 
them more willing to give resources to the entrepreneurs. In essence, then, the core 
idea of Huy and Zott is that the showing of some emotions can be considered as a 
sensegiving act: when you show that you are feeling the right emotions, others can 
conclude and trust that you will succeed. The sense-receivers take their perception of 
the emotional display as an additional data input for their cognitive sensemaking. In 
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contrast, I was studying how sensegivers generate emotional arousal in sense-
receivers; and how emotional arousal felt by sense-receivers influences their 
sensemaking processes non-consciously and reinforces the effect of cognitive 
sensegiving. In my theorizing, the emotional state of the sensegiver is not taken as an 
input for a rational process; rather the emotion induced by the sensegiver in sense-
receivers influences how the sense-receivers will interpret, internalize, remember, and 
act on the information provided by the sensegiver.  
Fifth, Hodgkinson and Healey (in press) argued that creating emotional commitment to 
strategy is essential for seizing new opportunities. In their conceptual paper, they 
grounded the discussion on how to create such emotional commitment on the current 
identity-based ideas.  In this thesis, I have shown an alternative, emotional arousal -
based way of increasing emotional commitment. In this way, I have built on top of 
Hodgkinson and Healey’s key argument and increased our understanding of how the 
desired outcome could be reached.  
7.4 Using Video for Analyzing Sensegiving 
I argued that methodological reasons partly explain why previous sensegiving studies 
have overemphasized the content of words at the expense of emotions. Previous 
studies have relied on field notes and interview transcripts when analyzing sensegiving 
and, consequently, concluded that identity and meanings are central to explaining what 
happens during sensegiving. Drastically differing from the previous studies, I used 
video to analyze sensegiving which allowed me to identify the emotional dynamics of 
sensegiving. This allowed me to pay attention to the way the words were said, the 
emotional expression and tone of the sensegiver, and to the emotional reactions of 
sensegiving. This methodological advance over the previous sensegiving studies 
allowed me to recognize previously ignored but fundamentally human and extremely 
relevant emotional dynamics in sensegiving.  
I used the video to analyze the sensegiver’s and the sense-receivers’ emotions in an 
unstructured way. However, future research can use more systematic ways for 
analyzing emotions. Video can be used to code emotions from facial expressions using 
the Facial Action Coding System (Ekman & Friesen, 1978). This coding system 
recognizes all muscle movements in the human face and, thus, provides a relatively 
objective way for determining emotions. Other opportunities for systematic coding of 
emotions include some bodily gestures (e.g., de Meijer, 1989) and the volume and 
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pitch of voice (e.g., Sobin & Alpert, 1999). Management scholars have also started to 
investigate how physical location and gestures could be recognized from video 
(LeBaron, unspecified; Whittington & LeBaron, 2010). This dissertation has only 
taken a preliminary step in the direction of using these possibilities for understanding 
sensegiving. I hope that this dissertation will contribute to the research practice by 
encouraging more researchers to use video in their work.  
The use of video recording instead of field notes or voice recording provides some 
additional complications in the data collection phase. First, getting participants’ 
consent can be more difficult because some people do not want to be recorded on 
video even if they were OK with voice recording. I initially planned to video record 
my interviews also but I had to abandon this idea because of these kinds of reasons. 
Second, even if people give their consent, they may still be more self-conscious than 
usual when they know that they are being video recorded. This issue must be dealt 
with on a case-by-case basis. One option for solving the problem is locating the video 
camera in a hidden or non-intrusive place, like I did in this study. A third challenge 
relates to mobility: a lot of sensegiving happens on the road, for instance, in hallways 
and through a series of meetings and phone calls. Being able to capture such “moving 
sensegiving” with video will be more difficult than recording a physically stable 
setting, as I did.   
Analyzing data is the most central phase in theory building qualitative research. Many 
people have access to vast amounts of qualitative data (basically everyone who works 
in organizations) but only few people are able to generate theory from that data. This 
basic principle applies also to video analysis. Based on my experience, the most 
central thing to do in video-based analysis is indeed to analyze the actual video, not a 
transcript of the video. Being used to having interviews transcribed, my initial impulse 
was to also have my video transcribed. However, I soon realized that the act of 
transcribing the video would reduce the data to mere text on paper whereas my goal 
was to analyze rich audio-visual data on what happened in the sensegiving instances. I, 
therefore, chose to analyze the video itself and add my first-order codes directly to the 
video. This required digitizing the video and using software that allowed doing this.  
The final phase in theory building is reporting the findings. When the main data is on 
video, transforming it into text can be difficult. It becomes challenging to verbalize all 
the non-verbal cues that are used to understand what is going on in the situations 
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analyzed. I tried to cope with this challenge by describing several non-verbal 
behaviors, such as facial expressions, the tone of voice, and body movements in my 
text. In addition, I used some screenshots from the video to provide a sense of the data 
behind the text. While these are preliminary steps, I believe that future research will 
develop ever better ways of describing video-based data in text.  
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8 CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has aimed to do to sensegiving research what Damasio (1994) and 
Loewenstein (e.g., 2008) have done for decision making research—bring in emotions 
in a way that transforms our understanding of the phenomenon under study. Previous 
sensegiving research has been over-focused on cognition, mainly in identity and the 
meanings of words. This focus has ignored large parts of the human brain that 
influence information processing, memory, choices, and actions. By theorizing and 
illustrating empirically how sensegivers can leverage the emotional dynamics that 
happen in human brains, in the subjective experience of people, and between people, 
this dissertation has expanded our understanding of sensegiving as a phenomenon. 
I developed a process theory of emotional sensegiving to fill in the emotion gap in the 
sensegiving research. It contributes to our understanding of sensegiving as a 
phenomenon in two main ways. First, the recognition that sensegivers may indeed try 
to influence sense-receivers’ emotional state in the first phase of sensegiving (and not 
their cognitions) allowed one to see several new aspects in sensegiving. Many tactics 
that seem to not make sense from a cognitive point of view indeed do not have a 
cognitive meaning—they are carried out to influence the sense-receivers’ emotions, 
not cognitions. The emotions generated in a first moment in time can influence how 
sense-receivers respond to information communicated in a second moment in time.  
Second, the process theory of emotional sensegiving shows how sensegivers can 
change sense-receivers’ mental models through a sensegiving process which consists 
of dozens of cycles of increasing emotional arousal, cognitive (re)framing, and 
reinforcing commitment to (re)framed ideas. Emotional arousal that is produced at the 
beginning of each micro-sequence transfers to the next moment and becomes 
associated with the cognitively (re)framed content. The additional tactics for 
reinforcing commitment further strengthen this association and commitment to the 
idea. To ensure that sensegivers will not reject the whole sensegiving approach, the 
micro-sequences must be accompanied by a background process which sufficiently 
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justifies and legitimizes the sensegiving tools the sensegiver is using. In addition to 
describing these basic elements of the process theory of emotional sensegiving, I also 
theorized how the valence and intensity of the emotional arousal, time delays between 
different micro-phases, different combinations of emotions, perceptions of cognitive 
continuity, and sense-receivers’ mental models all influence how well emotional 
sensegiving will succeed. Each of these nuances, as well as the basic dynamics of the 
process theory of emotional sensegiving increased our understanding of how emotions 
are a central part of sensegiving. I envisioned a large research program that can 
examine the effects of each of these variables and also further expand the process 
theory of emotional sensegiving.  
In addition to increasing our understanding of sensegiving as a phenomenon, the 
process theory of emotional sensegiving has implications for the currently dominating 
theories. The current sensegiving theories assume that identity has a central role in 
sensegiving; most importantly, they basically argue that some sorts of identity threats 
are necessary for the success of sensegiving. I argued that identity threats may be 
instrumental because they generate emotional arousal, not due to their cognitive 
effects. I showed that there might be cases where such identity threats are not needed 
but sufficient results can be achieved by using identity-neutral emotional arousal. I 
described several research designs through which future research can further examine 
to what extent identity and emotional arousal views are alternative explanations and to 
what extent they complement each other.  
I was able to make my empirical findings because I used an analysis method that is 
new to sensegiving studies. Instead of relying on interviews and field notes that 
emphasize the content of words spoken at the expense of everything else, I relied on 
video recording. By capturing and analyzing video, I was able to better theorize what 
went on in the sensegiving instances at the emotional level. Mere words tend to 
overemphasize cognitions, meanings, and identities whereas video provides a more 
balanced representation of verbal and non-verbal communication. This alternative 
methodological approach seems promising and future research will hopefully further 
develop video-based analysis approaches for studying sensegiving. 
In sum, this dissertation has tried to incorporate emotions into our current 
understanding of sensegiving. I developed a process theory of emotional sensegiving 
and discussed its implications for our understanding of sensegiving as a phenomenon 
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and for the current identity-based sensegiving theories. I also discussed how video can 
be used to capture more non-verbal sensegiving dynamics than field notes and 
interviews do. These have been early steps in a research program that considers the 
ways managers and other actors can leverage emotions to increase the effectiveness of 
their sensegiving.  
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